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16
1.1  The influence of political embeddedness on corporate business
Political embeddedness of government in the economy exists worldwide. In his 
seminal research, Keynes (1936) contends that because the allocation of goods and 
services is not always efficient in a pure market economy, appropriate government 
intervention is essential. Since then, the relation between the government and the 
market has been one of the core issues of economics. In particular, the role of the 
government in emerging economies, which are often evolving from a centrally 
planned economy to a market-oriented economy, is widely debated in the economic 
literature (e.g., Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; Lee et al., 2014; Ma, 1995; Qian, 1994; 
Wang and Chang, 1998). Since the 1990s, scholars have directed increasing attention 
to the influence of government involvement in micro-economies (e.g., Boubakri and 
Cosset, 1998; Che and Qian, 1998; Lin et al., 1998; Xu and Wang, 1999) and examined 
both the “supporting hand” and the “grabbing hand” approaches (Frye and Shleifer, 
1997; Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). The supporting hand approach 
argues that the government provides its affiliated firms with more useful resources. 
This also applies to China, the focal country in this dissertation. There is ample 
support for the resource advantages of politically embedded firms in China. Due to 
the natural bond with the government, politically embedded firms are, for example, 
found to gain more financial support from the government through easier access to 
debt financing (Brandt and Li, 2003; Megginson et al., 1994; Wei and Varela, 2003), 
lower taxation (Claessens et al., 2008; Faccio, 2010; Goldman et al., 2013; Johnson and 
Mitton, 2003; Khwaja and Mian, 2005), preferential access to government contracts 
(Goldman et al., 2009; Innes, 1991; Wang et al., 2008b), benefits from regulatory pro-
tection (Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998), and political bailouts (Wang et al., 2008b; 
Yu, 2013). The grabbing hand approach portrays government-owned firms as entities 
controlled by the government/politicians that pursue their own social and political 
objectives at the sacrifice of firm value (Boycko et al., 1996; Dewenter and Malatesta, 
2001; Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Lin and Man-lai Wong, 2013; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994, 
1998; Vining and Boardman, 1992). In this perspective, political embeddedness 
influences and directs corporate policies in favor of protecting the political interests 
and realizing the personal goals of politicians while leading to distortions in the 
distribution of resources and low economic efficiency. Given the two streams of 
the arguments, it remains unclear how political embeddedness influences corporate 
financial policies and strategies, especially in settings such as emerging economies.
The existing literature has identified two main channels through which 
corporate policies and strategies could be influenced by government involvement: 
shareholding (ownership) by the government (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; 
Shleifer, 1998; Xu and Wang, 1999) and the political network connections of firms’ 
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management (Faccio, 2006; Fan et al., 2007; Wu et al., 2012b, 2012c).1 First, a firm’s 
shareholders, who function as the decisive authority of corporate affairs, could 
be the government. In this way, the government influences corporate affairs 
through government ownership. Second, even without ownership, the government 
could influence the management (i.e., the board of directors, the executives, and 
the supervisors) of a firm through political network connections. For example, a 
firm could be politically connected if one of its managers is or was a member of 
the political system. Government ownership and political connections are both 
important channels through which the government can influence corporate affairs 
and realize its social and political goals. Henceforth, in this dissertation, the term 
“political embeddedness” refers to the two channels of government influence 
(government ownership and political connections) together.
In addition, since different levels of the Chinese political system have different 
characteristics, and thus can have different effects on corporate affairs, it is also 
crucial to differentiate between the different levels of government ownership and 
political connections. In China, the relationship between the central and the local 
governments—including the provincial, municipal, county, and rural levels—is 
that of principal-agent (Xia and Fang, 2005). While the central government plays a 
role in governing the affairs of the entire country, the local governments are more 
like agents of the central government. Therefore, inter-regional competition among 
local governments is an important aspect of the economy (Lee et al., 2014). Due to 
their increasing decentralization, local governments have both the power and the 
incentive to intervene in corporate affairs to achieve their political objectives (Chen 
et al., 2011b; Lin et al., 1998), such as fiscal freedom (Jin et al., 2005) and political 
aspirations (Tu et al., 2013; Wang, 2015; Wu et al., 2012b). Chen et al. (2008), for 
example, found that the central government would require firms to provide high 
quality financial information; however, the local governments would assist the local 
firms to use earnings management with subsidies to whitewash the local firms’ 
financial performance and thereby achieve a higher political performance. The 
incongruence of the goals between the central and the local governments may have 
different effects on the corporate affairs of their affiliated firms. Therefore, the only 
way to fully understand how political embeddedness affects corporate strategies is 
by addressing the political embeddedness at both the local and the central levels of 
government (Chen et al., 2011b; Marquis and Qian, 2014).
1 Other channels exist through which the government might draw influences on corporate strategies, such as 
policy-making on macro levels. However, this dissertation focuses on government’s involvement in corporate 
affairs, which is mainly identified as government ownership and political connections by the existing literature. 
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1�2 Political embeddedness in the Chinese setting
Although political embeddedness is not unique to China, China is an extremely 
well-suited empirical setting for analyzing the effects of governmental involvement 
in the business strategies of politically embedded firms, as the Chinese market is 
characterized by both strong government intervention via state ownership and the 
pervasive existence of the political connections of firms (Gao, 2009; Lau et al., 2016; 
Marquis and Qian, 2014; Tian et al., 2011).
First, even after four decades of transformation from a centrally planned to a 
market-oriented economy, China’s economy is still characterized by strong govern-
mental control via government ownership (Lee et al., 2014; Xu and Zeng, 2016). The 
Chinese government remains the majority owner of the listed transformed firms 
(Wang et al., 2008b) and thus maintains de facto control of these firms (i.e., the 
ability to direct a company to act on the government’s behalf) through practices 
of intervention in corporate affairs (Allen et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2014). Although the 
listed private firms2 are growing in number and the private sector has fueled most 
of China’s economic growth in the last two decades (Allen et al., 2005), the firms 
listed as “state owned enterprises” (SOEs) remain an extremely large proportion 
of the capital market in China (Wei et al., 2005; Xu and Wang, 1999). Therefore, 
the government exerts direct influence on corporate policies and strategic choices 
through the ownership of Chinese SOEs.
Figures 1.1 and 1.23, respectively, report the provincial distribution of the number 
and proportion of government-owned firms listed in mainland China in 2015. In 
absolute numbers, more government-owned firms are listed in the economically 
competitive provinces and municipalities, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, 
Jiangsu, and Shandong. However, the proportion of government-owned firms in 
these regions is relatively low in comparison to the economically less-developed 
regions, such as Xinjiang, Gansu, Yunnan, and Guizhou. With more private firms 
in the developed than in the developing regions, this clearly shows a heterogeneous 
pattern of government embeddedness in the Chinese economy.
Second, as another dimension of political embeddedness, the political connec-
tions between corporate executives and the government or congress exist widely 
in both SOEs and non-SOEs (Faccio, 2006, 2010; Faccio et al., 2006; Fan et al., 2007; 
Li et al., 2008; Tu et al., 2013). There are numerous examples of companies in which 
corporate executives are also current or former local or central government officials 
or members of congress (Ma and Parish, 2006; Marquis and Qian, 2014). Such 
political connections are therefore extremely likely to function as indirect ties for 
2 In this dissertation, the term “private firms” refers to firms that are not government-owned.
3 The data contained in Figures 1.1-1.4 are calculated based on the data from China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database.
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the government to exert its political influence and pressure on corporate policies 
and strategic choices. 
Figure 1�1: The provincial distribution of the number of government-owned firms listed in 
mainland China in 2015
Figure 1�2: The provincial distribution of the proportion of government-owned firms listed in 
mainland China in 2015
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Figure 1�3: The provincial distribution of the number of politically-connected firms listed in 
mainland China in 2015
Figure 1�4: The provincial distribution of the proportion of politically-connected firms listed in 
mainland China in 2015
Figures 1.3 and 1.4, respectively, present the provincial distribution of the 
number and proportion of politically-connected firms listed in mainland China in 
2015. Similar to the situation with government-owned firms, the provinces alongside 
PSM 20180417 Proefschrift Zhi Wang.indd   20 17-05-18   16:30
Introduction
21
Ch
ap
te
r 1
the eastern coastline (Beijing, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, and 
Guangdong) have the largest number of firms with political connections, while 
the less-developed regions (such as Xinjiang, Tibet, Jiangxi, Guangxi, Jilin, and 
Liaoning) have high proportions of politically connected firms.
1.3  Corporate finance-related policy changes in China
After several decades of rapid development, China is currently ranked as the world’s 
second largest economy in terms of gross domestic product (World Bank, 2016). 
One of the most salient characteristics of the Chinese economy is its phenomenal 
increase in foreign direct investment (FDI), both inward and outward. On the 
one hand, China has been attracting an increasing number of investments from 
throughout the world. In 2010, China attracted USD 108.82 billion in inward foreign 
direct investment (IFDI), which rose to USD 131.04 billion in 2017 (China Ministry of 
Commerce, 2017). On the other hand, the Chinese outward foreign direct investment 
(OFDI) has also increased significantly, from USD 59 billion in 2010 to USD 120.08 
billion in 20174 (China Ministry of Commerce, 2017). The surging value of both the 
IFDI and the OFDI made China the world’s third largest investment attractor (after 
the USA and the UK) and the second largest foreign investor (after the USA) in 
2016 (UNCTAD, 2016). One of the most significant reasons behind these phenomena 
is that, in recent years, the Chinese government introduced and revised a series 
of policies to attract IFDI by optimizing the domestic investing environment and 
facilitating OFDI by broadening the outward investing channels (described in more 
detail below).
For foreign investors, it is imperative to know whether Chinese firms provide 
high-quality financial and non-financial information for economic decision-making. 
Disclosure of high-quality information can influence capital providers and other 
stakeholders positively when they are making investments and credit decisions 
and allocating resources that may enhance the overall capital market efficiency 
(e.g., Gao, 2003; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Kling and Weitzel, 2011; Weitzel and Berns, 
2006). Moreover, the quality of a firm’s financial and non-financial information 
can shape that firm’s economic and societal legitimacies, which ensures the firm a 
better position for attracting foreign investments. As a basic requirement of a firm’s 
economic legitimacy, the quality of its financial information builds the foundation 
for a firm to exist (Dechow et al., 2010) and allows it to attract capital at a low capital 
cost (Kim and Sohn, 2013). The quality of non-financial information, in other words, 
the quality with which and the extent to which a firm discloses corporate social 
4  The Chinese annual OFDI reached a peak of USD 170.11 billion in 2016 (China Ministry of Commerce, 2016).
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responsibility (CSR) information, provides a firm with societal legitimacy among all 
of its stakeholders (Gao, 2003; Marquis and Qian, 2014). To enhance the quality of firms’ 
financial and non-financial information, in recent years, the Chinese government 
has been issuing relevant policies and regulations. Regarding the former, to ensure 
the quality of financial information, for example, since 2006, the Chinese Ministry 
of Finance has issued and been continuously revising the Accounting Standards for 
Enterprises (the latest revision was in 2017). As to the latter, the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) and the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) have issued a series of policies to 
encourage firms to undertake CSR and issue CSR reports, which are indicators of 
the quality of the non-financial information. These include such as the Guidelines on 
Listed Companies Social Responsibility of Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2006, the Guiding 
Opinions on Fulfilling Social Responsibilities of Central Enterprises in 2008, and the 
Guidelines on Listed Companies Environmental Information Disclosure of Shanghai Stock 
Exchange in 2008.
In addition to the policy changes regarding corporate financial and non-
financial reporting for uplifting IFDI, recent Chinese policies have also been leaning 
toward facilitating OFDI. Among the most influential policies with regional and 
international impacts, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), referring to The Silk Road 
Economic Belt and the twenty-first century Maritime Silk Road, is a top development 
strategy with very important political and economic implications for both China 
and the involved countries. It was stipulated in the Vision and Action on Jointly 
Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, co-issued by 
the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission, the Chinese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, on March 28, 2015, 
and has been implemented gradually ever since. The Chinese enterprises, in 
particular, have adopted cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) as a major 
mechanism of OFDI (Hong and Sun, 2006; Zhang and Ebbers, 2010) and employed 
international listing as an important channel for raising capital to finance their 
international expansion, which is supported by the Chinese government’s policies 
under the framework of BRI. The Chinese State Council issued The Opinions on 
Further Optimizing the Market for Mergers and Restructuring in March 2014. This 
was followed by The Regulations for Major Assets Restructuring of Listed Companies 
and The Regulations for Mergers and Acquisitions of Listed Companies revised by the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in July 2014. Due to the improved 
administrative processes, transaction mechanisms, financial support, and payment 
methods, these new regulations have facilitated cross-border M&As (Weitzel and 
Berns, 2006). New accounting and taxation policies regarding M&A activities issued 
by both the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation of China, 
especially in January 2015, have made other means of financing easier.
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1�4 Overview and contributions
As mentioned above, in recent years, the Chinese government has issued and 
revised a series of policies directed toward improving corporate financial and non-
financial reporting and promoting cross-border M&As to facilitate FDI. However, 
since most of these policies are not obligatory, it is unclear whether they work 
effectively and efficiently. For example, the Accounting Standards for Enterprises 
contain only general guidelines for the quality of accounting information. There are 
no specific regulations to prevent firms from using earnings management (Chen et 
al., 2008; Liu and Lu, 2007), which can negatively impact the quality of the corporate 
financial reporting. This is because, with earnings management, firms can use 
certain accounting strategies to obscure their true economic performance (Chen and 
Dai, 2004). As another example, although the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) and the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) encouraged firms to undertake CSR and issue a 
CSR report, there are no policies or regulations with specific rules regarding how 
firms should disclose their CSR information (Chang et al., 2015; Kuo et al., 2012; Xu 
and Zeng, 2016). Particularly in the Chinese institutional environment, providing 
high quality reports of financial and non-financial information and conducting 
cross-border M&As are government-desired activities (e.g., Kling and Weitzel, 2011; 
Liu and Lu, 2007; Marquis and Qian, 2014; Xu and Zeng, 2016). Given the multiple 
objectives of political embeddedness, a firm’s government or political background 
could make a difference in interpreting these policies and implementing them in 
corporate practices. For instance, undertaking CSR might draw negative impacts on 
corporate financial performance. Because it has to balance between corporate and 
political interests, a politically embedded firm might face a dilemma in responding 
to the policy that firms are encouraged to undertake CSR (Marquis and Qian, 
2014). Therefore, although interesting to know, it is not yet clear whether and how 
Chinese firms with different political embeddedness would differ in reacting to 
such regulative signals. 
The above-mentioned examples represent the central theme and research question 
of the dissertation: How does political embeddedness influence firms’ reporting 
strategies and internationalization? This dissertation aims to identify whether and 
how political embeddedness (i.e., government ownership and political connections, 
both at the central and the local level) affects corporate reporting strategies, 
particularly in light of the recent policy changes regarding the financial and non-
financial reporting of firms in China. In addition, this dissertation investigates the 
effect of political embeddedness on Chinese firms’ internationalization strategies, 
which is particularly interesting considering the recent government programs that 
were introduced to facilitate Chinese IFDI and OFDI. To achieve this aim, Chapters 
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2-4 examine the influence of political embeddedness on firms’ use of earnings 
management, CSR reporting, and the propensity to internationalize, respectively.
1�4�1 Chapter 2
Chapter 2 examines whether and how different types and levels of political 
embeddedness influence the quality of financial reporting in China. This was 
accomplished by investigating how central and local levels of government ownership 
and political connections influence the choices of the earnings management 
strategies of the listed Chinese firms. Using a panel data set of 5,531 publicly traded 
firms in China, for the years 2009–2013, the results of Chapter 2 demonstrate that 
government-owned firms, and central government-owned firms in particular, are 
more likely to substitute accrual-based earnings management with costlier, albeit 
less detectable, real earnings management strategies than non-government-owned 
firms. The results of this chapter additionally indicate that, compared to firms 
without political connections, firms with political connections are more likely to 
resort to less detectable real earnings management strategies. Although to a lesser 
extent, these firms are also more likely to increase the use of accrual-based earnings 
management, indicating a relative substitution effect. The results indicate that, 
by affecting the trade-off between accrual-based and real earnings management 
strategies disparately, different types and levels of political embeddedness influence 
firms’ choices of earnings management strategies, and thus the earnings quality. 
In considering both accrual-based and real earnings management, Chapter 2 
primarily adds to the ongoing research related to the relationship between political 
embeddedness and financial information quality. Studies of this concern (Beneish, 
1997; Braam et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2008; Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008; Liu and Lu, 
2007; McNichols, 2000; Ramanna and Roychowdhury, 2010) have focused mainly on 
accrual-based earnings management and neglected the potentially more hazardous 
effects of real earnings management, which might lead to an underestimation of 
the total effects of earnings management. This chapter thus complements such 
literature by investigating the relationship between political embeddedness and 
the choices of both accrual-based and real earnings management strategies among 
China’s listed companies. It thereby provides additional understanding of how 
political embeddedness may affect the quality of financial reporting.
1�4�2 Chapter 3
By examining whether and how political embeddedness influences the diffusion 
of corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices in China, Chapter 3 reveals the 
relationship between political embeddedness and the quality of corporate non-
financial information. Specifically, this chapter investigates how government 
ownership and political connections influence the listed Chinese firms’ likelihood of 
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issuing CSR reports. It also examines the underlying CSR performance (CSRP) and 
its relationship with the firms’ financial performance (CFP). Using the panel data 
of 15,419 publicly traded firm-year observations in China for the years 2008–2014, 
the results of this chapter demonstrate that politically embedded firms, particularly 
firms that are centrally politically embedded, are more likely to issue CSR reports 
than firms without political embeddedness. The results of this chapter additionally 
indicate that politically embedded firms, on average, have a higher CSRP than non-
politically embedded firms. In addition, the results indicate that, for politically 
embedded firms, CSRP is more negatively related with financial performance than 
for firms without political embeddedness. This indicates that political embeddedness 
also affects the trade-off between CFP and CSRP. This chapter thus provides the first 
evidence not only on the effectiveness of government-induced CSR policies, but also 
on their efficiency (i.e., the potential opportunity costs that they imply). The results 
also demonstrate that different types and levels of political embeddedness play 
significant, albeit different, roles in explaining the CSR-related practices of firms. 
Chapter 3 adds to the organizational theory literature by analyzing how firms 
strategically react to government signals. Specifically, this chapter analyzes the 
potential opportunity costs that adhering to the governmental signals regarding 
CSR imply, thus shifting the focus from a pure analysis of the effectiveness of 
governmental CSR initiatives to a more efficiency-oriented perspective, which also 
considers how political embeddedness influences the relationship between CFP 
and CSRP. By examining the political drivers of the diffusion of firms’ CSR-related 
practices, Chapter 3 additionally complements the non-financial reporting literature 
that frequently focuses on the business and societal drivers of corporate social 
responsibility (Moon, 2004). 
1�4�3 Chapter 4
Cross-border M&As are a dominant form of FDI and linked closely to inter-
nationalization strategies (Kling et al., 2014; Shimizu et al., 2004). Since cross-border 
M&As are government-supported investment activities, it is important to identify 
the roles that political embeddedness play in influencing firms’ internationalization 
strategies with regard to the government’s relevant policy changes. Chapter 4 is 
dedicated to responding to this call and investigating whether and how political 
embeddedness influences firms’ propensity for conducting cross-border M&As and 
their success in China. I contend that institutional constraints, and consequential 
resource allocation and industry traits influence both politically embedded 
enterprises and firms without political embeddedness. Therefore, building on prior 
theories over international business, I developed a theoretical Chinese specific 
“strategy tripod” framework centered on an institution-based perspective and 
incorporating resource- and industry-based views. Using a panel data set with 
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30,314 firm-year observations of publicly traded firms in China from 2000 to 2015, 
the results demonstrate that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) conduct fewer cross-
border M&As than non-SOEs. Compared with non-SOEs, SOEs benefit less from 
M&A activities. The level of government ownership matters, in that central SOEs 
conduct more cross-border M&As and benefit more from M&A activities than local 
SOEs. The results additionally indicate that political connections do not play a 
significant role in explaining a firm’s propensity for conducting cross-border M&As 
or M&A success. The findings in Chapter 4 indicate that different types and levels of 
political embeddedness in China influence firms’ propensity for conducting cross-
border M&As and M&A success differently.
Chapter 4 primarily extends the international business literature by analyzing 
the institutional determinants of M&A success and the propensity of Chinese 
acquirers for going abroad. In this sense, this chapter extends Kling and Weitzel 
(2011) by demonstrating that a firm’s political embeddedness, especially local 
political embeddedness, has a negative impact on both the firm’s internationalization 
and on its M&A performance. This chapter also identifies government ownership 
as the main channel through which the government exerts influence on the 
internationalization strategy of firms.
1�4�4 Contributions
Alongside the specific contributions that each chapter makes to the literature (see 
above), this dissertation additionally provides more general contributions across all 
of the chapters. The literature on the effects of political embeddedness on corporate 
affairs examines either government ownership (Wei and Varela, 2003; Wei et al., 2005; 
Wu et al., 2012a; Xu and Wang, 1999) or the political connections of the executives 
(Fan et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008; Tu et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2012c). However, a singular 
focus on either government ownership or political connections underestimates the 
total impact of political embeddedness. Therefore, applying a more comprehensive 
measure of political embeddedness is one of the more general contributions of this 
dissertation. The studies in Chapters 2–4 add to the literature by using government 
ownership and political connections as proxies for the total political embeddedness 
of the firms. 
In addition, this dissertation considers different levels of political embeddedness. 
Since different levels of the Chinese political system have different characteristics, 
and can thus have different effects on corporate affairs, this is particularly useful in 
the Chinese context. For example, as I found in Chapter 2, firms with a local level of 
political embeddedness are more likely to resort to real earnings management than 
their peers with central political embeddedness. These firms are also less likely to 
issue CSR reports and undertake CSR (Chapter 3) and they have a lower tendency to 
internationalize and create value from M&As as well (Chapter 4). The differentiation 
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between the central and the local levels in both government ownership and political 
connections thus makes it possible to present a more fine-tuned picture of the 
mechanisms behind the effects of political embeddedness on corporate strategies.
Another contribution of this dissertation is that it provides empirical evidence for 
corporate finance-related research in an emerging market. Studies on the influential 
factors of earnings management strategies (Braam et al., 2015; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010; Dechow et al., 2010), CSR reporting strategies (Baldini et al., 2016; Braam et al., 
2016; Delmas and Toffel, 2004), and internationalization strategies (Bamiatzi et al., 
2015; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Kling et al., 2014) are conducted primarily in developed 
and mature markets. There has been little systematic evidence of firms using the 
two earnings management strategies as substitutes for their CSR practices or their 
internationalization activities in the context of emerging markets, such as China. 
Due to its special transitional phase and institutional background, China provides 
both an appropriate and a more interesting setting for investigating the influential 
factors of corporate strategies. Overall, the studies of this dissertation enrich the 
findings regarding the effects of political embeddedness on corporate strategies in 
emerging markets.
1�4�5 Policy relevance
The results of this dissertation have several important policy implications for 
accounting, CSR, and M&A practices. First, the findings suggest that new or 
revised policies should be tailored according to a firm’s political embeddedness. 
The conclusion that both government ownership and political connections play 
considerable but different incremental roles in explaining the variance in the 
choices of corporate financial strategies requires policy-makers to consider the 
influence of firm ties with the government and make tailored policies governing the 
micro-economy. Specifically, such policies should make a distinction between firms 
with and without government ownership and firms with and without political 
connections. This could be especially useful when certain government-induced 
policies are encouraging but not binding, such as CSR practices-related and M&A-
related policies in the Chinese setting. For example, Chapter 3 finds that firms 
without political embeddedness are less likely to issue CSR reports, and tend to have 
lower CSR performances than politically embedded firms. Accordingly, CSR-related 
policies should pay particular attention to firms without political embeddedness, 
and could add more stimuli to such firms for a better CSR practice.
Second, instead of describing general ideas, policies should be formulated 
and revised to be directed toward solving specific problems. Since the central and 
the local levels of political embeddedness draw different influences on corporate 
financial strategies, the effectiveness of policies could be enhanced if policy-makers 
take the levels of political embeddedness into consideration. Chapter 3, for instance, 
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shows that firms with central political embeddedness are more likely to issue 
CSR reports than firms with local political embeddedness. Therefore, CSR-related 
policies should target the local levels of politically embedded firms by stipulating 
tougher guidelines or offering stronger stimuli for the local firms. As shown in the 
findings in Chapter 2, the local level of political embeddedness plays considerably 
more roles in influencing the choices for earnings management strategies and 
thus draws deeper degrees of worsening effects on financial information quality. 
Therefore, when revising related regulations, such as the Accounting Standards for 
Enterprises, it would be better if policy-makers could recognize such negative effects 
and make different specifications for firms that have different levels of political 
embeddedness. In Chapter 4, I found that the negative effect of local government on 
firms’ propensity for conducting cross-border M&As as well as on M&A success is 
much stronger than that of the central government. By rectifying the general practice 
that all kinds of government ownership are treated uniformly and suggesting that 
the national governance in emerging economies should focus on the reformation 
of local government, this finding optimizes the orientation of the reformation for 
policy makers of developing countries such as China.
Third, policy makers should also direct attention to the potential policy costs 
alongside the policy benefits. For instance, on top of the indication that different 
types and levels of dependency on the government in China is an important driver 
of the diffusion of corporate CSR practices, the findings in Chapter 3 also emphasize 
the necessity of considering the policy-related opportunity costs. If the improvement 
of the CSRP and the number of firms that publish CSR reports comes at the cost 
of a significantly decreasing CFP, the net societal benefit may become negative, 
rendering the policy unfavorable. Therefore, how to minimize the opportunity 
cost that political embeddedness draws on the listed Chinese firms’ CSR practices 
should be listed on the policy-makers’ agenda.
Please note that the following chapters in this thesis include their own introduction and 
conclusion and are as such self-contained. However, the different appendices to these chapters 
are found at the very end of this thesis (but before the biography and Dutch summary). The 
reference list is presented after the final chapter.
PSM 20180417 Proefschrift Zhi Wang.indd   28 17-05-18   16:30
Introduction
29
Ch
ap
te
r 1
PSM 20180417 Proefschrift Zhi Wang.indd   29 17-05-18   16:30
PSM 20180417 Proefschrift Zhi Wang.indd   30 17-05-18   16:30
31
Chapter 2
Firms’ political embeddedness and the choice 
of earnings management strategies in China5
5 This chapter is based on a joint paper with Geert Braam, Daniel Reimsbach and Utz Weitzel, Firms’ Political 
Embeddedness and the Choice of Earnings Management Strategies in China. Current status: under review.
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2�1 Introduction
As the world’s largest emerging stock market, China has been playing an 
increasingly important role in the global economy (Chen et al., 2011b). For investors 
in the Chinese stock market, it is important to know whether Chinese listed 
firms provide high-quality financial information for economic decision making. 
Disclosure of high-quality information can positively influence capital providers 
and other stakeholders when they are making investments and credit decisions and 
allocating resources that may enhance overall capital market efficiency. However, an 
important structural aspect of the Chinese stock market, which distinguishes it from 
its Western peers, is the political embeddedness of many companies (Lee et al., 2014). 
Political embeddedness refers to firms that have strong government ties, either via 
state ownership or via political network connections (Chen et al, 2011; Marquis and 
Qian, 2014). Although many Chinese firms have been transformed from government 
entities to publicly traded companies, both dimensions of political embeddedness 
are likely to continue to influence these firm’s corporate policies. The government 
often remains the majority shareholder, and thus maintains ownership (Wang et 
al., 2008b). Via de facto control of these firms (i.e., the ability to direct a company to 
act on the government’s behalf), the government can directly influence corporate 
policies (Chen et al., 2011b; Wu et al., 2012a). Furthermore, due to the appointment 
of top executives by the government, and the executives’ pursuit of positions in the 
political system, extensive political connections between the government and the 
senior management of large firms are still very common, which is likely to influence 
Chinese politically connected firms’ corporate policies indirectly. However, it is 
unclear how and to what extent this political embeddedness affects the quality of 
corporate financial reporting in China (Fan et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2014; Li et al., 2008; 
Wu et al., 2012b).
An important indicator of corporate financial reporting quality is the extent to 
which firms use so-called earnings management strategies to obscure the firms’ true 
economic performance. Firms can use multiple earnings management strategies 
to manage their earnings, most importantly accrual-based and real earnings 
management (Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos, 2017; Badertscher, 2011; Braam 
et al., 2015). Accrual-based earnings management occurs when managers choose 
accounting policies from a set of generally accepted policies to achieve earnings 
objectives (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). When using real earnings management, 
however, companies deviate from normal business practices by altering the 
timing or structuring of real business transactions to meet or beat earnings 
targets (Roychowdhury, 2006). Unlike accrual-based earnings management, real 
earnings management has direct cash flow consequences (Alhadab et al., 2015), 
as well as potential economic consequences for a firm’s long-term value (Gunny, 
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2010). Therefore, real earnings management strategies are considered costly (Ipino 
and Parbonetti, 2017) and more difficult to detect than accrual-based earnings 
management (Alhadab et al., 2015; Badertscher, 2011; Graham et al., 2005; Gunny, 
2010). For a comprehensive understanding of firms’ choices of earnings management, 
both dimensions need to be included at the same time because evidence shows that 
firms use the two earnings management strategies as substitutes (Badertscher, 
2011; Braam et al., 2015; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012). 
Therefore, this study considers both dimensions of earnings management as 
well as potential substitution effects when investigating the influence of political 
embeddedness on the choice of earnings management strategies, and thus corporate 
financial reporting quality.
Using a panel data set of 5,531 publicly traded firms in China from 2009 to 
2013, our results indicate that government-owned firms, especially firms owned 
by the central government, are more likely to substitute costly but less detectable 
real activities manipulation for accrual-based earnings management than non-
government-owned firms, after controlling for other incentives for earnings mana-
gement. The results also indicate that the trade-off between real and accrual-based 
earnings management strategies differs between firms with and without political 
connections. Compared to non-connected firms, firms with political connections 
are more likely to use real earnings management strategies. However, these firms 
are also more likely to increase the use of accrual-based earnings management, 
although to a lesser extent than real earnings management, indicating a relative 
substitution. Collectively, the results indicate that political embeddedness is 
negatively related to Chinese listed firms’ earnings quality, and thus, the quality of 
financial reporting. However, different types and levels of political embeddedness 
play different incremental roles in explaining the variance in the choices for earnings 
management strategies.
By addressing the two dimensions of both political embeddedness and earnings 
management simultaneously, this study contributes to the related literature in several 
ways. First, current studies of the relationship between political embeddedness and 
earnings management have mostly focused on only one aspect of both concepts. 
Ramanna and Roychowdhury (2010), for example, examine the influence of political 
connections on accrual-based earnings management using data from US firms but 
neglect the influence of government ownership, as well as the potentially more 
hazardous consequences of real earnings management. Chen et al. (2008), on the 
other hand, address the effects of government ownership (via subsidies) on earnings 
management but in turn do not include political connections into their analysis and 
they do not differentiate between real and accrual-based earnings management 
strategies. Braam et al. (2015), finally, incorporate both dimensions of earnings 
management, but they focus solely on the influence of political connections and 
again do not account for government ownership. 
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Second, the few studies that incorporate both dimensions of political 
embeddedness do not at all address the issues of financial reporting quality in 
general and earnings management in particular (Chen et al., 2011b; Marquis and 
Qian, 2014). Overall, no studies exist that address both dimensions of both concepts 
simultaneously. A singular focus on either government ownership or political con-
nec tions underestimates the total effects of political embeddedness on corporate 
financial reporting behavior, and solely addressing either accrual-based or real 
earnings management neglects the potential hazardous consequences of the other 
type of earnings management. Studying the different dimensions of political 
embeddedness and earnings management in parallel will contribute to a better 
understanding of the relationship between political embeddedness and firms’ 
choices of earnings management strategies, and to more robust conclusions. 
Third, the substitution effect between accrual-based and real earnings mana-
gement has mainly been investigated in the context of developed markets 
(Badertscher, 2011; Braam et al., 2015; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Zang, 2012). Little systematic evidence of firms’ using the two earnings management 
strategies as substitutes exists in the context of emerging markets, such as China.
Taking all these aspects into account, this study analyzes how the two dimen-
sions of political embeddedness affect listed firms’ choices of the two earnings 
management strategies and their potential substitution, using the Chinese setting.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we present a review 
of the related literature and develop hypotheses. Next, we describe the research 
method and then present the results. Finally, we discuss and provide conclusions 
regarding the results and indicate directions for further research.
2�2 Literature review and hypotheses
Firms can utilize multiple earnings management strategies, that is, accrual-based 
and real earnings management, to manage their earnings (Anagnostopoulou and 
Tsekrekos, 2017; Badertscher, 2011; Braam et al., 2015; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Dechow et al., 2010; Zang, 2012). Accrual-based earnings management occurs when 
managers aim to obscure true economic performance by changing accounting 
methods or estimates within the generally accepted accounting principles (Dechow 
and Skinner, 2000). In contrast, real earnings management occurs when managers 
undertake actions that adapt the timing or structuring of real operations and that 
deviate from normal business practices, such as manipulating sales, reducing 
discretionary expenditures, and overproducing inventories to decrease the costs 
of goods sold, with the primary objective of meeting or beating certain earnings 
thresholds (Roychowdhury, 2006). Real activities manipulation and accrual-based 
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earnings management are both costly (Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos, 2017; Zang, 
2012). However, real earnings management, as a departure from optimal operational 
decisions (Zang, 2012), is, in general, considered costlier than accrual-based earnings 
management (Graham et al., 2005; Ipino and Parbonetti, 2017; Kim and Sohn, 2013). 
Unlike accrual-based earnings management, real earnings management has direct 
cash flow consequences (Alhadab et al., 2015), which may also have detrimental 
economic impacts on firms’ long-term value (Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012). In contrast, 
real earnings management is more difficult to detect than accrual-based earnings 
management (Alhadab et al., 2015; Graham et al., 2005), because real activities 
manipulation is usually not under the jurisdiction of any existing auditing system, 
and is less subject to extensive controls and external monitoring by society, including 
scrutiny by the media, government and political parties (Braam et al., 2015; Kim and 
Sohn, 2013; Roychowdhury, 2006).
Darrough and Rangan (2005) argue that the greatest effect of accrual-based and 
real earnings management would be attained through the coordinated use of both 
tools. Managers of firms are aware of the rewards of meeting or beating earnings 
targets, which motivates the managers to choose among the alternative earnings 
management strategies (Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos, 2017; Bartov et al., 2002). 
In situations in which both earnings management methods can be utilized, managers 
are thus likely to trade off between the two earnings management strategies based 
on their relative costs and benefits (Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005; Zang, 2012).
However, a firm’s political embeddedness may influence this cost-benefit 
analysis and thus, the likelihood of trading off between the two strategies. For 
government-owned firms, the detection of low-quality reporting is very costly. 
In China, government-owned firms are meant to be symbols of the economy’s 
reliability and stability. Their reputation, which is directly related to the image of 
the Chinese government itself, is supposed to be positive and affirmative. Earnings 
management detection might damage a firm’s reputation, as well as the public image 
of the corresponding government. In addition, government-owned firms have more 
resources to deal with the risks inherently involved in the use of real earnings 
management. Due to the ownership ties with the government, these firms have 
better access to valuable resources through the government’s political and financial 
support (Brandt and Li, 2003; Li and Zhou, 2005; Qian, 1994; Wu et al., 2012c).6 For 
these reasons, the opportunity cost of using accrual-based earnings management is 
higher than that of using real earnings management for government-owned firms. 
Thus, government-owned firms should be more inclined to utilize real earnings 
6 For example, they get easier access to debt financing and lower taxation (Claessens et al., 2008; Faccio, 2010; 
Goldman et al., 2013; Johnson & Mitton, 2003; Khwaja & Mian, 2005), have preferential access to government 
contracts (Goldman et al., 2009), or obtain benefits from regulatory protection (Kroszner & Stratmann, 1998).
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management strategies which is less likely to be detected (Chaney et al., 2011; Braam 
et al., 2015; Faccio, 2006; Faccio et al., 2006). 
Overall, we thus expect that for government-owned firms in China the marginal 
benefits of using real earnings management strategies are likely to outweigh the 
marginal costs. Real earnings management strategies help these firms to mask 
political favors from the government and offer the firms a relative advantage of high 
opacity with a lower likelihood of detection (Chaney et al., 2011; Faccio, 2006; Faccio 
et al., 2006). The cost-benefit structure of trading off real for accrual-based earnings 
management is thus different from that of non-government-owned firms. Therefore, 
we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1a: Government-owned firms are more likely to substitute real 
earnings management for accrual-based earnings management than non-gov-
ernment-owned firms.
However, in China, the regulatory environment for firms owned by the central 
government differs from that for firms owned by local governments (Wang et al., 
2008b). Central government–owned firms are subjected to more effective regulation 
and strict supervision by supervisory and regulatory institutions, such as the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
(SASAC) and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), because of 
the firms’ crucial roles in the Chinese economy (Chen et al., 2004; Sun et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, to maintain the central government’s positive reputation, firms owned 
by the central government are more likely to choose higher-quality auditors (Wang 
et al., 2008b). Therefore, detection of low-quality reporting may damage not only 
the reputation of the firms owned by the central government and their managers 
but also that of the central government. In addition, the resource endowment and 
market status of central and local government–owned firms are different (Wang et 
al., 2008b; Wu et al., 2012a). Although local and central government–owned firms 
operate in the same industry, firms owned by the central government are usually 
leading conglomerates in the market with their larger control power of resources 
and support from the central government (Chen et al., 2004; Sun et al., 2002; Wang 
et al., 2008b). Such privileges enable centrally government-owned firms to better 
deal with the risks inherently involved in the use of real earnings management. 
For these reasons, the incentives for central government–owned firms to trade off 
real for accrual-based earnings management should be stronger than those for local 
government–owned firms. Thus, we hypothesize:
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Hypothesis 1b: The effect of substituting real earnings management for accru-
al-based earnings management is stronger for firms owned by the central gov-
ernment than for firms owned by local governments.
In addition to government ownership, extensive political connections between 
the government and companies’ senior management are common in China. There 
are many examples in which corporate executives are local or central government 
officials themselves (Ma and Parish, 2006; Marquis and Qian, 2014). These political 
connections may also influence firms’ choices of earnings management strategies 
and thus affect the earnings quality (Braam et al., 2015; Chaney et al., 2011) because 
politically connected managers have strong incentives and opportunities to 
pursue financial benefits and to achieve political and personal objectives, such as 
promotion and increased remuneration (Li and Zhou, 2005; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1994). Politically connected firms may thus, for example, try to hide or obscure 
the gains that the firms typically derive from their connections, because detection 
may damage the firms’ reputation, as well as the social image of the connected 
political party or politician (Chaney et al., 2011; Faccio, 2006; Faccio et al., 2006). In 
addition, detection may result in opportunity costs when a firm loses its privileged 
access to the benefits of political connections (Burton et al., 2011; Hay and Shleifer, 
1998). Furthermore, as politically connected firms derive benefits from political 
connections, such as easier access to bank loans (Boubakri et al., 2008; Khwaja and 
Mian, 2005; Li et al., 2008), favorable regulatory treatment (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
2000) and bailouts (Faccio et al., 2006), these firms are more capable of dealing with 
operational risks caused by using real earnings management. Taken together with 
the lower likelihood of detection, real earnings management strategies thus are also 
more attractive to politically connected firms. Therefore, we expect these firms to 
trade off real for accrual-based earnings management as well. Picking up on our 
previous arguments, the incentives to trade off real for accrual-based earnings 
management should again be stronger for firms with political connections to the 
central government than for firms with political connections to a local government. 
Therefore, we offer the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: Firms with political connections are more likely to substitute 
real earnings management for accrual-based earnings management than firms 
without political connections.
Hypothesis 2b: The effect of substituting real earnings management for accru-
al-based earnings management is stronger for firms with central political con-
nections than for firms with local political connections.
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2�3 Research method
2�3�1 Sample selection and descriptive statistics
To test the hypotheses, we used data for the Main Board A share public listed 
companies (PLCs) of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for 2009–2013. 
Consistent with Xia and Fang (2005), we excluded listed firms that had B shares 
or H shares. These firms are regulated by Chinese mainland and overseas (or 
Hong Kong) laws and regulations, which could bias the results. We also excluded 
financial companies and firms for which it was not clear who ultimately has de facto 
control. For inclusion in our sample, we required that all financial and non-financial 
information was available. This information was extracted from the Datastream and 
CSMAR databases, which contain historical financial data from the annual reports of 
Chinese listed companies. Data on government ownership were manually collected 
from annual reports of the companies selected. The CSRC requires listed companies 
disclose specific information on their de facto control in the firms’ annual reports. 
To collect data on political connections, the resumes of directors, supervisors, and 
managers (DSMs) were examined.
After we omitted missing observations, the remaining unbalanced panel data 
set includes 5,531 firm-year observations for 2009–2013. Table 2.1 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the sample firms. Panel A shows the yearly distribution of 
the sample firms across industries. Panels B, C, and D present the distribution of 
the firm’s government ownership and political connections across years, industries, 
and regions.
2�3�2 Variables
2.3.2.1 Measurement of real and accrual-based earnings management
The dependent variables are proxies for real and accrual-based earnings 
management.7 Following previous literature (Braam et al., 2015; Cohen et al., 2008; 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012), we 
used abnormal levels of cash flows from operations (RM_CFO), abnormal levels 
of production costs (RM_PROD), and abnormal levels of discretionary expenses 
(RM_DISX) as proxies for real earnings management.8 To calculate the proxies for 
real earnings management, consistent with previous research (Cohen and Zarowin, 
7 Unfortunately, due to copyright issues, the calculated values of real and accrual-based earnings management 
of each firm-year observation cannot be shared. However, all transformed data and computations used for the 
analyses are available on request by the authors.
8 Abnormal levels of cash flows from operations (RM_CFO) are a result of the acceleration of the timing of sales 
through increased price discounts or more lenient credit terms. Abnormal levels of production costs (RM_
PROD) occur through overproduction of inventory, resulting in a lower fixed cost per unit sold and a reduction 
of cost of goods sold. Abnormal levels of discretionary expenses (RM_DISX) are generated as a result of cutting 
discretionary expenses, such as advertising, research and development, and administrative (SG&A) expenses.
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2010; Dechow et al., 1995; Dechow et al., 1998; Roychowdhury, 2006), for each metric, 
we first used the following cross-sectional regression analysis and estimated 
parameters that allow calculation of the normal levels of cash flows from operations, 
production costs, and discretionary expenses, using the following equations: 
where CFOit is the net cash receipts and disbursements resulting from the operations 
of firm i in year t; ASSETSit–1 is the total assets of firm i at the end of year t–1; SALESit 
is the net sales of firm i in year t; ∆SALESit is the change in net sales from year 
t–1 to t of firm i; PRODit is the cost of goods sold by firm i in year t; and DISXit is 
discretionary expenses, computed as the sum of selling, general, and administrative 
expenses (SG&A) and research and development (R&D) expenses. Given sales 
levels, firms that engage in real earnings management exhibit one or more of the 
following characteristics: abnormally low cash flows from operations, abnormally 
high production costs, and/or abnormally low discretionary expenses. 
Second, consistent with Roychowdhury (2006), the differences between the actual 
levels and the estimated normal levels, that is, the residuals, were considered the 
abnormal levels of cash flows from operations, production costs, and discretionary 
expenses.
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To capture the aggregate effects of real earnings management, consistent 
with Braam et al. (2015), Cohen et al. (2008), Cohen and Zarowin (2010), Ipino and 
Parbonetti (2017) and Zang (2012), we combined the three individual real earnings 
management measures to compute three comprehensive metrics of real activities 
manipulation. For the first measure, we multiplied the standardized variables of 
abnormal cash flows from operations (RM_CFO) and abnormal discretionary 
expenses (RM_DISX) by negative one (so that the higher the amounts, the more 
likely it is that the firm is engaged in sales manipulation and cutting discretionary 
expenses) and then aggregated them into one measure (RM_CD). For the second 
measure, we added the standardized variable of abnormal discretionary expenses 
multiplied by negative one to the standardized variable of abnormal production 
costs (RM_PROD). The higher this aggregate measure (RM_PD), the more likely the 
firm is engaged in cutting discretionary expenses and production manipulation. For 
the third measure, we computed the sum of the standardized variables of abnormal 
cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses, multiplied by 
negative one, and the standardized variable of abnormal production costs (RM_
CPD). The higher this aggregate measure, the more likely the firm is engaged in real 
activities manipulation.
Following previous literature, we used two estimations of discretionary 
accruals to proxy accrual-based earnings management by using the cross-sectional 
Jones model (Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Dechow et al., 1995; Ipino 
and Parbonetti, 2017) and cash-flow-adjusted model (Ball and Shivakumar’s, 2006; 
Bruynseels and Cardinaels, 2014), as follows: 
where TAit is the total accruals of firm i in year t, measured by the earnings before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations minus the cash flows from 
operations (Hribar and Collins, 2002); PPEit is the net value of property, plant and 
equipment of firm i in year t; AVAit is the average total assets for firm i in year t and 
t–1; DCFOit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the cash flow from operations is 
negative, and 0 otherwise. Consistent with Cohen et al. (2008), the absolute values 
of the residuals serve as the proxies for accrual-based earnings management. We 
use the absolute value, because it also captures accrual reversals following earnings 
management. Next, following Braam et al. (2015), we computed a composite metric 
of accrual-based earnings management as the sum of the standardized variables of 
the two individual measures of accrual-based earnings management, divided by 
two. 
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Finally, as a proxy of substitution, we calculated the RM-AM ratio, computed 
as RM_CD, RM_PD and RM_CPD divided by AM. In addition, and consistent 
with Braam et al. (2015), we developed composite measures to assess a firm’s 
use of diametrically opposing combinations of accrual-based and real earnings 
management strategies, which could be an indication of a substitution of real 
earnings management for accrual-based earnings management. AMLowRMHigh is a 
dummy coded 1 if the value of RM_CPD firm i in year t is above the industry-year 
median9 and AM below the industry median, and 0 otherwise, indicating firms that 
choose a high level of real earnings management (RMHigh) combined with low levels 
of accrual-based earnings management (AMLow). Similarly, AMHighRMLow is a dummy 
that indicates firms with high levels of accrual-based earnings management and low 
levels of real earnings management. AMHighRMHigh and AMLowRMLow indicate firms 
with high/low levels of accrual-based earnings management and real earnings 
management.
To remove the problem of extreme outliers in some continuous variables, we 
winsorized all earnings management variables at the 1% and 99% percentile of their 
distribution to “avoid extreme observations due to noisy estimation” (Zang, 2012: 
p.689). Table 2.2, which summarizes the definitions of the dependent, independent, 
and control variables employed in our analyses, describes the calculations of the 
comprehensive metrics used to proxy real and accrual-based earnings management.
Table 2�2: Variable definitions
Variables Definition
AM_MJ Proxy of accrual-based earnings management estimated by discretionary accruals using 
the Modified Jones Model (Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Dechow et al., 
1995).
AM_BS Proxy of accrual-based earnings management estimated by discretionary accruals using 
the Ball and Shivakumar Model (2006), which controls for the asymmetric timeliness of 
accruals in recognizing economic gain and loss (Ball and Shivakumar, 2006; Bruynseels 
and Cardinaels, 2014).
AM Composite measurement of accrual-based earnings management, computed as the sum of 
the standardized absolute value of discretionary accruals computed using the Modified 
Jones Model (AM_MJ) and the standardized absolute value of discretionary accruals 
computed using the cash-flow-adjusted model of Ball and Shivakumar (AM_BS), divided 
by two.
RM_CFO (R) The reversed level of abnormal cash flows from operations.
9 A practical justification for the use of this cut-off point is that it splits the sample into two groups of equal 
size. This grouping eliminates potential small sample and selection biases that may occur when, for example, 
the average is used as a cut-off point. In the robustness section, we also use alternative cut-off points to check 
whether the cut-off at the median may have driven our results; that is, we repeat the analyses using the top 25% 
and 10% of the sample. The results of the additional tests show that segmentation of firms with and without 
earnings management at different levels do not change the results qualitatively, suggesting that the results are 
robust to different cut-off levels.
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Variables Definition
RM_PROD The level of abnormal production costs, where production costs are defined as the sum of 
the cost of goods sold.
RM_DISX (R) The reversed level of abnormal discretionary expenses, where discretionary expenses are 
the sum of R&D expenses and SG&A expenses.
RM_CD Comprehensive metric of real activities’ manipulation, computed as the natural loga-
rithm of the sum of the standardized variables of RM_CFO and RM_DISX multiplied by 
negative one, divided by two.
RM_PD Comprehensive metric of real activities’ manipulation, computed as the natural loga-
rithm of the sum of the standardized variable of RM_PROD and the standardized varia-
ble of RM_DISX multiplied by negative one, divided by two.
RM_CPD Comprehensive metric of real activities’ manipulation, computed as the natural loga-
rithm of the sum of the standardized variable of RM_PROD and the standardized varia-
bles of RM_CFO and RM_DISX multiplied by negative one, divided by three.
RM/AM RM-AM ratio, computed as RM_CD, RM_PD and RM_CPD respectively divided by AM.
AMLOWRMHIGH AM and RM combination dummy. The value is 1 if AM is lower than the industrial 
median and RM is higher than the industrial median.
AMHIGHRMLOW AM and RM combination dummy. The value is 1 if AM is higher than the industrial 
median and RM is lower than the industrial median.
AMHIGHRMHIGH AM and RM combination dummy. The value is 1 if AM is higher than the industrial 
median and RM is higher than the industrial median.
AMLOWRMLOW AM and RM combination dummy. The value is 1 if AM is lower than the industrial 
median and RM is lower than the industrial median.
GOV Government ownership dummy. The value is 1 if the ultimate owner of a firm is the gov-
ernment; 0 otherwise. The government has ultimate ownership if it holds the most shares 
directly and indirectly.
NONGOV Non-government ownership dummy. The value is 1 if the ultimate owner of a firm is not 
the government; 0 otherwise.
LOCGOV Local government ownership dummy. The value is 1 if the ultimate owner of a firm 
is local government; 0 if the ultimate owner of a firm is the central government or a 
non-government entity or a natural person.
PC Political connection dummy. The value is 1 if one of a firm’s directors, supervisors or 
top officers is or was: 1) a government official or 2) a representative of National People’s 
Congress (NPC) or 3) a member of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC); 0 otherwise.
NONPC Non-political connection dummy. The value is 1 if a firm has no political connection; 0 
otherwise.
LOCPC Local political connection dummy. The value is 1 if a firm has local political connection; 0 
if a firm has central political connection or no political connection.
SIZE Firm scale, computed as the natural logarithm of total assets.
AGE Duration from IPO to the sample year.
LEV Leverage ratio, computed as total liabilities divided by total assets.
LIQ Liquidity ratio, computed as current assets divided by current liabilities.
GO Growth opportunity, measured as the sales revenue growth rate.
ROE Return on equity, computed as net income divided by shareholders’ equity.
Table 2�2: Continuation
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Variables Definition
PUNISH Punishment exposure, measured as the number of punishments for corporate misdeeds, 
including illegal purchase of stock, fictitious profit, false equity, unauthorized use of 
funds, deferred disclosure, false statement, funding violation, material omissions, occu-
pation of assets by large shareholders, share price manipulation, fraudulent listing, illegal 
guarantee and illegal speculation. The promulgators include China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) and Stock Exchanges.
MTB Market to book value, computed as the market value divided by the book value of total 
assets.
FCF Enterprise free cash flow, computed as net profit + interest expenses + non-cash expenses 
- addition of working capital - capital expenditure.
INDDR Independent directors, computed as the proportion of independent directors on board.
CON Ownership concentration, computed as the Herfindahl Index (HHI) of the first ten share-
holdings.
2.3.2.2 Independent variables
To measure government ownership, we created a dummy variable government 
ownership (GOV), which takes the value of 1 if the government directly and 
indirectly—through pyramid structures—holds most of the company shares, and 0 
otherwise (Wang et al., 2008b; Xia and Fang, 2005).
To assess political connections, consistent with previous research (Chen et 
al., 2011a; Li et al., 2008; Wu and Liu, 2011; Wu et al., 2012b, 2012c), we created a 
dummy PC, which takes the value of 1 if a firm is identified as being politically 
connected, and 0 otherwise. Consistent with Faccio (2006), a company is defined as 
politically connected if at least one of its directors, supervisors, or top officers (CEO, 
president, vice-president, chairman, or secretary) is or was (1) a government official, 
or (2) a representative of the National People’s Congress (NPC), or (3) a member of 
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).10 The connected 
directors, supervisors, and managers can be central or local officials or members of 
the Conference.
To measure the levels of political embeddedness, we differentiate companies 
with central, local, or no political embeddedness. Next, using the central level as 
the reference group, we created dummies for the local level and firms that are 
not politically embedded. The dummy LOCGOV takes a value of 1 if the de facto 
owner of a firm is a local government, and 0 otherwise. The dummy NONGOV 
takes a value of 1 if the de facto owner of a firm is not the government, and 0 if the 
government is the de facto owner. To create the dummies LOCPC and NONPC, we 
used a similar approach.
10 The NPC and CPPCC are the two most important political councils in China, collectively known as ‘Lianghui’. 
According to the Chinese Constitution, the NPC is the national legislature and the highest authority in China; 
The CPPCC functions mainly in political consultation, democratic supervision and participation in politics.
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Panels A–D in Table 2.1 present descriptive statistics of the distribution of 
government ownership and political connections for 2009–2013. Panel A shows 
the distribution of all observations across years and industries. Panel B shows the 
yearly distribution of de facto controllers’ identity and political connections for 
2009–2013. Government ownership remained stable, but the number of firms with 
political connections increased substantially. Panel C presents the distribution of 
government ownership and political connections across industrial sectors. The 
government, on central and local level, owns a high number of firms in key sectors, 
such as industry and public utilities, while the government controls fewer firms 
in non-strategic sectors, such as real estate and commercials. Panel D reports the 
distribution of government ownership and political connections across Chinese 
regions. In terms of proportion, government-owned firms are more numerous in the 
northern, northwestern, and central regions of China. In contrast with government 
ownership, political connections do not show considerable differences across 
industrial sectors or regions.
Table 2�3: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
RM_CFO (R) 5,531 0.005 0.031 0.672 -2.609 1.953
RM_PROD 5,531 0.009 0.157 0.925 -3.567 1.924
RM_DISX (R) 5,531 0.01 0.166 0.873 -3.994 1.816
RM_CD 5,531 2.302 2.312 0.059 1.902 2.471
RM_PD 5,531 2.3 2.320 0.089 1.828 2.474
RM_CPD 5,531 2.301 2.314 0.069 1.889 2.469
AM_MJ 5,531 0.385 0.213 0.496 0 2.713
AM_BS 5,531 0.484 0.286 0.586 0 3.047
AM 5,530 0.435 0.262 0.501 0 2.880
GOV 5,531 0.658 1 0.474 0 1
PC 5,531 0.621 1 0.485 0 1
SIZE 5,518 7.548 7.705 1.517 2.89 10.818
AGE 5,531 12.749 13.266 4.336 0.504 20.778
LEV 5,530 0.553 0.544 0.266 0.078 1.994
LIQ 5,476 1.604 1.267 1.351 0.124 9.07
GO 5,452 0.274 0.107 1.003 -0.779 7.767
ROE 5,531 0.066 0.073 0.206 -1.161 0.666
PUNISH 5,531 0.095 0 0.293 0 1
MTB 5,350 3.757 2.644 4.987 -10.695 36.016
FCF 5,530 -0.004 0.011 0.119 -0.565 0.269
INDDR 5,507 0.368 0.333 0.053 0.3 0.571
CON 5,530 0.171 0.132 0.133 0.001 0.8
Notes: The letter R in brackets indicates reversed scores. See Table 2.2 for variable definitions.
PSM 20180417 Proefschrift Zhi Wang.indd   46 17-05-18   16:30
Firms’ political embeddedness and the choice of earnings management strategies in China
47
Ch
ap
te
r 2
Ta
bl
e 2
�4:
 C
or
re
lat
io
n 
m
at
rix
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
R
M
_C
FO
 (R
)
1
R
M
_P
R
O
D
0.5
4*
1
R
M
_D
IS
X
 (R
)
0.0
7*
0.6
4*
1
R
M
_C
D
0.6
4*
0.8
1*
0.8
1*
1
R
M
_P
D
0.3
3*
0.9
0*
0.9
0*
0.8
9*
1
R
M
_C
P
D
0.6
2*
0.9
4*
0.7
8*
0.9
6*
0.9
5*
1
A
M
_M
J
0.0
7*
0.0
5*
-0
.04
*
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
2
1
A
M
_B
S
0.0
5*
0.0
2
-0
.06
*
-0
.03
-0
.03
-0
.01
0.7
1*
1
AM
-0
.01
-0
.00
-0
.01
-0
.02
-0
.01
-0
.01
0.0
7*
0.0
6*
1
GO
V
0.0
3
0.0
6*
0.0
4*
0.0
5*
0.0
5*
0.0
6*
-0
.10
*
-0
.11
*
-0
.01
1
PC
0.0
0
0.0
6*
0.0
6*
0.0
5*
0.0
6*
0.0
5*
-0
.03
0.0
0
-0
.02
0.0
4*
1
SI
ZE
-0
.07
*
-0
.10
*
-0
.09
*
-0
.11
*
-0
.10
*
-0
.11
*
-0
.27
*
-0
.24
*
-0
.06
*
0.2
6*
0.1
5*
1
AG
E
0.0
4*
0.0
2
-0
.01
0.0
1
0.0
0
0.0
1
0.1
1*
0.1
1*
0.0
4*
0.0
3
0.0
8*
-0
.20
*
1
LE
V
0.1
3*
0.2
0*
0.0
6*
0.1
2*
0.1
4*
0.1
6*
0.1
7*
0.1
6*
0.0
1
-0
.02
0.0
2
-0
.03
0.1
1*
1
LI
Q
-0
.05
*
-0
.09
*
-0
.04
*
-0
.06
*
-0
.07
*
-0
.08
*
-0
.03
-0
.02
-0
.01
-0
.12
*
-0
.02
-0
.19
*
-0
.07
*
-0
.55
*
1
GO
-0
.03
-0
.02
0.0
0
-0
.02
-0
.02
-0
.03
0.0
5*
0.0
6*
0.0
1
-0
.06
*
0.0
0
-0
.08
*
0.0
5*
0.0
4*
0.0
0
1
RO
E
-0
.22
*
-0
.26
*
-0
.03
-0
.15
*
-0
.16
*
-0
.21
*
-0
.14
*
-0
.16
*
0.0
1
-0
.01
0.0
0
0.1
0*
-0
.06
*
-0
.13
*
0.0
9*
0.1
5*
1
P
U
N
IS
H
-0
.01
0.0
0
-0
.02
-0
.02
-0
.01
-0
.01
0.0
5*
0.0
4*
0.0
1
-0
.09
*
0.0
5*
-0
.08
*
0.0
8*
0.0
6*
-0
.03
-0
.01
-0
.04
*
1
M
TB
-0
.04
*
-0
.08
*
-0
.05
*
-0
.07
*
-0
.07
*
-0
.08
*
0.1
3*
0.1
1*
0.0
1
-0
.10
*
-0
.06
*
-0
.23
*
0.0
5*
-0
.05
*
0.0
1
0.0
9*
-0
.20
*
0.0
5*
1
FC
F
-0
.04
*
-0
.05
*
0.0
3
0.0
0
-0
.01
-0
.02
-0
.10
*
-0
.12
*
-0
.00
0.0
4*
0.0
2
0.1
3*
-0
.01
-0
.04
*
-0
.14
*
-0
.08
*
0.1
2*
-0
.04
*
-0
.10
*
1
IN
DD
R
-0
.01
0.0
1
0.0
3
0.0
1
0.0
1
0.0
1
0.0
3
0.0
3
0.0
4*
-0
.04
*
-0
.01
-0
.03
-0
.01
0.0
1
0.0
2
0.0
0
-0
.02
0.0
0
0.0
1
-0
.01
1
CO
N
-0
.10
*
-0
.03
0.0
7*
0.0
0
0.0
2
-0
.01
-0
.12
*
-0
.08
*
-0
.01
0.2
1*
0.0
5*
0.2
4*
-0
.22
*
-0
.04
*
0.0
2
0.0
7*
0.1
5*
-0
.08
*
-0
.09
*
0.0
6*
0.0
5*
1
N
ot
es
: 
T
h
e 
le
tt
er
 R
 in
 b
ra
ck
et
s 
in
d
ic
at
es
 r
ev
er
se
d
 s
co
re
s.
 *
 I
n
d
ic
at
es
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
al
 s
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
 a
t 1
%
 le
ve
l. 
Se
e 
Ta
bl
e 
2.
2 
fo
r 
va
ri
ab
le
 d
efi
n
it
io
n
s.
PSM 20180417 Proefschrift Zhi Wang.indd   47 17-05-18   16:30
Chapter 2
48
2.3.2.3 Control variables
Consistent with previous literature (Braam et al., 2015; Li and Zhou, 2005; Wang 
et al., 2008b; Wu et al., 2012b, 2012c), we included the following control variables: 
company scale (SIZE), duration since initial public offering (AGE), leverage ratio 
(LEV), liquidity of assets (LIQ), growth opportunity (GO), profit indicators (ROE), 
punishment exposure (PUNISH), market-to-book value (MTB), enterprise free 
cash flow (FCF), proportion of independent directors on the board (INDDR), 
and ownership concentration (CON). We also included year-dummies to control 
for omitted variables that vary over time but are constant among the firms, and 
industry-dummies to control for sector-specific effects. Table 2.3 reports summary 
statistics for the dependent, independent, and control variables employed in the 
analyses.
2�3�3 Method
Because we have repeated measurements at the firm level that are nested within 
provinces, we used multilevel (panel) data regression analyses to test the hypotheses. 
Multilevel analysis is an appropriate method to include explanatory variables 
at different levels simultaneously and to study interactions among these levels 
(Dong and Stettler, 2011). In this multilevel analysis, random effects at provincial 
level are controlled for differences between the provinces, such as corruption and 
economic development, whereas random effects at firm level are controlled for 
omitted variables that vary over time but are constant among the firms. To test the 
hypotheses, we used the following general multilevel regression model:
where the dependent variable EMsubstitution is a proxy for the substitution of real 
earnings management for accrual-based earnings management. The dependent, 
independent, and control variables of Equation (6) were described above and in 
Table 2.2. 
Equation (6) tests whether substitution of real earnings management for accruals-
based earning management generally takes place. However, to address the fact that 
it is difficult to infer the level at which the substitution takes place, as a robustness 
check, we also analyzed whether politically embedded firms (i) are more likely to 
use combinations of high levels of real earnings management strategies and low 
levels of accrual-based earnings management strategies and (ii) are less likely to 
use combinations of low levels of real earnings management strategies and high 
levels of accrual-based earnings management strategies than non-connected firms. 
Therefore, we defined another econometric specification, which estimates a firm’s 
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likelihood for using diametrically opposing combinations of high and low levels of 
real and accrual-based earnings management strategies (as dependent variables):
Equation (7) is identical to Equation (6) with the exception of the dependent 
variable(s). For estimation methods, we used multilevel logistic regressions for 
Equation (7).
In addition, the assumptions underlying the regressions were tested for 
multicollinearity based on Pearson correlations and the variance inflation factors. 
Table 2.4 reports the Pearson pair-wise correlations between all variables in the 
main tests. The correlations between the proxies for real earnings management 
and our comprehensive real earnings management proxies indicate that they 
overall are based on the same underlying construct. The variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) were smaller than 2 for each of the independent variables, which indicated 
that multicollinearity is not an issue. In addition, in an analysis of the residuals, 
normality and homoscedasticity were not rejected.
2�4 Results
Panel A in Table 2.5 reports the results of the regression analyses for the hypothesized 
relationships between political embeddedness and the substitution between 
different earnings management strategies in China. 
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Table 2�5: Effects of political embeddedness on earnings management substitution
Panel A: Effects of political embeddedness
RM_CD/AM RM_PD/AM RM_CPD/AM
Model (1) (2) (3)
GOV 0.469** 0.856*** 0.668***
(2.47) (2.97) (3.14)
PC 0.528*** 1.019*** 0.682***
(2.80) (3.55) (3.22)
SIZE -0.264*** -0.452*** -0.317***
(-3.85) (-4.33) (-4.11)
LEV 2.457*** 3.782*** 3.157***
(5.51) (5.58) (6.30)
LIQ 0.043 -0.006 0.053
(0.53) (-0.05) (0.58)
GO 0.020 0.041 0.073
(0.22) (0.30) (0.72)
ROE -2.370*** -3.292*** -3.365***
(-5.05) (-4.61) (-6.39)
AGE -0.017 -0.040 -0.020
(-0.79) (-1.22) (-0.82)
PUNISH -0.075 -0.069 -0.067
(-0.26) (-0.16) (-0.20)
MTB -0.074*** -0.118*** -0.096***
(-4.03) (-4.25) (-4.66)
FCF -1.127 -1.902 -1.478*
(-1.47) (-1.63) (-1.72)
INDDR 2.111 2.762 2.173
(1.33) (1.14) (1.22)
CON 1.445** 2.696** 1.420*
(2.08) (2.56) (1.83)
Industry dummies Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y
Random province effects Y Y Y
Random firm effects Y Y Y
Intercept -0.191 0.112 -0.331
(-0.20) (0.08) (-0.32)
N 5251 5251 5251
Wald-chi2 139.652*** 149.385*** 186.168***
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively (two-tailed), z-values are 
below the regression coefficients in parentheses. Individual coefficients of the industry dummies, year dummies, and 
random province and firm effects are not reported for parsimony. See Table 2.2 for variable definitions.
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Panel B: Effects of levels of political embeddedness
RM_CD/AM RM_PD/AM RM_CPD/AM
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
LOCGOV -0.683*** -1.196*** -0.927***
(-3.03) (-3.49) (-3.66)
NONGOV -0.961*** -1.726*** -1.336***
(-3.91) (-4.61) (-4.83)
LOCPC -0.141 -0.153 -0.084
(-0.65) (-0.47) (-0.35)
NONPC -0.604*** -1.103*** -0.736***
(-2.83) (-3.40) (-3.08)
SIZE -0.280*** -0.475*** -0.334***
(-4.06) (-4.52) (-4.31)
LEV 2.422*** 3.716*** 3.105***
(5.42) (5.47) (6.19)
LIQ 0.027 -0.032 0.032
(0.33) (-0.26) (0.35)
GO 0.022 0.044 0.076
(0.24) (0.32) (0.75)
ROE -2.346*** -3.244*** -3.324***
(-5.00) (-4.54) (-6.31)
AGE -0.015 -0.038 -0.017
(-0.70) (-1.16) (-0.70)
PUNISH -0.062 -0.046 -0.046
(-0.21) (-0.10) (-0.14)
MTB -0.075*** -0.119*** -0.097***
(-4.07) (-4.27) (-4.70)
FCF -1.125 -1.896 -1.475*
(-1.47) (-1.63) (-1.72)
INDDR 2.125 2.806 2.201
(1.34) (1.16) (1.24)
CON 1.469** 2.772*** 1.470*
(2.11) (2.62) (1.88)
Industry dummies Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y
Random province effects Y Y Y
Random firm effects Y Y Y
Intercept 1.468 3.064** 1.827*
(1.49) (2.04) (1.65)
N 5251 5251 5251
Wald-chi2 150.401*** 162.753*** 200.923***
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively (two-tailed), z-values are 
below the regression coefficients in parentheses. Individual coefficients of the industry dummies, year dummies, and 
random province and firm effects are not reported for parsimony. See Table 2.2 for variable definitions.
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The results for Models 1–3 in Panel A show positive and statistically significant 
associations between government ownership and the ratios of real and accrual-
based earnings management strategies for all composite measurements, after 
controlling for other incentives for earnings management substitution. These results 
provide support for H1a, indicating that government-owned firms are more likely 
to substitute relatively costlier and less detectable real earnings management for 
accrual-based earnings management than non-government-owned firms. Moreover, 
these findings show that these results are qualitatively robust to the different 
measures of real earnings management. 
Table 2.6 reports the results of the multilevel logistic regressions using the 
combinations of high and low, real and accrual-based earnings management 
strategies as dependent variables. The results for Model 1 shown in Table 2.6 show 
statistically significant positive coefficients for government ownership. These 
coefficients reflect the log of the odds ratio between government ownership and 
no government ownership, controlling for the other factors specified in the models. 
This odds ratio indicates the change in odds that government-owned firms use 
combinations of relatively high levels of real earnings management strategies 
and low levels of accrual-based earnings management strategies compared to 
non-government-owned firms, everything else held constant. The statistically 
significant association for Model 1 shown in Table 2.6 indicates that government-
owned firms are more likely to use combinations of relatively high levels of real 
earnings management and low levels of accrual-based earnings management than 
non-government-owned firms. Moreover, Model 2 shows that government-owned 
firms are statistically significantly less likely to use combinations of relatively low 
real earnings management strategies and high accrual-based earnings management 
strategies, after controlling for other differences in earnings management incentives. 
Together, these results provide additional support for H1a. 
Panel A in Table 2.5 also shows the results for the tests of H2a, which 
predicted that firms with political connections would be more likely to substitute 
real earnings management for accrual-based earnings management than firms 
without political connections. The statistically significant and positive results 
shown in Panel A support this notion. However, at the same time, the results in 
Table 2.6 also show a statistically significantly positive relationship between 
firms with political connections and the combination of AMhigh and RMhigh, and 
a statistically significantly negative association with AMlow and RMlow, indicating 
that politically connected firms use both earnings management strategies more 
than non-politically connected firms. Compared with non-politically connected 
firms, politically connected firms thus make a different trade-off between real and 
accrual-based management strategies. Specifically, compared with firms without 
political connections, politically connected firms are more likely to resort to less 
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detectable real earnings management strategies, but at the same time, these firms 
also use relatively more accrual-based earnings management. However, the relative 
increase in the use of real earnings management is greater than that of accrual-based 
earnings management. Collectively, the results thus indicate a relative substitution 
effect.11
Panel B in Table 2.5 shows the results for the tests of H1b and H2b, which 
collectively predicted that, in China, the substitution effect between real and 
accrual-based earnings management would be stronger for firms that are centrally 
politically embedded compared to firms that are locally politically embedded. 
The negative and statistically significant results for LOCGOV indicate that central 
government–owned firms are more likely to substitute real earnings management 
for accrual-based earnings management than local government–owned firms. 
These results provide support for H1b. However, the negative yet non-statistically 
significant results for LOCPC do not provide support for the expectation that the 
substitution effect will be stronger for firms with central political connections than 
for firms connected to local governments. Thus, the results do not support H2b.
11 To address the fact that the effect of the government ownership on firms’ choices of earnings management 
strategies may differ depending on the existence of political connections and vice versa, we also estimated 
models including both the direct effects of government ownership and political connections and their interaction. 
The results of the additional tests (reported in Tables A.1 and A.2) did not show significant interaction effects, 
indicating no combined effects of government ownership and political connections on the substitution between 
different earnings management strategies for the Chinese listed firms. These findings suggest that the effects 
of the two dimensions of political embeddedness on earnings management substitution do not reinforce each 
other.
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Table 2�6: Effects of political embeddedness on earnings management substitution dummies
AMLOWRMHIGH AMLOWRMHIGH AMLOWRMHIGH AMLOWRMHIGH
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
GOV 0.203*** -0.222*** 0.103 -0.010
(2.61) (-2.91) (1.36) (-0.13)
PC 0.033 -0.078 0.336*** -0.275***
(0.43) (-1.04) (4.39) (-3.66)
SIZE -0.055** 0.131*** -0.284*** 0.277***
(-2.06) (4.61) (-10.40) (9.29)
LEV 0.552*** -0.751*** 0.642*** -1.757***
(3.26) (-3.67) (3.78) (-7.85)
LIQ 0.015 -0.066* -0.003 -0.034
(0.48) (-1.95) (-0.11) (-1.02)
GO -0.015 0.029 0.047 -0.154***
(-0.39) (0.86) (1.32) (-3.47)
ROE -0.931*** 2.059*** -1.909*** 2.519***
(-5.01) (8.81) (-10.01) (9.01)
AGE -0.010 0.017** 0.010 -0.008
(-1.19) (1.98) (1.09) (-0.92)
PUNISH 0.039 0.207* -0.105 -0.151
(0.33) (1.83) (-0.91) (-1.21)
MTB -0.059*** 0.062*** -0.021*** 0.014
(-6.79) (7.98) (-2.88) (1.37)
FCF -0.590** -0.518* 0.761** 0.289
(-1.99) (-1.68) (2.52) (0.88)
INDDR 2.164*** -0.495 -0.024 -2.128***
(3.58) (-0.77) (-0.04) (-3.24)
CON 0.973*** -0.441 -0.083 -0.696**
(3.62) (-1.58) (-0.29) (-2.48)
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
Random province effects Y Y Y Y
Random firm effects Y Y Y Y
Intercept -1.632*** -2.162*** 0.489 -1.211***
(-4.39) (-5.67) (1.30) (-3.16)
N 5271 5271 5271 5271
Wald-chi2 176.007*** 211.421*** 308.894*** 288.109***
Notes: In this table, the dependent variables are built with RM_CPD. Additional tests of this method with dependent 
variables built with RM_CD and RM_PD are demonstrated in Table A.3 and A.4 respectively. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively (two-tailed), z-values are below the regression 
coefficients in parentheses. Individual coefficients of the industry dummies, year dummies, and random province 
and firm effects are not reported for parsimony. See Table 2.2 for variable definitions.
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2�5 Discussion and Conclusion
This study investigated how political embeddedness affects Chinese listed firms’ 
choices for earnings management strategies. By using government ownership and 
political connections as measures of political embeddedness and multiple proxies for 
real and accrual-based earnings management, we show that government ownership 
and political connections play considerable but different roles in explaining the 
variance in the choices for earnings management strategies. The results indicate that 
government-owned firms, especially central government–owned firms, are more 
likely to substitute costly but less detectable real activities manipulation for accrual-
based earnings management than non-government-owned firms. This finding is in 
line with the different cost-benefit structures of trading off real for accrual-based 
earnings management for government-owned and non-government-owned firms. 
Given the higher secrecy and potential to protect the firm’s reputation, the marginal 
benefits of the use of real earnings management strategies obviously outweigh the 
marginal costs for government-owned firms, especially those owned by the central 
government. 
The results also indicate that the trade-off between real and accrual-based 
manage ment strategies differs between firms with and without political connections. 
Compared with firms without political connections, firms with political connections 
are more likely to resort to less detectable real earnings management strategies, but 
at the same time, firms with political connections also use more accrual-based ear-
nings management. However, given that the relative increase in the use of real 
earnings management is greater than that of accrual-based earnings management, 
we speak of a relative substitution effect for politically connected firms. A potential 
explanation for this finding could be that, as indicated in previous literature (Li et 
al., 2008; Wu et al., 2012c), one of the most important criteria for the promotion of 
politically connected managers is corporate performance, which makes the multiple 
goals of politically connected managers (i.e., corporate, political and personal goals) 
interdependent. In this sense, corporate financial performance in the shorter term is 
more important for politically connected managers because it is closely related to 
their political careers (Li and Zhou, 2005). Thus, politically connected managers 
have strong incentives to pursue financial benefits to achieve political and personal 
objectives, such as promotion (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Although real earnings 
management is the first option for politically connected managers, accrual-based 
earnings management might also be adopted to achieve the expected level of 
corporate performance. In addition, political connections can be considered a 
protection mechanism that decreases the likelihood that outsiders will take 
disciplinary actions against the firm (Chaney et al., 2011; Li et al., 2008), which leaves 
room for politically connected managers to use relatively more accrual-based 
earnings management.
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However, we do not find support for the hypothesis (H2b) that the substitution 
effect is stronger for firms with political connections to the central government 
than for locally connected firms. A potential explanation might be that due to fierce 
competition and institutional pressure, locally politically connected managers face 
more intense political, operational, and personal goal risks. The fast expansion of 
the Chinese economy is creating a competitive environment for listed firms, and 
innovation is needed more than ever. The marginal institutional benefits that 
politically connected firms get from the government could not cover the marginal 
costs of the lack of market competitiveness. Thus, corporate financial performance 
would be even more important when evaluating managers’ operational success, 
which offers locally connected managers stronger incentives than ever to whitewash 
performances and use earnings management strategies. For this purpose, real 
earnings management is a better option because, as previously discussed, detec-
tion, which would jeopardize the managers’ political career and personal goals, is 
costlier. Thus, locally connected managers could resort to real earnings management 
more and have a stronger relative substitution effect for accrual-based earnings 
management. Consequently, the substitution effect of locally connected firms 
becomes almost as strong as that of firms connected to the central government.
Collectively, the findings suggest that government ownership and political 
connections, as well as their different levels, play different incremental roles in 
explaining the variance in the earnings management strategy chosen. These results 
have several important implications for accounting practices and research related 
to earnings management. First, the results are likely to be helpful for external capi-
tal providers and other stakeholders in assessing the pervasiveness of earnings 
management and the overall integrity of the financial reporting of Chinese listed 
firms. Second, the finding that political embeddedness affects firms’ choices of real 
and accrual-based earnings management strategies has important implications for 
research. In research settings where accrual-based and real earnings management 
strategies are likely to be used to achieve earnings targets, variation in earnings 
management cannot be fully captured by studying only accrual-based earnings 
management (Kim and Sohn, 2013). If firms trade off between different earnings 
management strategies, studying only the former could underestimate the earnings 
management activities of political embeddedness. Third, the results also imply that 
different types and levels of political embeddedness play considerable but different 
incremental roles in explaining the variance in the choices for earnings management 
strategies. In other words, the results suggest that central political embeddedness, 
especially government ownership, have stronger effects on the substitution between 
different earnings management strategies.
The results of this study have to be considered in relation to several limitations. 
Two limitations are related to the proxies of earnings management and political 
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embeddedness. Regarding the former, we considered only one aspect of earnings 
manipulation, the level of accrual-based and real earnings management. However, 
we did not examine the relationship between political embeddedness and other 
aspects of earnings management, such as timeliness, value relevance, and earnings 
conservatism (Dechow et al., 2010). Regarding our proxies of political embeddedness, 
we examine variation in earnings management strategies given the existence of 
government ownership and political connections. The underlying assumption in 
the empirical part is that all politically embedded firms are uniformly associated 
with choices for accrual-based and real earnings management strategies. However, 
the degree of political influence might differ among different firms. Moreover, the 
benefits from political connections should be expected to differ for a member of 
parliament or a minister in the government. Consequently, different types of political 
connections, in addition to the differentiation of local or central connections, may 
have different effects on firms’ choices of earnings management strategies. 
Further research is needed for a more detailed measurement of the degree of 
political influence on different firms. Further research could also compare and 
contrast the different effects of political embeddedness on earnings quality in the 
financial reports of public and private firms in China, and Chinese versus Western 
settings. Overall, more research is needed for an improved understanding of the 
influence of political embeddedness on financial reporting quality in different 
national and international contexts. This would help to identify critical factors that 
affect the choices of firms and their managers for different earnings management 
strategies.
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Chapter 3
Political embeddedness and the diffusion of corporate 
social responsibility practices in China: A trade-off 
between financial and CSR performance?12
12 This chapter is based on a joint paper with Daniel Reimsbach and Geert Braam, Political embeddedness and the 
diffusion of corporate social responsibility practices in China: A trade-off between financial and CSR performance?. 
Current status: under review.
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3�1 Introduction
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is increasingly becoming a worldwide 
phenomenon. However, as Moon (2004) pointed out, “it remains contextual not only 
in terms of its corporate environment but also in terms of its national environment.” 
Accordingly, the salience of CSR varies across countries and time periods (Steurer, 
2010). Although CSR has been a well-established concept in developed economies 
for decades, it has more recently entered the business and political agenda in many 
emerging economies, such as China. As the world’s largest emerging stock market, 
China has been playing an increasingly important role in the global economy (Chen 
et al., 2011b). As part of the Chinese government’s political agenda, the government 
promotes CSR as a desired activity.13 In a context like this, CSR is mainly a government-
induced phenomenon. Steurer (2010) called for research on the effectiveness of 
government-induced CSR policies but also the opportunity costs that these policies 
imply. We answer this call by analyzing how Chinese listed firms make strategic 
CSR choices in response to government signals. Specifically, we investigate whether 
and how these signals may drive firms’ initial decision to issue a CSR report, as well 
as the underlying CSR performance (CSRP) and a potential trade-off with corporate 
financial performance (CFP), representing opportunity costs. 
However, government signals and pressures may not drive firms unitarily toward 
CSR; instead, firms may respond differently due to different types of dependency 
on the government (Post et al., 2002). A very important aspect of the Chinese 
stock market, which distinguishes it from its Western peers, is the pervasiveness 
of political embeddedness in many companies (Lee et al., 2014). Although many 
Chinese firms have been transformed from government entities into publicly traded 
companies, the government often remains the majority shareholder, maintaining 
ownership and control of these firms (Guthrie, 2012; Sun et al., 2002). Furthermore, 
extensive political connections between the government and/or the congress and 
a firm’s senior management are still very common (Tu et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2012c). 
The strategic reactions of such politically embedded firms might differ from firms 
without political embeddedness because the embedded firms are subject to stronger 
government pressure and have to maintain their political legitimacy. Therefore, this 
study specifically addresses the relationship between government ownership and 
political connections and companies’ strategic CSR choices. 
Using panel data from 15,419 publicly traded firm-year observations in China 
for the years 2008–2014, the results show that politically embedded firms, and in 
particular firms that are centrally politically embedded, are more likely to issue CSR 
13 In this paper, the term CSR is used in a broad sense, and includes real activities and investments that shape a 
firm’s CSR performance, as well as the disclosure of this performance in designated corporate reports.
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reports than firms without political embeddedness. The results also indicate that 
politically embedded firms, on average, have a higher CSRP than non-politically 
embedded firms. Finally, the results show that CSRP is more negatively related to 
CFP for politically embedded firms than for firms without political embeddedness. 
This result indicates that political embeddedness also affects the trade-off between 
corporate financial performance and CSR performance.
This paper contributes to the ongoing research related to political embeddedness 
and CSR in several ways. First, we complement the non-financial reporting litera-
ture that often focuses on the business and societal drivers of corporate social 
responsibility (Liu and Anbumozhi, 2009; Moon, 2004; Shi et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 
2008) by focusing on the role of governments as drivers of the diffusion of firms’ CSR-
related practices. This research provides the first evidence of both the effectiveness of 
government-induced CSR policies in China and the potential opportunity costs that 
the policies imply: the tradeoff with financial performance. Second, we contribute 
to the literature on the effects of political network connections. Recent studies 
about the effects of political embeddedness on corporate policies or strategies have 
focused on either government ownership (Chen et al., 2008; Xu and Wang, 1999) 
or political connections (Tu et el., 2013; Wu et al., 2012c). However, a singular focus 
on either government ownership or political connections underestimates the total 
effects of political embeddedness. Our study complements this network literature 
by applying a more comprehensive measure of political embeddedness, using 
government ownership and political connections as proxies for firms’ total political 
embeddedness. In addition, we consider in more depth different levels of political 
embeddedness. We differentiate between the central and local government levels 
in firm ownership and senior managers’ political connections which allows us to 
present a more fine-tuned picture of the mechanisms behind the effects of political 
embeddedness. Third, we also contribute to the organizational theory literature by 
analyzing how firms strategically react to government signals. Most importantly, we 
add to the work of Marquis and Qian (2014), who show that government signaling 
is an important mechanism of political influence (also see Geng et al., 2010) and that 
different types of dependency on the government expose firms to different types of 
legitimacy pressure. In this paper, we analyze the potential opportunity costs that 
adhering to government signals regarding CSR imply. Thus, we shift the focus from 
a pure analysis of the effectiveness of government CSR initiatives to an efficiency-
oriented perspective, which also takes into account how political embeddedness 
influences the relationship between CFP and CSRP.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we present a review 
of related literature and develop hypotheses. Next, we describe our research method 
and then present the results of our analyses. Finally, we provide conclusions and 
discuss limitations, as well as potential directions for future research.
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3�2 Background and hypotheses
Politically embedded firms are firms that have strong government ties, either via 
state ownership or via network connections (Marquis and Qian, 2014). On one hand, 
politically embedded firms may have better access to government resources, but on 
the other, these firms are probably highly monitored and thus, are more likely to 
adhere to government signals.
China is a very good example of an institutional setting with politically 
embedded firms (Lau et al., 2016; Marquis and Qian, 2014). Although the country 
has moved significantly toward a more market-oriented system over the last few 
decades, China’s economy is still characterized by strong government control 
(Lee et al., 2014; Xu and Zeng, 2016). Although many Chinese firms have been 
transformed from government entities into publicly traded companies, often the 
government is still the majority shareholder and thus maintains ownership and 
de facto control of these firms, i.e., the ability to direct a company to act on the 
government’s behalf (Guthrie, 2012; Sun et al., 2002). Furthermore, extensive political 
connections between the government and firms’ senior management are still very 
common (Tu et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2012c). There are many examples of companies 
in which corporate executives are also local or central government officials (Ma and 
Parish, 2006; Marquis and Qian, 2014). There is also ample support for the supposed 
resource advantage of politically embedded firms in China. Due to the natural bond 
with the government, politically embedded firms are, for example, found to gain 
more financial support from the government via easier access to debt financing and 
lower taxation (Claessens et al., 2008; Faccio, 2010; Goldman et al., 2013; Johnson and 
Mitton, 2003; Khwaja and Mian, 2005), to have preferential access to government 
contracts (Goldman et al., 2009), or to obtain benefits from regulatory protection 
(Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998). Overall, China is a very well-suited empirical 
setting to analyze the effects of government signals on politically embedded firms’ 
strategic choices.
A very topical example of such a government signal is the promotion of CSR 
and sustainable business conduct. Although the discussion about CSR has a long 
history in Western countries, it is more recent in emerging economies, such as 
China. While the first years after the economic reform were geared toward growth 
“at all costs” (Marquis and Qian, 2014, p.129), today a shift in China’s economic 
development can be observed which also acknowledges the need to address the 
social and environmental effects of business activities (See, 2009). Accordingly, there 
is ample proof that the Chinese government signals that CSR is a desired activity 
(Geng et al., 2010; Marquis et al., 2011; Marquis and Qian, 2014; See, 2009). This is, 
for example, documented by Communist Party Committee statements that promote 
“social responsibility amongst citizens, enterprises and all kinds of organizations” 
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(Sino-Swedish CSR Cooperation, 2009). As a consequence, state-controlled 
institutions, such as the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, issued guidelines 
and recommendations for CSR reporting (Lin, 2010), and the Chinese government 
developed its own specific reporting standard for Chinese companies (Geng et al., 
2010; Marquis and Qian, 2014). Overall, in China the government can be considered 
an important driver of CSR (Liu and Anbumozhi, 2009; Xu and Zeng, 2016; Zhang 
et al., 2008).
Against this background, the question arises whether a firm’s political embedd-
edness affects the firm’s CSR practices, most importantly, the initial decision to 
issue a CSR report, but also the firm’s CSRP, as well as the relation between CFP 
and CSRP. Determinants of CSR reporting seemed to be one of the first areas of 
interest in the related scholarly research. Consequentially, a plethora of studies have 
analyzed the likelihood of engaging in CSR reporting (for an overview, see Braam et 
al., 2016; Hahn and Kühnen, 2013; Liu and Anbumozhi, 2009). One of the prominent 
anchors in this discussion is legitimacy theory. The premise of legitimacy theory is 
that companies do not have an inherent right to exist; instead, society grants them 
a “license to operate” (Deegan, 2002). Thus, companies need to have legitimacy to 
access the necessary resources to successfully conduct business. A specific aspect 
among different levels of legitimacy is political legitimacy, which Marquis and Qian 
(2014, p.127) define as “the extent to which the government views the firm’s actions 
as being in accordance with norms and laws.” In a context where the government 
signals that CSR (reporting) is a desired activity, political legitimacy can be achieved 
by adhering to this signal and publishing a CSR report. 
Marquis and Qian (2014) argue that politically embedded firms have political 
legitimacy per se and thus, have less incentive to adhere to the government signal and 
publish a CSR report than non-politically embedded firms. However, this argument 
contradicts a control-oriented perspective, which suggests that regulatory pressure 
from the government can significantly shape politically embedded firms’ behavior 
toward CSR (Huang and Kung, 2010; Zhao, 2012). This argument is particularly true 
in China where politically embedded firms are often used as pioneers in adhering 
to the government’s signals and implementing the encouraged policy (Zeng et 
al., 2012). The control-oriented perspective applies to both dimensions of political 
embeddedness. The government can directly shape firms’ CSR practices via (majority) 
ownership. Consistently, Amran and Haniffa (2011), Gallo and Jones Christensen 
(2011), and Tagesson et al. (2009) find initial empirical evidence for a positive relation 
between government ownership and CSR disclosure in different institutional and 
regional settings. In addition, the government can indirectly shape firms’ CSR 
practices via politically connected executives. By taking actions in accordance with 
government policies, such as issuing CSR reports, politically connected executives 
maintain their legitimacy in the eyes of the government (Marquis and Qian, 2014) 
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and thus, also ensure their future political careers (Patten and Trompeter, 2003). 
Agency theory explains these actions by suggesting that executives may act in 
their own best interests, and in cases of conflicting interests, also at the expense of 
the firm’s owners and other stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Given the 
theoretical background outlined above, the peculiarities of the Chinese setting, and 
the empirical evidence from other settings, we differ from Marquis and Qian’s (2014) 
approach and focus on the control- and agency-oriented perspectives expecting that 
politically embedded firms are more likely to issue a CSR report than firms without 
political embeddedness: 
Hypothesis 1: Politically embedded firms are more likely to issue a CSR report 
than firms without political embeddedness.
Political embeddedness, however, is likely to influence not only the decision to 
issue a CSR report but also the decision to invest in CSR activities that shape the 
CSRP a firm can present in its report. In the current Chinese setting, in line with 
the Chinese ideology of building a harmonious society (See, 2009), the government 
has strong incentives to divert wealth to obtain societal welfare (Bai et al., 2006; 
Shi et al., 2008) via, for example, infrastructure development and resolution of the 
region’s fiscal and unemployment challenges (Li and Zhang, 2010), and to overcome 
environmental problems, for instance, caused by climate change and pollution (Xu 
and Zeng, 2016; Zeng et al., 2012). Accordingly, it is in the government’s interest 
that firms pursue non-financial objectives related to the official government policy 
(Wei and Varela, 2003; Xia and Fang, 2005). Therefore, it can be expected that the 
Chinese government exerts pressure on firms to pursue CSR activities and invest 
in CSR (Cho and Patten, 2007; Darrell and Schwartz, 1997; Patten and Trompeter, 
2003; See, 2009). Government-owned firms play a key role in this context, as they 
are often used as role models and pioneers in implementing government policies. 
Government-owned firms, therefore, receive even stronger pressure to invest in 
CSR activities, especially in a context where they are also urged to publicly report 
on their CSR achievements (Xu and Zeng, 2016). In addition, previous research has 
shown that slack resources can significantly affect firms’ CSR activities (Marquis 
and Qian, 2014; Seifert et al., 2004; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Wang et al., 2008a). 
In China, government-owned firms usually get more access to financial resources, 
such as bank loans (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Li et al., 2008), government subsidies 
(Chen et al., 2011b), and favorable regulatory treatment (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
2001). This access equips the firms with more slack resources and enables them to 
invest more in CSR activities. Overall, and in line with previous research that has 
shown government-owned enterprises, for example, invest more in environmental 
protection than private firms (Chang et al., 2015; Zeng et al., 2012), we expect that 
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government-owned firms invest more in CSR activities, resulting in a higher CSRP 
compared to firms without government ownership.
Similarly, it can be assumed that, in a setting where CSR is considered a desired 
activity by the government, firms with political connections tend to invest more in 
CSR activities due to the personal goals of politically connected senior managers. As 
mentioned earlier, compared with their counterparts without political connections, 
executives with political connections have stronger incentives to protect their 
reputation and to maintain their personal political legitimacy (Marquis and Qian, 
2014). In doing so, they ensure their political career. These assumptions are also 
in line with Xu and Zeng (2016) who find that managers with a reputation for 
conducting high CSR investment increase their chances of promotion (also see Cao 
and Dou, 2007) and obtain other political benefits.
Overall, both government ownership and political connections can be assumed 
to increase firms’ willingness to invest in CSR activities thus also increasing their 
CSRP. Therefore, we expect: 
Hypothesis 2: The CSRP of politically embedded firms is higher than the CSRP 
of firms without political embeddedness.
Apart from the hypothesized influence of political embeddedness per se, 
different levels of political embeddedness are also likely to have different effects on 
firms’ CSR practices. In general, firms that are politically embedded at the central 
level have a closer bond with the central government and play more crucial roles in a 
country’s economic and political system (Chen et al., 2004; Sun et al., 2002). For these 
reasons, the implementation of government policy in China is a gradual process 
starting at the central level and then down to the local level. The encouragement 
from the Chinese government for firms to voluntarily issue CSR reports and increase 
their CSRP would first be delivered to firms that are politically embedded at the 
central level. Accordingly, the Chinese central government released “Guidelines to 
the State-owned Enterprises Directly under the Central Government on Fulfilling 
Corporate Social Responsibilities” in 2008. These guidelines are specifically 
designed to encourage firms owned by the central government to fulfill their social 
responsibilities (Zheng et al., 2014).
Furthermore, as Marquis and Qian (2014) argue, a firm’s strategic response 
to government signals may vary with the likelihood or extent of government 
monitoring. In China, the regulatory environment for centrally politically embedded 
firms differs from that for local firms (Wang et al., 2008b). Firms that are politically 
embedded at the central level are usually subject to stricter monitoring by the central 
government and regulatory institutions, such as the State-owned Asset Supervision 
and Administration Commission (SASAC) and the China Securities Regulatory 
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Commission (CSRC), because of the firms’ crucial role in the Chinese economy (Chen 
et al., 2004; Sun et al., 2002). If these firms fail to fulfill their social responsibilities, 
the negative reputational consequences are likely to also be attributed to the central 
government and thus, the country as a whole. Given this increased government 
monitoring and factoring in that politically embedded firms at the central level 
probably have even more slack resources than their local counterparts, we expect 
that the level of embeddedness plays a role in explaining the likelihood of issuing a 
CSR report and firms’ CSRP: 
Hypothesis 3a: Political embeddedness at the central level has stronger effects 
on a firm’s likelihood of issuing a CSR report than political embeddedness at 
the local level.
Hypothesis 3b: Political embeddedness at the central level has stronger effects 
on a firm’s CSRP than political embeddedness at the local level.
Until now, we have argued that political embeddedness positively affects 
firms’ likelihood of issuing a CSR report and their CSRP. This would imply that 
political embeddedness is a factor that increases the effectiveness of implementing 
government policies. This perspective, however, neglects potential opportunity 
costs. Given that issuing a CSR report and investing in CSR activities are very costly, 
a potential trade-off between CSRP and CFP needs to be addressed as well. 
Previous research on the CFP–CSRP relationship is controversial (Tang et al., 
2012; Zeng et al., 2010) and offers mixed and inconclusive empirical findings (e.g., 
Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Luo et al., 2015; Margolis and Walsh, 2003). Some scholars 
argue for a positive relation based on the argument that a better CSRP helps firms to 
create a positive image from a stakeholder perspective (Fry et al. 1982, Haley, 1991; 
Nollet et al., 2016; Xiong et al., 2016) and thus, secures access to critical resources 
(Fombrun et al., 2000; Frooman, 1999). In contrast, other studies find a negative or 
no significant relation between CSRP and CFP. Here, the main arguments brought 
forward are that the involvement in CSR activities diverts corporate resources and 
undermines CFP (Friedman, 2007) and that firms conduct CSR activities primarily 
driven by managers’ personal network needs (Marquis et al., 2007).
It is commonly agreed that the CSRP–CFP relationship is context-specific 
(e.g., Tang et al., 2012; Xiong et al., 2016) and may vary across jurisdictions, 
which helps explain the inconclusive empirical findings. In the Chinese context, 
where government influence pervasively exists in corporate businesses, political 
embeddedness could play an important role in affecting the CSRP–CFP relationship. 
Government-owned firms perform CSR activities and increase their CSRP due to 
political pressure. Such government intervention often comes with low efficiency 
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and reallocation of resources away from their (financially) optimal use. In this case, 
the increased CSRP of government-owned firms would be interpreted by market 
participants as a result of the government’s bureaucratic intervention in regular 
corporate business, thus, decreasing the market-based CFP. In contrast, the CSRP of 
non-government-owned firms would be perceived more as a reflection of market-
driven motives. Consequently, the better CSRP of government-owned firms could 
lead to a stronger trade-off with CFP compared to non-government-owned firms. 
Investment in CSR activities could have more costs for politically connected firms 
as well. As outlined above, agency theory suggests that executives may act in their 
own best interests, but at the expense of the firm’s owners and other stakeholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In the case of CSR, the potential for a conflict of goals 
between executives and stakeholders is likely to be very salient (Wang et al., 2008b). 
As shown in previous literature, politically connected managers are more likely to 
be involved in self-interested activities to enhance their own political capital and 
personal career (Tu et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2012b, 2012c). Thus, it is reasonable for 
investors to suspect that politically connected managers invest in CSR to build 
personal reputations within social and political circles or to pursue their political 
career agendas at the expense of the shareholders. Furthermore, active involvement 
in CSR may also send a signal to the market that a firm has a large pool of slack 
resources (Preston and O’Bannon 1997; Seifert et al. 2004; Wang et al., 2008a). In such 
cases, politically connected firms are more likely to be suspected by investors of 
conducting possible self-serving managerial behavior, resulting in a lower market 
price. This, in turn, suggests that the better CSRP of politically connected firms is 
associated with a lower CFP than that of firms without political connections. Based 
on the arguments above, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 4: For politically embedded firms, CSRP is more negatively related 
to CFP than for non-politically embedded firms.
3�3 Research method
3�3�1 Sample selection and descriptive statistics
To test the hypotheses, we used data from Chinese public listed companies of the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for the years 2008–2014. Consistent with 
previous studies (Chen et al., 2011b; Wu et al., 2012b; Xia and Fang, 2005; Zeng et 
al., 2012), we excluded listed firms of B shares or H shares because these firms 
are regulated by overseas or Hong Kong laws and regulations, which makes the 
nature of the firm’s financial and non-financial disclosures not comparable to those 
of A-share listed companies. Data on financial and non-financial information, 
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including CSR report issuance, was extracted from the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database, firms’ annual reports, the RKS (Runling) 
CSR rating agency, and the Bloomberg Database. CSMAR is the primary source for 
financial and non-financial data of Chinese listed firms, including their financial 
statements. The data on CSRP was retrieved from the RKS (also see, Marquis and 
Qian, 2014), whose organization and China-specific products are modeled after the 
US social investment rating agency Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini and Co., Inc. (KLD). 
The RKS provides ratings on CSRP based on firms’ activities as presented in their 
CSR reports. Bloomberg provides environmental, social, and corporate governance 
scores (ESG scores), which also serve as proxies for companies’ CSRP (Aragón-
Correa, Marcus, and Hurtado-Torres, 2016; Shrivastava and Addas, 2014).14 Our 
analysis was restricted to firms for which all financial and non-financial information 
was available. After these data were merged and observations that were missing 
were removed, the remaining unbalanced panel dataset included 15,419 firm-year 
observations, including 3,447 firm-year observations of companies that issued a CSR 
report. 
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample companies. Panel 
A shows the yearly distribution of the sample firms across industries. Panel B 
presents the yearly distribution of the sample firms that are government-owned, 
have political connections, and issue CSR reports. Panel B indicates that, overall, the 
proportion of both government-owned and politically connected firms remained 
stable, while the number of firms that issued CSR reports increased over time. 
Panel C depicts the distribution of the sample firms that are government-owned, 
have political connections, and issue CSR reports across industries. Panel C shows 
that the government holds the most shares in key industries such as real estate and 
public utility, whereas the financial sector has the highest percentage of politically 
connected firms and firms that issued CSR reports.
14 The Bloomberg ESG data was collected from different disclosure sources, such as CSR reports, annual reports, 
company websites, as well as a Bloomberg survey. The ESG scores are based on companies’ ESG performance in 
environmental, social, and governance-related CSR performance aspects (Eccles et al., 2011; Nollet et al., 2016). 
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Table 3�1: Descriptive statistics for sample firms (2008-2014)
Panel A: Distribution of observations in terms of industries and years
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
Finance 34 36 41 44 45 45 46 291
Manufacturing 1,037 1,142 1,417 1,601 1,698 1,729 1,821 10,445
Real estate 162 168 171 177 180 180 181 1,219
Commercials 136 139 149 154 157 157 160 1,052
Comprehensive 55 58 73 75 78 80 80 499
Public Utility 179 209 256 290 312 324 343 1,913
Total 1,603 1,752 2,107 2,341 2,470 2,515 2,631 15,419
Panel B: Yearly distribution of government ownership, political connections  
and the likelihood of issuing a CSR report
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
GOV N 855 747 811 832 957 937 942 6,081
% 53.34% 42.64% 38.49% 35.54% 38.74% 37.26% 35.80% 39.44%
Non-GOV N 748 1,005 1,296 1,509 1,513 1,578 1,689 9,338
% 46.66% 57.36% 61.51% 64.46% 61.26% 62.74% 64.20% 60.56%
Total 1,603 1,752 2,107 2,341 2,470 2,515 2,631 15,419
PC N 784 855 1,024 1,125 1,170 1,171 1,201 7,330
% 48.91% 48.80% 48.60% 48.06% 47.37% 46.56% 45.65% 47.54%
Non-PC N 819 897 1,083 1,216 1,300 1,344 1,430 8,089
% 51.09% 51.20% 51.40% 51.94% 52.63% 53.44% 54.35% 52.46%
Total 1,603 1,752 2,107 2,341 2,470 2,515 2,631 15,419
Issue N 178 185 497 587 612 678 710 3,447
% 11.10% 10.56% 23.59% 25.07% 24.78% 26.96% 26.99% 22.36%
Not Issue N 1,425 1,567 1,610 1,754 1,858 1,837 1,921 11,972
% 88.90% 89.44% 76.41% 74.93% 75.22% 73.04% 73.01% 77.64%
Total 1,603 1,752 2,107 2,341 2,470 2,515 2,631 15,419
Panel C: Distribution of government ownership, political connections and the likelihood of issuing a CSR 
report across industry
Finance Manufac-
turing
Real estate Commer-
cials
Compre-
hensive
Public 
Utility
Total
GOV N 118 3,831 615 519 164 834 6,081
% 40.55% 36.68% 50.45% 49.33% 32.87% 43.60% 39.44%
Non-GOV N 173 6,614 604 533 335 1,079 9,338
% 59.45% 63.32% 49.55% 50.67% 67.13% 56.40% 60.56%
Total 291 10,445 1,219 1,052 499 1,913 15,419
PC N 240 4,909 558 528 243 852 7,330
% 82.47% 47.00% 45.78% 50.19% 48.70% 44.54% 47.54%
Non-PC N 51 5,536 661 524 256 1,061 8,089
% 17.53% 53.00% 54.22% 49.81% 51.30% 55.46% 52.46%
Total 291 10,445 1219 1,052 499 1,913 15,419
Issue N 219 2,225 304 171 96 432 3,447
% 75.26% 21.30% 24.94% 16.25% 19.24% 22.58% 22.36%
Not Issue N 72 8,220 915 881 403 1,481 11,972
% 24.74% 78.70% 75.06% 83.75% 80.76% 77.42% 77.64%
Total 291 10,445 1,219 1,052 499 1,913 15,419
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3�3�2 Variables
3.3.2.1 Dependent variables
To test the hypotheses, we used three dependent variables. First, we created a 
dummy variable CSR, which takes the value 1 if a company issued a sustainability 
report, and the value 0 otherwise. Second, and consistent with recent studies (Lau 
et al., 2016; McGuinness et al., 2017), we used the RKS rating scores as a composite 
measure of CSRP, similar to studies that use the KLD score as an indicator of CSRP 
for US firms (Luo et al., 2015; Turban and Greening, 1997; Waddock and Graves, 1997). 
For robustness, we also used the ESG disclosure score from the Bloomberg database, 
which assesses the ratings of Bloomberg’s analysts on the degree of transparency of a 
company’s reporting on ESG performance (Lai et al., 2016; Nollet et al., 2016; Utz and 
Wimmer, 2014). Finally, we used composite measures to assess the trade-off between 
CSRP and CFP. For this purpose, we computed two dummy variables that assess a 
firm’s CSRP in combination with its CFP. The dummy variable CSRPHighCFPLow is a 
dummy coded 1 (zero otherwise) if the CSRP of firm i in year t is above the industry-
year median15 and the CFP is below the industry-year median, thus representing 
firms that have a high CSRP (CSRPHigh) combined with a low financial performance 
(CFPLow). Similarly, CSRPLowCFPHigh is a dummy that represents firms with a high 
CFP and a low CSRP (coded as 1, and 0 otherwise). To measure a company’s CSRP, 
we used the RKS and ESG scores, and we used two indicators to assess CFP that 
combine market- and accounting perspectives, i.e., Tobin’s Q (Gunasekarage et al., 
2007; Hess et al., 2010; Ng et al., 2009; Tian and Estrin, 2008; Wei and Varela, 2003) 
and the price-to-book value ratio (Gunasekarage et al., 2007; Sun and Tong, 2003; 
Sun et al., 2002; Xu and Wang, 1999).
15 A practical justification for the use of this cut-off point is that it splits the sample into two groups of equal size. 
This grouping eliminates potential small sample and selection biases that may occur when, for example, the 
average is used as a cut-off point. To test the robustness of the results, we also used alternative cut-off points 
to check whether the cut-off at the median may have driven our results; that is, we repeated the analyses using 
the top 25% and 10% of the sample. The results of the additional tests show that the results do not change 
qualitatively, suggesting that the results are robust to different cut-off levels.
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Table 3�2: Variable definitions
Variables Definition
CSR CSR is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a firm issues a CSR report, and 0 other-
wise.
CSRP CSRP is measured by the RKS rating score and, for robustness, by the Bloomberg 
ESG disclosure score.
RKS RKS (Runling) rating score as composite measure of CSRP (Lau et al., 2016; Marquis 
and Qian, 2014; McGuinness et al., 2017).
ESG Bloomberg disclosure score on ESG performance as second indicator of CSRP (Lai et 
al., 2016; Nollet et al., 2016; Utz and Wimmer, 2014).
TQ Tobin’s Q is computed as the market value of equity and debts divided by total assets 
(Gunasekarage et al., 2007; Hess et al., 2010; Ng et al., 2009; Tian and Estrin, 2008; Wei 
and Varela, 2003).
PB The price to book value ratio is computed as the market value of equity divided by 
the book value of equity (Gunasekarage et al., 2007; Sun and Tong, 2003; Sun et al., 
2002; Xu and Wang, 1999).
CSRPHighCFPLow CSRP and CFP combination dummy. The value is 1 if CSRP is higher than the indus-
trial median and CFP is lower than the industrial median, and 0 otherwise. CSRP is 
proxied by either the RKS or ESG score, and CFP is proxied by either TQ or the PB ratio.
CSRPLowCFPHigh CSRP and CFP combination dummy. The value is 1 if CSRP is lower than the indus-
trial median and CFP is higher than the industrial median, and 0 otherwise. CSRP is 
proxied by either RKS or ESG score, and CFP is proxied by either TQ or the PB ratio.
GOV Government ownership is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the de facto owner of 
a firm is the government, and 0 otherwise. The government has de facto ownership if it 
directly and indirectly holds the most shares (Wang et al., 2008b; Xia and Fang, 2005).
GOVLEVEL Government ownership level is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the de facto 
owner of a firm is the central government, and 0 otherwise.
NONGOV Non-government ownership is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the de facto 
owner of a firm is not the government, and 0 otherwise.
LOCGOV Local government ownership is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the de facto 
owner of a firm is local government, and 0 otherwise.
PC Political connection is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if one if a firm’s directors, 
supervisors or senior managers are or were 1) a government official, 2) a represent-
ative of National People’s Congress (NPC), or 3) a member of the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and 0 otherwise (Wang et al., 2008b; Wu 
et al., 2012b, 2012c).
PCLEVEL Political connection level is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a firm has central 
political connections, and 0 otherwise.
NONPC Non-political connection is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a firm has no politi-
cal connections, and 0 otherwise.
LOCPC Local political connection is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a firm has local 
political connections, and 0 otherwise.
SIZE Company size is a relative measure that assesses the total assets per employee (Wang 
et al., 2008a; Zhao, 2012).
AGE Company age is proxied by the duration from the initial public offering (IPO) to the 
sample year (Clarkson et al., 2008; Marquis and Qian, 2014; Wang et al., 2008a; Zeng 
et al., 2012).
ROA Return on assets is computed as net income divided by the average total assets 
(Wang et al., 2008a; Xu and Zeng, 2016).
LEV Leverage is measured as the total liabilities divided by the total assets (Wang et al., 
2008a; Li and Zhang, 2010; Xu and Zeng, 2016).
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Variables Definition
GROWTH Growth is measured as the sales revenue growth rate (Chang et al., 2015).
FCF Company’s free cash flow is computed as the sum of the net profit, interest expenses, 
and non-cash expenses minus the sum of the addition of working capital and capital 
expenditure (Marquis and Qian, 2014; Wang et al., 2008a; Zhao, 2012).
INDEPENDENCE The proportion of independent directors is computed as the number of independent 
directors divided by the total number of directors on board (McGuinness et al., 2017).
VISIBILITY Visibility controls for negative media exposure and public visibility and is measured 
as the number of punishments promulgated by the CSRC for corporate misdeeds, 
including illegal purchase of stock, fictitious profit, false equity, unauthorized use 
of funds, deferred disclosure, false statement, funding violation, material omissions, 
occupation of assets by large shareholders, share price manipulation, fraudulent 
listing, illegal guarantee, and illegal speculation (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Hughes et 
al., 2001; Huang and Kung, 2010).
CROSSLISTING Cross-listing is a dummy that is equal to 1 if a firm is listed domestically and interna-
tionally, and 0 otherwise (McGuinness et al., 2017; Zeng et al., 2012).
INDUSTRY Industry dummies control for sector-specific effects.
PROVINCE Province dummies control for regional effects.
YEAR Year dummies control for time effects and for omitted variables that vary over time, 
but are constant among firms.
3.3.2.2 Independent variables
To measure government ownership, we created a dummy variable (GOV), which 
takes the value 1 if the government directly and indirectly—through pyramid 
structures—holds the majority of the company shares, and 0 otherwise (Wang et al., 
2008b; Xia and Fang, 2005).
To assess political connections, and consistent with previous research (Chen et 
al., 2011a; Li et al., 2008; Tu et al., 2013; Wu and Liu, 2011; Wu et al., 2012b, 2012c), 
we created a dummy (PC), which takes the value 1 if a firm is identified as being 
politically connected, and 0 otherwise. A company is defined as politically connected 
if at least one of its directors, supervisors, or senior officers (CEO, president, vice-
president, chairman, or secretary) is or was (1) a government official, and/or (2) a 
representative of the National People’s Congress (NPC), and/or (3) a member of the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 16 (also see, Wang et al., 
2008b; Wu et al., 2012b, 2012c). 
To measure different levels of political embeddedness, we differentiated between 
companies with central, local, or no political embeddedness. Using the central level 
as the reference group, we created dummies for the local level and firms that are 
not politically embedded. The dummy LOCGOV takes the value 1 if the de facto 
owner of a firm is a local government and 0 otherwise. The dummy NONGOV takes 
the value 1 if the de facto owner of a firm is not the government, and 0 otherwise. 
16 The NPC and CPPCC are the two most important political councils in China, collectively known as ‘Lianghui’. 
According to the Chinese Constitution, the NPC is the national legislature and the highest authority in China; 
The CPPCC functions mainly in political consultation, democratic supervision and participation in politics.
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To create the dummies for political connections, we used a similar approach with 
political connections at the central level as the reference group. The dummy variables 
LOCPC and NONPC are coded 1 if a company has political connections at the local 
level and no political connections, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
3.3.2.3 Control variables
Consistent with previous literature, we included the following firm-specific control 
variables: company size (SIZE) (Wang et al., 2008a; Zhao, 2012), company age (AGE) 
(Clarkson et al., 2008; Marquis and Qian, 2014; Wang et al., 2008a; Zeng et al., 2012), 
return on assets (ROA) (Wang et al., 2008a; Xu and Zeng, 2016), leverage (LEV) (Li 
and Zhang, 2010; Wang et al., 2008a; Xu and Zeng, 2016), company’s growth (GO) 
(Chang et al., 2015), company’s free cash flows (FCF) (Marquis and Qian, 2014; Wang 
et al., 2008a; Zhao, 2012), and the percentage of independent directors on the board 
(INDEPENDENCE) (McGuinness et al., 2017). To control for negative media exposure 
and public visibility (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Marquis and Qian, 2014), we added the 
variable visibility (VISIBILITY), which was measured as the number of punishments 
promulgated by the CSRC for corporate misdeeds (Huang and Kung, 2010; Hughes 
et al., 2001). To control for the extent to which international pressures drive a firm’s 
CSR-related practices, we accounted for whether a company was cross-listed at an 
international stock exchange (CROSSLISTING) (McGuinness et al., 2017; Zeng et al., 
2012). Finally, we added industry dummies (INDUSTRY) and province dummies 
(PROVINCE) to control for sector-specific and regional effects, respectively, and we 
included year dummies (YEAR) to control for the omitted variables that vary over 
time but are constant among the firms.
To deal with the problem of extreme outliers in the continuous control variables, 
we winsorized all continuous variables at the 1% and 99% percentiles of their 
distribution. Table 3.2 summarizes the definitions of the dependent, independent, 
and control variables employed in the analyses. Table 3.3 reports the summary 
statistics for these variables. 
3�3�3 Research model
We used multilevel logistic and linear panel data regression analyses to test the 
hypotheses. For this reason, we estimated the following multilevel regression models:
where the dependent variables reflect a firm’s choices related to its CSR practices. The 
explanatory variables, i.e., government ownership (GOV) and political connections 
(PC), are the factors that explain the variation in the sample companies’ CSR 
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reporting and performance, and the trade-off between CSRP and CFP. In addition, 
we controlled for company- and industry-specific effects, and included provinces 
random effects and year dummies.17
The assumptions underlying the regressions were tested for multicollinearity 
based on Spearman pairwise correlations and the variance inflation factors. Table 
3.4 reports the Spearman pairwise correlations between all variables in the main 
tests. All variance inflation factors (VIF) values are well below the established cut-
offs of 5.3 (Hair et al., 1992) and 10 (Ryan, 1997) for each of the independent variables, 
which indicated the absence of multicollinearity. In addition, in an analysis of the 
residuals, normality and homoscedasticity were not rejected.
17 To address the fact that the influence of government ownership on firms’ CSR reporting strategies, CSRP and 
CFP-CSRP relations may differ depending on the presence of political connections and vice versa, we also 
estimated models including both the direct effects of government ownership and political connections and 
their interaction. The results of the additional tests (reported in Tables B.1 and B.2) did not show significant 
interaction effects, indicating no combined effects of government ownership and political connections on CSR 
practices for the Chinese listed firms. These findings suggest that the effects of the two dimensions of political 
embeddedness on CSR practices do not reinforce each other.
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Table 3�3: Summary statistics
Panel A: Total sample
Variables N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
CSR 15,419 0.224 0.000 0.417 0.000 1.000
GOV 15,419 0.394 0.000 0.489 0.000 1.000
PC 15,419 0.475 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000
SIZE 15,409 14.35 14.154 1.143 7.707 22.29
AGE 15,419 9.204 9.386 6.194 0.000 21.27
ROA 15,418 0.039 0.036 0.064 -0.245 0.243
LEV 15,410 0.463 0.458 0.243 0.041 1.292
GROWTH 15,418 0.163 0.076 0.523 -0.782 3.724
FCF 15,409 -0.001 0.010 0.116 -0.570 0.261
INDEPENDENCE 15,316 0.369 0.333 0.054 0.091 0.800
VISIBILITY 15,419 0.128 0.000 0.460 0.000 11.000
CROSSLISTING 15,419 0.074 0.000 0.263 0.000 1.000
Notes: See Table 3.2 for variable definitions.
Panel B: Subsample of companies that issued a CSR report
Variables N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
RKS 1,866 37.810 34.693 12.272 16.210 88.848
ESG 2,813 20.806 20.661 5.263 7.851 45.455
TQ 3,387 1.520 1.086 1.411 0.068 7.649
PB 3,387 2.885 2.262 2.060 0.590 11.738
GOV 3,447 0.536 1.000 0.499 0.000 1.000
PC 3,447 0.598 1.000 0.490 0.000 1.000
SIZE 3,444 14.644 14.405 1.205 11.892 19.260
AGE 3,447 10.579 11.175 5.843 0.170 21.693
ROA 3,447 0.048 0.039 0.051 -0.092 0.227
LEV 3,444 0.507 0.520 0.216 0.056 0.944
GROWTH 3,447 0.160 0.108 0.358 -0.555 2.099
FCF 3,444 0.010 0.015 0.091 -0.358 0.237
INDEPENDENCE 3,436 0.372 0.333 0.059 0.125 0.800
VISIBILITY 3,447 0.100 0.000 0.385 0.000 6.000
CROSSLISTING 3,447 0.155 0.000 0.362 0.000 1.000
Notes: See Table 3.2 for variable definitions.
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Table 3�4: Correlation matrix
Panel A: Total sample
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. CSR 1.00
2. GOV 0.16* 1.00
3. PC 0.13* 0.01 1.00
4. SIZE 0.15* 0.09* 0.08* 1.00
5. AGE 0.12* 0.35* -0.03* 0.16* 1.00
6. ROA 0.09* -0.05* 0.07* 0.05* -0.08* 1.00
7. LEV 0.10* 0.25* 0.02 0.18* 0.40* -0.11* 1.00
8. GROWTH 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.07* 0.02 0.12* 0.04* 1.00
9. FCF 0.05* 0.01 0.02* -0.02 -0.01 0.04* -0.01 -0.02* 1.00
10. INDEPENDENCE 0.03* -0.04* 0.01 0.03* -0.03* -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 1.00
11. VISIBILITY -0.03* -0.05* -0.02 -0.01 0.04* -0.07* 0.06* -0.00 -0.04* 0.01 1.00
12. CROSSLISTING 0.16* 0.15* 0.08* 0.14* 0.17* 0.02* 0.14* -0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.04* 1.00
Notes: * Indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. See Table 3.2 for variable definitions.
Panel B: Subsample of companies that issued a CSR report
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. RKS 1.00
2. ESG 0.60* 1.00
3. TQ -0.22* -0.18* 1.00
4. PB -0.20* -0.18* 0.86* 1.00
5. GOV 0.15* 0.10* -0.24* -0.16* 1.00
6. PC 0.14* 0.09* -0.04 0.00 -0.05 1.00
7. SIZE 0.23* 0.08* -0.35* -0.19* 0.12* 0.08* 1.00
8. AGE -0.01 0.06 -0.23* -0.11* 0.30* -0.05 0.20* 1.00
9. ROA -0.07* -0.04 0.55* 0.31* -0.14* 0.04 -0.16* -0.12* 1.00
10. LEV 0.24* 0.15* -0.63* -0.21* 0.18* 0.08* 0.44* 0.25* -0.49* 1.00
11. GROWTH -0.01 0.01 0.06* 0.10* -0.06 0.02 0.07* -0.03 0.12* 0.05 1.00
12. FCF 0.01 0.02 0.07* 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 0.16* -0.04 -0.04 1.00
13. INDEPENDENCE 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.03 -0.05 -0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 1.00
14. VISIBILITY -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 1.00
15. CROSSLISTING 0.33* 0.24* -0.18* -0.14* 0.12* 0.10* 0.16* 0.10* -0.03 0.17* -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.06* 1.00
Notes: * Indicates statistical significance at 1% level. See Table 3.2 for variable definitions.
3�4 Results
Table 3.5 reports the results of the multilevel logistic regression models that we 
used to examine the relationship between political embeddedness and companies’ 
likelihood of issuing a CSR report. Model 1 reports positive and statistically 
significant associations between political embeddedness, proxied by government 
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ownership and political connections, and the disclosure of CSR reports. The results 
provide support for H1, indicating that politically embedded firms are more likely 
to issue CSR reports than non-politically-embedded firms. Models 2 through 4 
show the results of the regression models that we used to examine the relationship 
between the levels of political embeddedness and the firms’ likelihood of issuing 
CSR reports. The results for Model 2 show a statistically significant and negative 
relationship between the levels of political embeddedness and CSR disclosure, 
indicating that compared with central politically embedded firms, local and non-
politically embedded firms are less likely to issue CSR reports. These results provide 
further support for H1. At the same time, they also support H3a, indicating that the 
effects of central levels of political embeddedness on CSR reporting are stronger 
than the effects of local levels of political embeddedness. Additionally, the results 
for Model 3 and Model 4, which use the subsamples of government-owned firms 
and firms with political connections, respectively, show statistically significantly 
positive relations between the two measures of political embeddedness and the 
likelihood of issuing CSR reports, thus providing additional support for H3a. 
Table 3.6 reports the results of the multilevel linear regression analyses that 
examined the relationship between political embeddedness and CSRP, using the 
RKS and ESG scores as proxies for CSRP. The results for Model 1 and Model 2 show 
that government ownership and political connections are statistically significantly 
positively related to CSRP, indicating that the CSRP of politically embedded firms 
is, on average, higher than the CSRP of firms without political embeddedness. The 
results thus provide strong support for H2. Model 3 and Model 4 report the results 
for the hypothesized relation between the level of political embeddedness and 
CSRP. The statistically significantly negative coefficients of NONGOV and NONPC 
indicate that, compared to central politically embedded firms, non-politically 
embedded firms are more likely to have a lower CSRP. These results provide further 
support for H2. The results for Models 3 and 4 also show that the differences in CSRP 
between the firms that have political connections at the local level relative to central 
levels are statistically significantly negative. These results provide support for H3b, 
indicating that compared to central politically connected firms, firms with local 
political connections are more likely to have a lower CSRP. However, the results for 
Model 3 and Model 4 do not show statistically significant relations between levels of 
government ownership and CSRP. Taken together, the results of Model 3 and Model 
4 provide support for H2 and partial support for H3b, indicating that only the level 
of political connections matters in explaining the variance of firms’ CSRP, not the 
level of government ownership.
Panels A and B of Table 3.7 show the results of the multilevel logistic regression 
analyses that tested H4, which predicted that for politically embedded firms CSRP is 
more likely to be negatively related with CFP than for non-politically embedded firms. 
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Panel A presents the results for the associations between political embeddedness 
and the CSRP-CFP trade-off, using different proxies for the combinations CSRPHigh 
& CFPLow and CSRPLow & CFPHigh. Panel B reports the results of additional analyses 
for the different subsamples of politically embedded firms, i.e., firms that are 
government owned vs. non-government owned, and firm with political connections 
vs. firms without political connections. The results of Models 1 through 4 in Panel 
A consistently show positive, predominantly statistically significant relationships 
between political embeddedness and high CSRP in combination with low CFP, 
while the results for Models 5 through 8 consistently show that the relations between 
political embeddedness and combinations of low CSRP and high CFP are negative 
and mostly statistically significant. These results provide support for H4, indicating 
that the trade-off effect between CSRP and CFP is stronger for politically embedded 
firms than for non-politically embedded firms. The additional results in Panel B for 
the subsamples of the politically embedded firms versus non-politically embedded 
firms provide further support for H4 in the Model 1 versus Model 2, Model 3 versus 
Model 4, and Model 7 versus Model 8. Taken together, the results presented in Panel 
A and B of Table 3.7 indicate that for politically embedded firms, CSRP is more 
negatively related to CFP than for non-politically embedded firms.
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Table 3�5: Effects of political embeddedness on CSR reporting
Total sample Sub sample
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
GOV 0.696***
(7.46)
PC 0.569***
(6.80)
LOCGOV -0.520***
(-4.10)
NONGOV -1.031***
(-8.71)
LOCPC -0.354***
(-3.13)
NONPC -0.779***
(-7.11)
GOVLEVEL 0.383***
(2.82)
PCLEVEL 0.338***
(2.96)
SIZE 0.174*** 0.179*** 0.295*** 0.109**
(4.21) (4.33) (4.82) (1.98)
AGE 0.034*** 0.036*** -0.001 0.048***
(4.06) (4.24) (-0.06) (4.50)
ROA 5.703*** 5.708*** 5.973*** 6.460***
(9.23) (9.26) (6.11) (7.17)
LEV 0.862*** 0.815*** 0.391 1.539***
(4.24) (3.99) (1.29) (5.22)
GROWTH -0.119*** -0.125*** -0.140** -0.101*
(-2.98) (-3.10) (-2.28) (-1.65)
FCF 0.701*** 0.724*** 0.730** 0.378
(3.54) (3.62) (2.22) (1.24)
INDEPENDENCE 0.823 0.800 2.188** 1.794**
(1.24) (1.21) (2.34) (2.17)
VISIBILITY -0.201*** -0.198*** -0.287*** -0.269***
(-3.71) (-3.71) (-3.39) (-2.96)
CROSSLISTING 0.828*** 0.791*** 0.840*** 0.925***
(5.34) (5.11) (4.67) (4.89)
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
Random province effects Y Y Y Y
Random firm effects Y Y Y Y
Intercept -4.377*** -2.843*** -5.220*** -3.456***
(-5.61) (-3.58) (-4.51) (-3.37)
N 15307 15307 6017 7242
Wald chi2 734.548 752.069 448.729 422.289
Notes: Model 3 is based on the sub-sample of government-owned firms. Model 4 is based on the sub-sample of 
politically connected firms. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively 
(two-tailed), z-values are below the regression coefficients in parentheses. Individual coefficients of the industry 
dummies, year dummies, and random province and firm effects are not reported for parsimony. See Table 3.2 for 
variable definitions.
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Table 3�6: Effects of political embeddedness on CSRP
Dependent variable CSRP
RKS ESG RKS ESG
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
GOV 1.757*** 0.565***
(3.36) (2.80)
PC 2.337*** 0.659***
(4.80) (3.50)
LOCGOV 0.414 -0.187
(0.59) (-0.67)
NONGOV -1.639** -0.703***
(-2.41) (-2.67)
LOCPC -2.118*** -0.585**
(-3.41) (-2.39)
NONPC -3.530*** -0.990***
(-5.92) (-4.21)
SIZE 0.360 -0.090 0.363 -0.073
(1.29) (-0.85) (1.29) (-0.69)
AGE -0.307*** -0.033* -0.319*** -0.036**
(-6.75) (-1.88) (-7.02) (-1.99)
ROA 16.775*** 7.098*** 15.290*** 6.915***
(2.98) (3.35) (2.72) (3.26)
LEV 11.490*** 4.176*** 11.174*** 4.099***
(7.82) (7.36) (7.58) (7.22)
GROWTH -0.647 0.279 -0.574 0.296
(-0.96) (1.07) (-0.85) (1.13)
FCF -2.262 -0.233 -2.341 -0.212
(-0.87) (-0.24) (-0.91) (-0.22)
INDEPENDENCE 5.991 0.198 5.781 0.082
(1.48) (0.13) (1.43) (0.05)
VISIBILITY -0.683 -0.127 -0.687 -0.129
(-1.34) (-0.57) (-1.35) (-0.58)
CROSSLISTING 7.676*** 3.625*** 7.491*** 3.549***
(10.82) (9.51) (10.53) (9.28)
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
Random province effects Y Y Y Y
Random firm effects Y Y Y Y
Intercept 21.176*** 15.005*** 26.207*** 16.386***
(4.25) (7.82) (5.21) (8.46)
N 1862 2804 1862 2804
Wald chi2 721.685 550.245 738.558 557.404
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively (two-tailed), z-values are 
below the regression coefficients in parentheses. Individual coefficients of the industry dummies, year dummies, and 
random province and firm effects are not reported for parsimony. See Table 3.2 for variable definitions.
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3�5 Discussion and conclusion 
This study examined whether and how political embeddedness influences the 
diffusion of CSR practices in China. Specifically, we investigated how government 
ownership and political connections affect Chinese listed firms’ likelihood of 
issuing CSR reports, firms’ underlying CSRP, and its relation with firms’ CFP. The 
results indicate that politically embedded firms, and in particular central politically 
embedded firms, are more likely to issue CSR reports than non-politically embedded 
firms. The results also indicate that politically embedded firms, on average, have a 
higher CSRP than non-politically embedded firms. In addition, the CSRP of firms 
with central political connections is higher than that of firms with local political 
connections.18 The control- and agency-oriented perspectives of political legitimacy 
explain these findings by suggesting that political embeddedness increases the 
effectiveness of government-induced CSR policies. More specifically, different 
types and levels of dependency on the government expose firms to different types 
of political pressures, which differently drive their CSR-related practices. This study 
shows that the government can shape firms’ CSR practices directly via (majority) 
ownership and indirectly via politically connected executives. For these reasons, 
government ownership and political connections can be effective instruments for 
the diffusion of CSR practices. However, the results also indicate that for politically 
embedded firms in China, CSRP is more likely to be negatively related to CFP than 
for non-politically embedded firms. This result indicates that political embeddedness 
also affects the trade-off with corporate financial performance, representing 
opportunity costs, undermining the efficiency of government-induced CSR policies. 
Collectively, the results indicate that in settings with political embeddedness, both 
effectiveness and efficiency measures have to be taken into account for a holistic 
evaluation of government-induced policies, such as the diffusion of CSR practices. 
From an effectiveness perspective, the different types and levels of political 
embeddedness play considerable but different roles in explaining the diffusion of 
corporate CSR-related practices. From an efficiency perspective, the results indicate 
that state interventions involve opportunity costs. 
These results have several implications for policy-makers and research related 
to CSR practices. First, the finding that in China political embeddedness is an 
important driver of the diffusion of corporate CSR practices and the finding that 
18 The results, however, do not indicate that the CSRP of central government–owned firms is higher than that of 
local government–owned firms. A potential explanation for this finding might be that in recent years the process 
of reform has deepen more to local government–owned firms. Central and local government–owned firms have 
to meet minimum levels of CSRP required by regulators and society. For this reason, government-owned firms 
at the central and local levels were facilitated to be involved in more CSR activities and thus, increase their CSRP, 
reducing variation in CSR.
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firms respond differently due to different types and levels of dependency on 
the government have policy implications. The Chinese government could apply 
different CSR policies for politically embedded firms at the central and local levels, 
and for non-politically embedded firms to more effectively affect firms’ strategic 
CSR choices. However, the findings also emphasize the necessity of taking into 
account policy-related opportunity costs. If the improvement in the CSRP and 
the number of firms that publish CSR reports comes at the cost of a statistically 
significantly decreasing CFP, then the net societal benefit may become negative, thus 
rendering the policy unfavorable. Second, from a research perspective, the finding 
that government ownership and political connections both affect companies’ CSR 
practices implies that in research settings in which different types of political 
embeddedness are present, variation in companies’ CSR-related practices cannot 
be fully captured by studying the effects of only government ownership or only 
political connections. Additionally, the findings imply that current and future 
research should continue to make a distinction between different levels of political 
embeddedness to provide a more fine-tuned picture of the mechanisms behind the 
effects of political embeddedness. 
However, the findings of this study have to be considered in light of several 
limitations. Two limitations of this study are related to the CSR and political 
embeddedness proxies. We considered only the likelihood of issuing CSR reports, 
the CSRP, and the CSRP–CFP relation in our analysis. We did not examine the 
relation between political embeddedness and other aspects of CSR, such as the 
credibility of the CSRP information displayed in the CSR reports. Regarding the 
political embeddedness proxies, the underlying assumption in the empirical section 
is that government ownership and political connections have uniform effects on 
companies’ strategic CSR choices. However, the degree of political influence might 
differ among firms. For example, the benefits from political connections could be 
expected to differ for a member of parliament or a government minister. Further 
research could make a more refined distinction between types and levels of political 
embeddedness to increase insight into the role that political embeddedness plays in 
affecting the diffusion of government policies and signals, such as the promotion of 
CSR practices in China. Overall, more research is needed for an in-depth analysis 
of the roles the government plays in facilitating the diffusion of corporate CSR 
practices. Further research could also use a broader and international firm sample, 
and include Western settings, to provide greater insight into the external validity 
of the findings. An improved understanding is important as it may advance 
our understanding of the conditions that facilitate or inhibit the development of 
sustainable business practices and the creation of sustainable value.
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Table 3�7: Effects of political embeddedness on the CSRP-CFP trade-off
Panel A: Total sample
Dependent: CSRPHigh & CFPLow CSRPLow & CFPHigh
RKShigh
TQlow
RKShigh
PBlow
ESGhigh
TQlow
ESGhigh
PBlow
RKSlow
TQhigh
RKSlow
PBhigh
ESGlow
TQhigh
ESGlow
PBhigh
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
GOV 0.513*** 0.474*** 0.244 0.378** -0.666*** -0.664*** -0.329** -0.351**
(2.98) (2.79) (1.60) (2.46) (-4.14) (-4.29) (-2.34) (-2.56)
PC 0.668*** 0.520*** 0.380** 0.202 -0.300** -0.156 -0.393*** -0.265**
(3.64) (2.94) (2.45) (1.40) (-2.06) (-1.07) (-2.85) (-1.96)
SIZE 0.259*** 0.326*** 0.282*** 0.321*** -0.240*** -0.270*** -0.173** -0.236***
(2.78) (3.40) (3.21) (3.94) (-2.78) (-3.20) (-2.34) (-3.18)
AGE 0.027* 0.017 0.016 0.011 0.052*** 0.052*** -0.005 0.006
(1.79) (1.15) (1.00) (0.73) (3.94) (3.89) (-0.37) (0.47)
ROA -4.042** -5.324*** -6.055*** -6.298*** -0.280 1.343 4.140*** 5.200***
(-2.22) (-3.28) (-3.43) (-4.05) (-0.16) (0.77) (2.75) (3.42)
LEV 3.943*** 1.119** 4.277*** 1.185*** -4.926*** -1.836*** -4.613*** -1.384***
(7.01) (2.30) (7.73) (2.76) (-10.75) (-3.97) (-10.57) (-3.18)
GROWTH 0.033 -0.328* -0.138 -0.424*** 0.327* 0.398** 0.072 0.066
(0.17) (-1.67) (-1.00) (-3.00) (1.83) (2.39) (0.51) (0.49)
FCF 1.282* 1.005 -0.037 0.293 1.245* 1.006 -0.932* -0.685
(1.82) (1.63) (-0.07) (0.58) (1.79) (1.49) (-1.74) (-1.42)
INDEPENDENCE 0.264 0.384 1.047 0.575 1.473 0.692 1.504 0.931
(0.19) (0.30) (0.72) (0.40) (1.16) (0.56) (1.44) (0.91)
VISIBILITY -0.063 -0.085 -0.209* -0.265* 0.156 0.161 -0.123 -0.064
(-0.45) (-0.54) (-1.67) (-1.94) (1.26) (1.37) (-0.80) (-0.50)
CROSSLISTING 0.760*** 0.807*** -0.526* -0.581** -0.455 -0.600* -1.367*** -2.032***
(3.19) (3.52) (-1.85) (-2.13) (-1.42) (-1.92) (-4.11) (-5.28)
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Random province 
effects
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Random firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Intercept -9.880*** -8.446*** -9.851*** -7.801*** 6.100*** 4.362*** 5.538*** 4.052***
(-5.27) (-4.61) (-5.88) (-5.08) (3.83) (2.75) (4.05) (2.99)
N 3236 3246 3390 3386 3260 3250 3382 3433
Wald chi2 334.553 340.606 228.259 167.006 405.946 253.328 338.852 184.883
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively (two-tailed), z-values are 
below the regression coefficients in parentheses. Individual coefficients of the industry dummies, year dummies, and 
random province and firm effects are not reported for parsimony. See Table 3.2 for variable definitions.
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Panel B: Subsamples of companies that are politically embedded
Sub samples: Politically embedded firms vs non-politically embedded firms
GOV=1 GOV=0 GOV=1 GOV=0 PC=1 PC=0 PC=1 PC=0
Dependent: TQ PB TQ PB
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
RKS -0.007*** 0.001 -0.019*** -0.007 -0.003 -0.006 -0.016*** -0.012*
(-2.69) (0.25) (-4.15) (-1.11) (-1.09) (-1.64) (-3.70) (-1.79)
GOV -0.249*** -0.244*** -0.405*** -0.428***
(-4.08) (-3.05) (-3.83) (-3.02)
PC -0.075 -0.027 -0.122 -0.103
(-1.39) (-0.38) (-1.17) (-0.87)
SIZE -0.200*** -0.153*** -0.455*** -0.420*** -0.123*** -0.272*** -0.361*** -0.543***
(-6.60) (-3.65) (-7.81) (-6.00) (-3.79) (-6.18) (-6.45) (-6.97)
AGE 0.003 -0.019*** 0.007 -0.024** -0.015*** -0.000 -0.014 0.001
(0.57) (-2.99) (0.70) (-2.32) (-2.67) (-0.07) (-1.46) (0.05)
ROA 7.631*** 9.265*** 12.870*** 14.218*** 10.649*** 5.582*** 16.825*** 8.600***
(11.36) (12.12) (9.97) (11.18) (15.50) (7.12) (14.14) (6.21)
LEV -2.161*** -2.980*** 0.672** 0.291 -2.787*** -2.530*** 0.097 0.369
(-12.61) (-13.94) (2.04) (0.82) (-14.93) (-12.14) (0.30) (1.00)
GROWTH 0.041 0.173* 0.280* 0.385** 0.156* 0.113 0.463*** 0.243
(0.53) (1.86) (1.90) (2.48) (1.95) (1.15) (3.32) (1.41)
FCF -0.488 0.494 -0.764 0.445 -0.170 0.081 -0.816 0.520
(-1.64) (1.39) (-1.34) (0.75) (-0.54) (0.22) (-1.50) (0.80)
INDEPENDENCE 0.246 1.554*** -0.015 2.731*** 1.275*** 0.753 2.214*** 0.608
(0.52) (2.76) (-0.02) (2.91) (2.70) (1.19) (2.71) (0.55)
VISIBILITY 0.011 -0.007 0.126 -0.053 0.056 -0.044 0.067 0.046
(0.18) (-0.10) (1.12) (-0.45) (0.93) (-0.57) (0.64) (0.34)
CROSSLISTING -0.189*** -0.443*** -0.261* -0.732*** -0.287*** -0.322*** -0.448*** -0.436**
(-2.62) (-3.59) (-1.89) (-3.57) (-3.56) (-2.63) (-3.21) (-2.02)
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Random province 
effects
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Random firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Intercept 6.421*** 5.774*** 11.653*** 10.163*** 5.247*** 8.269*** 9.756*** 13.871***
(11.78) (7.70) (11.13) (8.14) (9.19) (10.25) (9.88) (9.68)
N 964 867 964 867 1098 733 1098 733
Wald chi2 1017.902 1372.924 425.912 593.513 1657.667 841.831 800.096 311.436
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively (two-tailed), z-values are 
below the regression coefficients in parentheses. Individual coefficients of the industry dummies, year dummies, and 
random province and firm effects are not reported for parsimony. See Table 3.2 for variable definitions.
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Chapter 4
The effects of political embeddedness on Chinese 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions19
19 This chapter is based on a joint paper with Gerhard Kling and Utz Weitzel, The effects of political embeddedness on 
Chinese cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Current status: under review.
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4�1 Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are important strategic corporate initiatives 
enabling firms to extend their current businesses, enter markets and leverage 
capabilities (Bhagat et al., 2011). In particular, cross-border M&As are a dominant 
form of foreign direct investment (FDI) and closely linked to internationalization 
strategies (Kling et al., 2014; Shimizu et al., 2004). Are Chinese companies, both state-
owned and private, at the brink of becoming multinational enterprises (MNEs)? 
What are the drivers of cross-border M&As? What makes them successful? And 
above all, what is the role of political embeddedness?
After decades of economic reforms and institutional transitions starting in the 
late 1970s, China is the world’s second largest economy (Chen et al., 2011b; Child 
and Rodrigues, 2005; Cui and Jiang, 2012; Delios et al., 2008; Quer et al., 2012) and 
a trading partner of many major economies, including the EU, the US, and Japan 
(Gao et al., 2010). Recently, China has accelerated its pace regarding outward foreign 
direct investment (OFDI) (Deng, 2009; Zhang et al., 2011). Chinese OFDI was USD 
59 billion in 2010, which has risen to USD 170.11 billion in 2016 (China Ministry of 
Commerce, 2017). The surging value of OFDI makes China the world’s third largest 
foreign investor (UNCTAD, 2016). Especially, Chinese enterprises have adopted 
cross-border M&As as a major mechanism of OFDI (Hong and Sun, 2006; Zhang 
and Ebbers, 2010) and employed international listing as an important channel to 
raise capital to finance their international expansion.
In sharp contrast to market-based developed economies, dramatic changes have 
taken place in the Chinese economic system which has hitherto been characterized 
by centralized political control, dominance of state ownership in big businesses, and 
bureaucratic intervention (Chen and Young, 2010; Hong and Sun, 2006; Morck et al., 
2008). Although China has recently been experiencing the change from a centrally 
planned to a market-based economy through liberalization and privatization (Child 
and Tse, 2001; Gao et al., 2010; Peng and Heath, 1996; Tan and Tan, 2005), such tran-
sition is a challenging and enduring process filled with institutional difficulties 
such as unpredictable regulatory changes, lack of effective legal protection, 
underdeveloped market factors and inefficient market intermediaries because of 
pervasive government intervention and imperfect market mechanism (Nee, 1992; 
Wu and Chen, 2014; Yiu et al., 2007). Many publicly traded Chinese companies have 
been transformed from government entities, and the government is still the majority 
shareholder and thus maintains ownership and control of these firms (Chen et al., 
2011b). Furthermore, extensive political connections between the government and 
executives of large firms are still the norm (Wu et al., 2012b, 2012c). There are many 
examples, where corporate executives are central or local government officials 
themselves (Ma and Parish, 2006). Consequently, the significant influence of the 
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government has still remained a striking feature of the economy (Lee et al., 2014), 
especially FDI by Chinese MNEs (Kang and Jiang, 2012). Moreover, the government’s 
stance on OFDI regulations has also continuously been evolving during the past 
three decades from tight control to active sponsoring and even direct funding 
(Buckley et al., 2007; Liu and Li, 2002). All these features make China a very well 
suited empirical setting to capture the effects of governmental signals on firms’ 
behavior and decision-making (Cui and Jiang, 2012).
Given the recent surge in OFDI, studies on China’s OFDI in general (Hong 
and Sun, 2006) and cross-border M&As in particular (Kling and Weitzel, 2011) 
do not capture the period after 2008. Existing research on the drivers of Chinese 
diversification strategies (Buckley et al. 2007; Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 2009; 
Gao et al., 2010; Lu et al., 2011; Morck et al, 2008; Peng et al., 2007; Rui and Yip, 2008; 
Sun et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2012a; Wu and Chen, 2014; Zheng et al., 2016) and the 
determinants of M&A success (Liao and Yu, 2012; Ma et al., 2013; Zhang and Ebbers, 
2010; Zhang and He, 2014; Zhang et al., 2011; Zhong et al., 2013) approach these 
topics more generically, without accounting for the peculiarities of the Chinese 
institutional environment (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Kling and Weitzel, 2011), 
except for a few studies such as Cui and Jiang (2009, 2012), Du and Boateng (2015) 
and Kling and Weitzel (2011). However, these studies only consider state ownership 
overlooking other forms of political embeddedness. This study tries to capture a 
wider range of dimensions of political influence to assess their impact on cross-
border M&A activity and their success.
Building on prior work such as Kling and Weitzel (2011) and a Chinese 
specific “strategy tripod”, we develop a theoretical framework centered around 
an institution-based view. This framework incorporates resource- and industry-
based views. We contend that institutional constraints, and consequential resource 
allocation and industry traits, influence both politically-embedded enterprises 
(PEEs) and firms without political embeddedness (NPEEs). Using a panel data set 
with 30,314 firm-year observations of publicly traded firms in China from 2000 to 
2015, we find that SOEs are less likely to conduct cross-border M&As than non-
SOEs. In addition, government-led M&As are less likely to achieve success, proxied 
by cumulative abnormal return (CAR), market-to-book ratio (MTB) and operational 
risk measures. The level of government ownership matters, in that central SOEs 
(i.e. SOEs controlled by the central government) conduct more cross-border M&As 
and benefit more from M&A activities than local SOEs. Political connections of 
firms’ executives, as another dimension of political embeddedness, exhibits similar 
but insignificant effects on firms’ international diversification choices and M&A 
success. This indicates that relative to executives’ political connections, government 
ownership is the major channel through which political embeddedness operates on 
firms’ internationalization strategies and M&A success.
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Our contribution is threefold. First, this paper extends the international busi-
ness literature by analyzing the institutional determinants of Chinese acquirers’ 
propensity for going abroad and M&A success. This paper extends Kling and 
Weitzel (2011) by showing that firms’ political embeddedness, especially local 
political embeddedness, has a negative impact on firms’ internationalization and 
M&A performance. Second, this paper adds to the literature in political economy by 
enriching the findings of the effects of political embeddedness in emerging markets. 
The literature on the effects of Chinese political embeddedness examines either 
government ownership (Wei and Varela, 2003; Wei et al., 2005; Xu and Wang, 1999) 
or political connection of executives (Fan et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008; Tu et al., 2013; 
Wu et al., 2012c). An exception is Chen et al., (2011), which treats both government 
ownership and political connection of executives as forms of ‘government 
intervention’ and shows that government intervention reduces firm value. The third 
contribution lies in the finding that the level of political embeddedness, i.e. local 
versus national, exerts a different influence on firms’ geographical diversification. 
Studies that regard the state as a single entity overlook conflicting agendas of 
various levels of government.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we develop a 
conceptual framework and hypotheses. Next, we describe the research method and 
discuss our findings. Finally, the conclusion re-examines our results and indicates 
directions for further research.
4�2 Research background and hypotheses
4�2�1 The conceptual framework
In line with Kling and Weitzel (2011), our study refers to cross-border M&As as entry 
mode and does not consider greenfield investments. For large-scale longitudinal 
studies, access to reliable data on greenfield investments is challenging, whereas 
various data sources capture cross-border M&As. Empirically, cross-border 
M&As have been the dominant form of OFDI, reaching up to 83% in certain years 
(UNCTAD, 2000). Hence, the decision to internationalize overlaps with the decision 
to acquire foreign targets (Kling and Weitzel, 2011, p.358). Moreover, the ownership-
location-internalization (OLI) framework that has been predominantly used for 
analyzing cross-border M&As (Williamson, 1975) is not relevant for the analysis 
of domestic versus cross-border transactions (Kling et al., 2014), because it is only 
applicable in the context of OFDI into host countries (Rugman, 2010). Moreover, the 
OLI framework provides only limited insights into the outcome of M&A and its 
implementation (Shimizu et al., 2004).
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Compared with developed markets, the institutional environment is one of the 
most salient features and peculiarities of emerging economies (Gao et al., 2010). 
Accordingly, the institution-based view is the most suitable theoretical perspective 
for analyzing and understanding business strategy in emerging or transitional 
economies (Buckley et al., 2007; Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Du and Boateng, 2015; 
Hoskisson et al., 2000; Kang and Jiang, 2012; Meyer and Peng, 2016; Peng et al., 2008, 
2017; Quer et al., 2012). Based on this notion and consistent with Cui et al. (2011), Gao 
et al. (2010), Peng et al. (2008) and Sun et al. (2012), this study adopts the “strategy 
tripod” perspective – namely the institution-, resource- and industry-based views 
due to the following considerations. First, since these three perspectives are based 
on different underlying assumptions and boundary conditions, each perspective 
provides only a partial explanation for firms’ cross-border expansion (Wang et al., 
2012a). Only using one or two perspectives might not fully capture the complete 
mechanisms (Gao et al., 2010; Sun et al., 2012). Second, because these three 
perspectives are interdependent (Wang et al., 2012a), it is more useful to investigate 
the comprehensive effects based on an integrated framework. Third, the “strategy 
tripod” perspective not only fully captures the special driving forces behind Chinese 
OFDI (Cui et al., 2011, p.484), but gives better explanations for M&A success as well.
Different from the existing literature, which treats the three views in parallel, we 
argue that in China, the institutional environment is decisive in the economy and 
thus plays a key role in firms’ decision making. The resource-based view suggests 
that variation of managerial decisions in internationalization is a function of inter-
firm resource heterogeneity driven by motives of efficiency and competitiveness 
(Insead and Chatain, 2008; Wang et al., 2012a). The industry-based view stresses 
that the key principle of competitive strategy formulation is a firm’s relationship 
to the industry environment in which the firm competes (Lu et al., 2011). In China, 
both firm-specific resources and industry characteristics are closely related to and 
even dependent on the institutional environment. Firms’ strategic choices not only 
reflect their capabilities and industry conditions, but also represent the formal and 
informal constraints of their institutional environments (Hitt et al., 2004; Hoskisson 
et al., 2000; Peng et al., 2008; Wu and Chen, 2014). Accordingly, the institutional theory 
suggests that the institutional environment in which a firm operates significantly 
shapes the efficacy of its operations and performance (Cui and Jiang, 2012; Meyer et 
al., 2009; Peng et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2012a; Wright et al, 2005; Wu and Chen, 2014). 
This enables us to explain the internationalization of companies from emerging 
economies (Quer et al., 2012; Wright et al., 2005). Especially in the context of China, 
where political embeddedness dominates, it is more useful to adopt the institution-
based view as an overarching concept within which the resource- and industry-
based views function mediating the influence of the political domain, which shape 
the propensity of cross-border M&As and their success.
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4�2�2 Political embeddedness and propensity for conducting cross-border 
M&As
One of the most distinct characteristics of the Chinese institutional environment 
is that the government maintains strong influence on outward FDI (Cui and Jiang, 
2012; Deng, 2009; Morck et al., 2008). Prior studies found that external institutional 
constraints and pressures can influence firms’ strategic choices in OFDI (Brouthers, 
2002; Chan and Makino, 2007; Cui and Jiang, 2012; Gao et al., 2010; Meyer et al., 
2009; Nee, 1992). Based on prior evidence, one can argue that Chinese institutional 
characteristics constrain cross-border M&As conducted by PEEs while propelling 
those conducted by NPEEs.
To analyze how Chinese political embeddedness affects the propensity of PEEs 
conducting cross-border M&As, we follow the framework developed by Cui and 
Jiang (2012). First, from the home country’s view, the Chinese government exercises 
pervasive capital control for OFDI (Cui and Jiang, 2010; Morck et al., 2008). The 
Chinese PEEs, especially central PEEs, dominate so-called critical and strategic 
industries such as energy, natural resources, transport, heavy industry, aviation, 
and telecommunications (Schüler-Zhou and Schüller, 2009). Due to their key status 
in the economy and inherent bonds with the government, PEEs are confronted with 
serious institutional constraints (Deng, 2009; Morck et al., 2008). Many regulations 
and governmental agencies such as the Chinese Ministry of Commerce regulate 
and scrutinize OFDI strictly. The main purposes of these institutional arrangements 
are to direct PEEs’ investment activities to adhere to the government’s national 
investment strategies (Cui and Jiang, 2012) and to be in line with national interests 
(Cui and Jiang, 2012; Deng, 2009). Thus, compared with NPEEs, PEEs face an 
additional constraint when conducting cross-border M&As because in many cases 
they need to invest and deploy resources in specific areas due to either government 
requirements or their indebtedness to politicians (Vanhonacker, 2004; Wu and Chen, 
2014). As such, cross-border activities of PEEs are confronted with stricter scrutiny 
and control by the government (Wu and Chen, 2014). Furthermore, politically 
embedded managers lack the capabilities and willingness to conduct cross-border 
M&As. These managers are mostly appointed by the government (Fan et al., 2007; 
Wu et al., 2012b) and thus retain their connections to the bureaucratic command 
system (Delios et al., 2008). Because of the indigenous political background, 
they tend to lack the experience and capabilities to deal with organizational and 
managerial complexities that come with international diversification (Delios et al., 
2008; Fan et al., 2007; Teece, 2014). Moreover, these executives usually have complex 
goals such as protecting their political career and personal wealth (Faccio, 2006; Li 
et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2012c). Thus, compared with their counterparts in the private 
sectors, politically embedded managers are more likely to be “extra conservative” 
and risk averse (Nee, 1992; Teece, 2014) when selecting cross-border projects, as 
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they are confronted with dual risks - both political risk and economic risk (Delios 
et al., 2008). Second, from the host country’s perspective, political embeddedness 
often conveys ideological and cognitive motivations such as “national pride” in the 
course of conducting OFDI (Hope et al., 2011). Besides, PEEs are often associated 
with the image of bureaucratic practice and inefficiency (Chen et al., 2011b; Xu and 
Wang, 1999), and are usually perceived by host-country institutions not only as 
business entities but also as political actors (Cui and Jiang, 2012). The state-driven 
cross-border M&As by PEEs are thus suspected of having political agendas that do 
not necessarily benefit the commercial interests of shareholders (Chen and Young, 
2010; Zou and Adams, 2008), or may even conflict with the business interests of local 
firms and distort competition in the host country (Globerman and Shapiro, 2009; He 
and Lyles, 2008; Zhang et al., 2011). Hence, cross-border M&As conducted by PEEs 
might stimulate political sensitivity and public concerns in host countries (Cui and 
Jiang, 2012). Consequently, these firms undergo strict scrutiny or even resistance by 
host-countries’ regulatory institutions, which create strong institutional barriers for 
Chinese PEEs to conduct cross-border M&As.
Yet, the institutional environment could also promote the internationalization of 
NPEEs. We argue that, under the Chinese institutional environment, there are two 
motives for NPEEs to conduct cross-border M&As. The first motive for NPEEs to go 
global is to reach new markets and seek growth (Deng, 2009; Hong and Sun, 2006; 
Quer et al., 2012) as the domestic market is dominated by government-supported 
PEEs and has created a very competitive environment for NPEEs (Child and 
Rodrigues, 2005; Khanna and Palepu, 2006; Lu et al., 2011). It is also characterized 
by weak legal system and poor protection for property rights (Delios et al., 2008), 
which makes it harder for NPEEs to grow healthily. Facing institutional and market 
constraints at home, NPEEs can use OFDI as a route escaping from the turbulence 
and uncertainty of the domestic institutional environment (Deng, 2009; Ramasamy 
et al., 2012; Witt and Lewin, 2007), avoiding cut-throat competition (Cui et al., 
2011; Wiersema and Bowen, 2008), introducing new products and accessing new 
innovations in the host market (Quer et al., 2012). Second, going global provides 
NPEEs with more (strategic) resources and assets (Deng, 2009; Wong and Chan, 
2003). Due to institutional constrains, domestic policies of capitals such as land, 
finance, natural resources and subsidies are much less preferential for NPEEs 
(Child and Rodrigues, 2005). Thus, cross-border M&As are effective springboards 
by NPEEs to acquire or buy strategic assets, or absorb managerial know-how 
(Quer et al., 2012) and operational knowledge (Schüler-Zhou and Schüller, 2009) 
to compensate for their domestic competitive weaknesses and to compete more 
effectively against global rivals (Deng, 2009; Luo and Tung, 2007; Rui and Yip, 2008). 
Furthermore, as Peng et al. (2004) contend, NPEEs generically possess managerial 
incentive to pursue innovative and efficiency-seeking strategies. Compared with 
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their politically embedded peers, NPEEs are young and have flexible organizational 
and governance structures (Bai et al., 2006). Firm strategies of NPEEs are often 
characterized by aggressive entrepreneurship (Peng et al., 2007) and having a focus 
on innovation and change (Delios et al., 2008). These firm-specific characteristics act 
as pulling forces driving NPPEs to conduct cross-border M&As.
To sum up, Chinese domestic institutional constraints, and their consequential 
resource and industry peculiarities refrain PEEs from conducting cross-border 
M&As and, at the same time, propel NPEEs to go global. Hence, we propose the 
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Compared to NPEEs, Chinese PEEs conduct less cross-border 
M&As.
4�2�3 Political embeddedness and M&A success
Studies show a negative influence of political embeddedness on firm value of 
PEEs, as PEEs tend to be politically rather than commercially motivated (Dewenter 
and Malatesta, 2001; Du and Boateng, 2015; Fan et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008; Tu et al., 
2013; Wei and Varela, 2003; Wei et al., 2005; Wu et al., 2012a; Xu and Wang, 1999). 
In the Chinese context, the goals of PEEs are more complex (Chen et al., 2011b; 
Shleifer, 1998). Tightly controlled by the government, these politically embedded 
conglomerates are vehicles to revitalize China’s loss-making enterprises and absorb 
unemployed workers, rather than autonomously operated enterprises. Economic 
missions, such as creating national champions and sustaining national economy 
are much more important than commercial goals. Social goals such as providing 
employment, developing regional economies and maintaining social stability and 
fiscal health motivate the government to compete for resources (Chen et al., 2011b; 
Lin et al., 1998; Xia and Fang, 2005). Meanwhile, politically embedded leaders are 
motivated to accomplish their own political and personal goals such as enhancing 
their political capital and promotional potential (Chen et al., 2011a; Li and Zhou, 
2005; Lin et al., 1998; Wu et al., 2012b, 2012c). M&A activities initiated by PEEs are 
appropriate means by which the government or political leaders mobilize resources 
and achieve such goals. Thus, politically driven M&As usually diverge from the 
firms’ commercial goals (Brockman et al., 2013; Sun et al., 2010). In addition, serious 
agency problem (Delios et al., 2008; Zou and Adams, 2008) and lack of monitoring 
mechanism (Chen and Young, 2010) caused by institutional deficiency exacerbate 
the alleged value-destroying effect of political embeddedness (Cui and Jiang, 2012). 
By contrast, the agency problems between shareholders and managers are less 
severe in NPEEs (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Shleifer, 1998) and thus firm value 
maximization is the primary interest of non-politically connected managers (Delios 
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et al., 2008; Xu and Wang, 1999). The choices of international diversification made 
by NPEEs are more consistent with maximizing shareholder value and corporate 
development. For these reasons, we hypothesize the following.
Hypothesis 2: Compared to NPEEs, Chinese PEEs benefit less from M&As.
4�2�4 The level of political embeddedness
In China, the regulatory environment for firms owned by the central government 
differs from that for firms owned by local governments (Wang et al., 2008b). 
Furthermore, different levels of government play different roles in the economy (Du 
and Boateng, 2015; Sun et al., 2010). We argue that under the theoretical framework 
of the “strategy tripod”, different levels of political embeddedness affect both the 
motives and the capabilities of firms to conduct cross-border M&As and their 
success as well.
In China, the central government dominates the economy by issuing regulatory 
policies and delegating executive power to its local subordinates. Thus, different 
levels of political embeddedness in China might have different or even divergent 
interests and goals due to this principal-agent relationship (Sun et al., 2010; Wang 
et al., 2008b). Central PEEs are more tightly connected with the interests of the 
whole country, and are thus more concerned with globalization, openness and the 
integration of the country into the world economy (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). The 
operational plans of central PEEs’ have to stick to the national development blue 
prints. In many cases, the attempts of cross-border M&As are even initiated by the 
central government for national developing and strategic purposes. Thus, under the 
same scrutinizing system, it would be easier for central PEEs to get authorization 
from the central government and related regulatory agencies for their cross-border 
M&A activities (Cantwell et al., 2010; Pan et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2012b). By contrast, 
local PEEs are less likely involved in globalization and benefit less from M&A 
activities due to several institutional peculiarities of their own. First, local PEEs lack 
the motives to conduct cross-border M&As. Local PPEs are self-sufficient in terms 
of financial resources, preferable policy treatment and political bailouts due to their 
natural ties with the government (Chen et al., 2011a, 2011b; Dewenter and Malatesta, 
2001; Shleifer, 1998; Tu et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2012b, 2012c). Unlike privately owned 
firms, local PEEs face less institutional constraints on the domestic market and 
thus have less need to compete for resources abroad. Also, local PPEs would be less 
likely to receive administrative commands to conduct cross-border M&As because 
those cross-border projects related to national strategies and initiated by the central 
government are mostly undertaken by central PEEs. For local PEEs, the marginal 
benefits of cross-border M&As are far less than the marginal costs as such activities 
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would bring extra economic and political risks to the firm and local politicians 
(Wang et al., 2012b). Thus, self-interested local politicians would be extra reluctant to 
voluntarily choose high-risk cross-border projects. Second, as Du and Boateng (2015) 
find, the quality of the institution may affect the M&A process and firm value. The 
lower quality of local government institutions might reduce benefits from M&As. As 
agents of the central government, local governments assume a heavy policy burden 
to boost the local economy, eliminate local unemployment and maintain local 
societal stability (Shleifer, 1998; Xu and Wang, 1999). Thus, local government leaders 
possess stronger motives to compete with each other in grabbing resources for social, 
political and personal purposes (Cheung et al., 2010; Faccio, 2006; Li et al., 2008; 
Wu et al., 2012a) and thus have more preferences in uplifting local fiscal revenues 
(Li and Zhou, 2005; Lin et al., 1998). The M&As that are mandatorily conducted by 
local PPEs are one of the most ‘efficient’ vehicles for local government officials to 
boost local GDP and hit the appraisal target for promotion so as to enhance their 
own political career. As a result of market reformations and restructuring of the 
power distribution from the central government, local governments tend to be more 
autonomous in fiscal matters (Xia and Fang, 2005), which enables local governments 
to over-invest in projects. Moreover, local monitoring systems are incomplete and 
inefficient, enabling local PEEs to conduct unjustified M&As. Consequently, those 
M&As conducted by local PEEs are mostly unnecessary and potentially value 
destroying.
Apart from institutional peculiarities of local PEEs, the resource-based view 
propounds that firms can attain competitive advantage if they possess resources 
not held by others (Wernerfelt, 1984). These firm-specific variables that improve 
access to resources and capabilities translate into competitive advantage, which in 
turn stimulates internationalization (Kling and Weitzel, 2011). In China, different 
levels of political embeddedness provide access to resources and capital (Sun et al., 
2010). Central political embeddedness provides firms with better access to financial 
resources, policy preferences and political assistance due to “natural ties” with the 
central government (Buckley et al., 2007; Cheung et al., 2010; Cui and Jiang, 2012; 
Delios et al., 2008; Vaaler and Schrage, 2009; Wang et al., 2012b). In addition, top 
managers appointed by the central government usually maintain strong connections 
with central government officials (Delios et al., 2008; Li and Zhang, 2007). Compared 
with local firms, they enjoy much greater network advantages and receive support 
and even protection from the central government (Li and Zhang, 2007; Luo and 
Junkunc, 2008; Xu et al., 2006). Moreover, different government interests and 
institutional arrangements at different levels may also affect how firms accumulate 
and manage knowledge and resources (Mahmood and Rufin, 2005). As such, central 
PEEs obtain scarce resources, privileged industrial development information about 
foreign market and preemptive opportunities that enhances the likelihood of 
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internationalization through cross-border M&As (Cui and Jiang, 2009; Cui et al., 
2011; Gao et al., 2010; Kling and Weitzel, 2011; Lu et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2012b; 
Wu and Chen, 2014). In addition, central PEEs possess the ability to extract more 
value from M&A, for synergies can be realized easier, and better access to resources 
provides additional synergies (Kling and Weitzel, 2011).
Besides, Kling and Weitzel (2011) also find that firms with better internal and 
external corporate governance mechanisms conduct more cross-border M&As and 
exhibit better value creation potential from M&As because they have easier access 
to foreign markets, and investors have more trust in their quality of governance. 
This notion also leads to the expectation that central political embeddedness might 
enhance internationalization and benefit from it more than local ties as central 
PEEs are exposed to stronger internal and external governance. Both the central 
government and regulatory institutions such as the State-owned Asset Supervision 
and Administration Commission (SASAC) and China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) exercise considerable administrative control over central PEEs. 
In addition, central politically connected executives receive more public attention 
from the society and media nationwide (Chen et al., 2011b; Wu et al., 2012c), which 
in turn strengthens the quality of internal governance and increases the chances 
of conducting cross-border M&As and their value creation potential. Hence, we 
formulate the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3: Compared to central PEEs, Chinese local PEEs conduct less 
cross-border M&As.
Hypothesis 4: Compared to central PEEs, Chinese local PEEs benefit less from 
M&As.
4�3 Data, variables and methods
4�3�1 Sample and data
The M&A deal-related data are extracted from Thomson Reuters Financial M&A 
database (SDC database). Our sample section criteria are as follows: (1) acquisitions 
announced between January 1st, 2000 and December 31st, 2015; (2) Chinese acquirers 
that are publicly listed on Chinese mainland stock exchanges, i.e. Shanghai and 
Shenzhen; (3) where the transaction value of the deal is recorded in the database. 
This creates a dataset of 7,164 domestic and cross-border transactions by Chinese 
mainland acquirers. Political embeddedness data refer to government ownership 
and executives’ political connections. Government ownership data, financial data 
and data of firm-specific variables are downloaded from the China Stock Market 
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and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database, which contains historical data from 
annual reports of Chinese listed companies. Data on political connections are 
manually extracted from the resumes of firms’ directors, supervisors and managers. 
Finally, our unbalanced panel dataset includes 30,314 firm-year observations.
4�3�2 Political embeddedness
Political embeddedness is proxied by government ownership and executives’ 
political connections. To measure government ownership, we assess whether the 
government has de facto control. The government has de facto control if it directly 
and/or indirectly – through pyramidal structures – holds the majority of shares 
(Wang et al., 2008b; Xia and Fang, 2005). Subsequently, we create a dummy labeled 
gov that takes the value 1 if the government has control right, and 0 otherwise.
Table 4�1: Variable definitions
Variable Description
M&A success
car Cumulative abnormal return, computed as the mean of the CARs calculated with 
the following three models: 1) CAPM; 2) Modified Market Return Model; 3) Con-
stant Mean Return Model.
mtb Market to book ratio, computed as share market value divided by the book value 
of total assets.
risk Operational risk exposure, computed as the volatility of cash flows.
Deal-related variables
crossborder Cross-border M&A dummy. The value is 1 if an M&A deal is cross-border; 0 oth-
erwise.
volcrossborder Cross-border M&A deal volume.
completion M&A completion status dummy. The value is 1 if an M&A deal is closed; 0 other-
wise.
attitude Acquirer attitude dummy. The value is 1 if the attitude of the acquirer is friendly; 
0 otherwise.
divestiture Divestiture dummy. The value is 1 if an M&A deal is a divestiture; 0 otherwise.
cashmerger Cash payment dummy. The value is 1 if an M&A deal is disbursed with cash; 0 
otherwise.
tglist Public status dummy of the target firm. The value is 1 if the target firm is publicly 
traded; 0 otherwise.
horizontal Horizontal or vertical M&A dummy. The value is 1 if the acquirer and the target 
share the same SIC code; 0 otherwise.
Political embeddedness variables
gov Government ownership dummy. The value is 1 if the de facto owner of a firm is 
the government; 0 otherwise. The government has de facto ownership if it holds 
the most shares directly and indirectly.
locgov Local government ownership dummy. The value is 1 if the de facto owner of a firm 
is the local government; 0 otherwise.
pc Political connection dummy. The value is 1 if one if a firm’s directors, supervi-
sors or top managers is or was: 1) a government official or 2) a representative of 
National People’s Congress (NPC) or 3) a member of Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC); 0 otherwise.
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Variable Description
locpc Local political connection dummy. The value is 1 if a firm has local political con-
nection; 0 otherwise.
Firm-specific variables
size Firm size, computed as the natural logarithm of total assets.
roa Return on assets, computed as net income divided by total assets.
age Company age, proxied by the duration from the Initial Public Offering (IPO) to the 
sample year.
lev Financial leverage, computed as total liabilities divided by total assets.
growth Total assets growth rate.
fcfrate Free cash flow rate, computed as the sum of net profit, interest expenses and 
non-cash expenses minus the sum of the addition of working capital and capital 
expenditure.
independent Proportion of independent directors on board, computed as the number of inde-
pendent directors divided by total number of directors on board.
mgtshare Management share percentages.
hhi10 Ownership concentration, computed as the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of the 
first ten shareholdings.
board Board size, computed as the number of directors on board.
duality The duality dummy of chairman and CEO. The value is 1 if the CEO and chairman 
are the same person; 0 otherwise.
exchange Stock exchange dummies, including Shanghai Main Board, Shenzhen Main Board, 
Small and Medium Enterprise Board and Growth Enterprise Market.
intershare International shareholding dummy. The value is 1 if a firm is listed both domesti-
cally and overseas; 0 otherwise.
industry Industry dummies, including finance, industry and manufacturing, real estate, 
commercials, comprehensive and public utility.
year Year dummies, from 2000 to 2015.
To assess political connection, consistent with prior research (Chen et al., 
2011a; Li et al., 2008; Tu et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2012b, 2012c), we create a dummy 
denoted pc, taking the value 1 if a firm is identified as being politically connected, 
and 0 otherwise. A company is defined as politically connected if at least one of its 
directors, supervisors or top executives (CEO, president, vice-president, chairman, 
or secretary) is or was: (1) a government official or (2) a representative of the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) or (3) a member of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC).
To measure the levels of political embeddedness, we create two dummies that 
refer to the local level of embeddedness. The dummy locgov takes the value 1 if the 
de facto owner of a firm is the local government and 0 otherwise. The dummy locpc 
takes the value 1 if a firm is identified as being politically connected with the local 
government, or local NPC or CPPCC and 0 otherwise.
4�3�3 M&A success
The success of M&A activities is multi-faceted regarding different stakeholders, 
periods, and firms’ financial and non-financial performances (Zollo and Meier, 2008). 
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We focus on shareholders’ interests and use both market-based and accounting-
based measures of M&A success. For market-based measures, we adopt an event 
study methodology and calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) based on the 
following three models: (1) Following Brown and Warner (1985), we use the CAPM 
and calculate CARs with a 90-day period transaction window, 30 days before the 
announcement date. (2) Following Dong et al. (2006), Fuller et al. (2002) and Kling 
and Weitzel (2011), we estimate a modified market adjusted model and compute 
CARs for the three-day period around the announcement date [-1, +1]. (3) Following 
Brown and Warner (1980, 1985), we compute CARs with a constant mean return 
model. Then, we calculate average CARs labeled car based on the three approaches.20
For accounting measures, in line with Kling et al. (2014), we focus on value 
creation and operational risk exposure of acquirers after M&A. Value creation 
is measured by the market-to-book ratio (mtb) and operational risk exposure is 
computed as the volatility of cash flows (risk).
Notes: The sub-group SOE indicates government-owned firms; The sub-group LOC_SOE indicates local government-
owned firms; The sub-group PRIVATE indicates non-government-owned firms. The data contained in this Figure are 
calculated based on the data from the SDC database and the CSMAR database.
Figure 4�1: Comparison of CARs over time among subgroups with different types of ownership
20 Unfortunately, due to copyright issues, the calculated values of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of each 
firm-year observation cannot be shared. However, all transformed data and computations used for the analyses 
are available on request by the authors.
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4�3�4 Deal-related variables
We use both a dummy (crossborder) and the deal volume (volcrossborder) to capture 
cross-border M&As. In line with the M&A literature (Erel et al., 2012; Fuller et 
al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2004; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Weitzel and Berns, 2006), 
we control for several transaction-specific variables. The method of payment can 
influence the success of M&A, for cash mergers are regarded as positive signals 
(Tichy, 2001). Therefore, we indicate whether a transaction has been primarily a 
cash merger defined as 90% cash offer compared to the total offer price (cashmerger). 
Moreover, we distinguish between mergers and divestiture (divestiture). Finally, we 
account for whether the attitude of the acquirer is friendly (attitude), whether the 
target firm is publicly traded (tglist), whether the transaction is horizontal or vertical 
(horizontal) based on the four-digit SIC codes of acquirers and targets, and the status 
of completion (completion), which is a dummy.
4.3.5  Firm-specific variables
We account for firm-specific characteristics, financial conditions and corporate 
governance variables as these reflect firm resources (Kling and Weitzel, 2011, p.361). 
Firm-specific characteristics include firm size (size), duration from IPO to the sample 
year (age), and an indicator variable for the stock exchanges (exchange). Financial 
variables include return on assets (roa), financial leverage (lev), assets growth (growth) 
and free cash flow rate (fcfrate). Corporate governance-related variables include the 
proportion of independent directors (independent), managerial stock ownership 
(mgtshare), the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the first ten shareholdings (hhi10), 
board size (board), a duality dummy (if the chairman and CEO are the same person) 
(duality) and an international shareholding dummy (intershare). Table 4.1 shows 
definitions of all variables.
4�3�6 Methods
To test how different types and levels of political embeddedness affect firms’ 
propensity for conducting cross-border M&As, i.e. our hypotheses H1 and H3, 
we employ both a dummy (crossborder) indicating whether firm i engages in cross-
border M&As in year t and the deal volume (volcrossborder) as dependent variables. 
Accordingly, we apply both logistic models for our binary dependent variable 
(Equation 1) and random effect models to explain deal volume (Equation 2), which 
take the following forms:
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In equation (1) and (2), political embeddedness is included as either gov and pc 
or locgov and locpc to capture different levels of political ties. Besides, we account 
for firm-specific control variables, and include year-dummies (year) to control 
for omitted variables that vary over time but are constant among the firms, and 
industry-dummies (industry) to control for industry-specific effects.
To test H2 and H4, which expect that PEEs, especially local PEEs would benefit 
less from M&A activities, we need to explain the success of M&A, which includes 
domestic and cross-border transactions. The specification of the model is similar 
to Equation (1), except that the dependent variables are the equally weighted 
cumulative abnormal return (car), market-to-book ratio (mtb) and operational risk 
(risk), and that control variables include deal-related indicators. We estimate the 
following model specification with random effects for the three measures of value 
creation. Additionally, to test the effect on CAR, we also use quantile regressions 
analysis as CARs tend to exhibit outliers. In all the analyses, the explanatory 
variables are lagged by one year to account for alleged endogeneity. Using lagged 
variables ensures weak exogeneity.21 
21 To address the fact that the influence of government ownership on firms’ internationalization strategies 
and M&A success may differ depending on the presence of political connections and vice versa, we also 
estimated models including both the direct effects of government ownership and political connections and 
their interaction. However, the results of the additional tests (reported in Table C.1) did not show significant 
interaction effects, indicating no combined effects of government ownership and political connections on firms’ 
internationalization strategies and M&A success for the Chinese listed firms. These findings suggest that the 
effects of the two dimensions of political embeddedness on firms’ M&A practices do not reinforce each other.
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In addition, the assumptions underlying the regressions were tested for 
multicollinearity based on the pairwise correlation matrix and the variance 
inflation factors. All variance inflation factors (VIF) are less than 2, which shows that 
multicollinearity is not present. In addition, in an analysis on residuals, normality 
and homoscedasticity were not rejected.
Table 4�2: M&A activity, deal structure and success
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2000 1 23 24 83.33% - 471.9 19.663 2.63% 2.97% 3.235 2.246 
2001 0 25 25 80.00% - 2875 115.000 0.23% 0.78% 2.487 2.453 
2002 3 97 100 57.89% - 2938 29.380 0.44% 1.02% 1.892 2.516 
2003 5 212 217 70.77% 62.21% 4318 19.899 0.09% 0.88% 1.440 2.289 
2004 1 301 302 71.90% 56.29% 3913 12.957 0.05% -0.18% 1.115 2.246 
2005 3 195 198 83.08% 58.08% 1857 9.379 0.18% 0.24% 0.883 2.246 
2006 1 215 216 57.69% 45.83% 9491 43.940 1.71% 4.71% 1.302 2.246 
2007 12 371 383 52.48% 49.87% 25396 66.308 3.04% 6.91% 2.847 3.977 
2008 10 471 481 46.43% 50.10% 58878 122.407 1.46% -2.15% 1.225 3.356 
2009 11 414 425 50.75% 52.00% 40623 95.584 3.15% 10.60% 2.457 3.674 
2010 21 545 566 66.28% 47.53% 67829 119.839 1.90% 7.91% 2.567 3.125 
2011 30 655 685 76.95% 41.75% 46744 68.239 0.89% 1.81% 1.648 2.999 
2012 29 652 681 70.59% 36.42% 41836 61.433 1.47% 4.72% 1.536 2.820 
2013 32 736 768 59.44% 32.68% 90437 117.757 3.23% 6.50% 1.759 3.016 
2014 29 862 891 49.47% 29.52% 140448 157.630 5.28% 12.56% 2.108 3.398 
2015 62 1,140 1,202 17.15% 23.46% 291512 242.522 5.37% 5.62% 3.087 3.554 
Total 250 6,914 7,164 48.52% 38.68% 829566.9 115.797 1.94% 4.06% 1.974 2.885 
Notes: State-led M&A percentages from 2000 to 2002 are not presented due to a data default. 
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4�4 Results
4�4�1 Descriptive analysis
Usually there is only one bidder, except in one case with two bidders and two cases with 
three. There are no hostile M&As in our sample, with 86% friendly and 14% neutral. 
Moreover, only 45.3% of the bids have been completed. Among those not completed, 
48.7% are still pending and 6% were withdrawn. Table 4.2 presents descriptive 
statistics for our sample highlighting the number and types of transactions, method 
of payment, state involvement, deal volumes, and measures of success.
In the 16-year sample period, the number of Chinese M&A transactions has 
ascended dramatically by 4,908%. Except for a sharp decline in 2005 and modest 
slowdowns in 2009 and 2012, Chinese firms conduct M&A activities on a steadily 
rising pace until 2015. However, cross-border deals account for only 5.16% among 
all M&A transactions. Nevertheless, the tendency to internationalize has increased, 
especially with 2007 witnessing a pronounced upturn and in 2015 cases doubled 
compared to the previous year reaching a peak. Together with the increasing number 
of transactions deal volumes have surged, although the increase in volume per deal 
has been less pronounced. In contrast to earlier studies (Kling and Weitzel, 2011), cash 
is no longer the predominant method of payment with less than half (48.52%) of all 
transactions making room for other forms of payment such as stocks and assets.
The involvement of the government in M&A activities has declined from 
62.21% in 2003 to 23.46% in 2015, meaning that with the deepening of economic 
reformations, government intervention in the economy has reduced. 2015 seems 
to be an exceptional year as compared to 2014, the number of cross-border M&As 
doubled and domestic deals also increased considerably. Deal volumes in 2015 also 
doubled, and the volume per deal reached its peak. Moreover, cash payments and 
government involvement reached their lowest levels. These phenomena could be 
explained by two major policy changes concerning M&As and OFDI around 2015. 
First, the Chinese State Council has issued The Opinions on Further Optimizing the 
Market for Mergers and Restructuring in March 2014, which was followed by the 
CSRC’s revision of The Regulations for Major Assets Restructuring of Listed Companies 
and The Regulations for Mergers and Acquisitions of Listed Companies in July 2014. These 
new regulations have facilitated M&As due to improved administrative processes, 
transaction mechanisms, financial support and payment methods. Especially 
in January 2015, new accounting and taxation policies regarding M&A activities 
issued by both the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation of 
China have made other means of financing easier. Second, The Vision and Action of 
the Belt and Road co-issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce of China in March 
2015 and its following relevant policies have stimulated Chinese OFDI.
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M&As were rather successful indicated by positive average CARs and MTB in 
excess of one (Kling et al., 2014). In contrast to Kling and Weitzel (2011) is that value 
weighted CARs (4.06%) are higher than equally weighted measures (1.94%) for all 
the firms, indicating that larger deals are more successful. These discrepancies are 
partly due to excluding the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from our sample and a more 
up-to-date investigation period. In addition, as is shown in Figure 4.1, we compare 
CARs with sub-samples based on government ownership. The M&As of non-SOEs 
are the most successful and all the means of CARs are above zero throughout the 
sample period. By contrast, the M&As of SOEs are less successful, with four years 
exhibiting negative average CARs. The fact that SOEs’ M&As underperform non-
SOEs’ is mainly caused by low performance of local SOEs.
 Table 4.3 reports political embeddedness indicators of acquiring firms from 2000 
to 2015. While the proportion of central SOEs has risen steadily, the number of SOEs 
has followed a downward trend. This is a result of privatization in recent years, 
particularly among local SOEs. By contrast, the number of politically connected 
executives, especially the ones with local political connections increased.22 Table 4.4 
reports summary statistics for the dependent, independent and control variables 
employed in our analyses.
Table 4�3: Political embeddedness and corporate governance
Year Go
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H
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h
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2000 - - 0.527 0.177 - - 0.017 9.420 0.152 - -
2001 - - 0.590 0.150 - - 0.063 9.372 0.115 - -
2002 - - 0.751 0.117 - - 0.241 9.861 0.129 - -
2003 0.600 0.236 0.802 0.133 0.000 0.232 0.328 9.858 0.156 0.061 0.016
2004 0.604 0.257 0.823 0.099 0.000 0.226 0.342 9.703 0.153 0.057 0.016
2005 0.609 0.270 0.824 0.106 0.000 0.212 0.348 9.566 0.130 0.057 0.015
2006 0.584 0.294 0.839 0.113 0.002 0.175 0.352 9.429 0.136 0.051 0.018
2007 0.561 0.303 0.847 0.095 0.004 0.172 0.359 9.394 0.151 0.043 0.021
2008 0.554 0.326 0.858 0.099 0.011 0.175 0.362 9.262 0.155 0.040 0.020
2009 0.525 0.336 0.849 0.094 0.037 0.175 0.365 9.151 0.186 0.031 0.017
2010 0.457 0.346 0.846 0.103 0.081 0.177 0.367 9.078 0.220 0.025 0.012
2011 0.416 0.348 0.842 0.096 0.103 0.177 0.369 8.988 0.246 0.021 0.011
2012 0.398 0.343 0.833 0.087 0.109 0.179 0.370 8.973 0.251 0.020 0.012
2013 0.395 0.339 0.836 0.082 0.103 0.175 0.374 8.858 0.249 0.019 0.011
2014 0.377 0.339 0.827 0.078 0.095 0.168 0.373 8.696 0.259 0.017 0.010
2015 0.350 0.348 0.711 0.066 0.098 0.161 0.377 8.584 0.266 0.015 0.009
Total 0.469 0.314 0.799 0.106 0.062 0.181 0.333 9.154 0.215 0.031 0.014
Notes: The averages of government-owned firms, central government-owned firms, management shareholding, 
ownership concentration, B-share firms and H-share firms from 2000 to 2002 are not presented due to a data default. 
22 To make it comparable with Kling and Weitzel (2011), we also include corporate governance measures of 
acquiring firms in Table 4.3. Please refer to Page 362-364 of Kling and Weitzel (2011).
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Table 4�4: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
car 6,127 0.027 0.074 -0.083 0.202
mtb 29,199 1.995 1.525 0.354 5.973
risk 20,886 3.283 0.517 2.246 4.346
crossborder 7,164 0.035 0.184 0.000 1.000
volcrossborder 7,164 0.112 0.713 -3.101 8.869
gov 25,466 0.469 0.499 0.000 1.000
locgov 25,466 0.320 0.467 0.000 1.000
pc 28,894 0.799 0.401 0.000 1.000
locpc 28,894 0.721 0.449 0.000 1.000
size 30,311 21.595 1.153 19.811 24.126
lev 30,311 0.471 0.209 0.115 0.855
roa 28,948 0.035 0.047 -0.083 0.124
fcfrate 26,729 0.002 0.095 -0.235 0.160
growth 28,946 0.182 0.281 -0.163 0.992
age 30,314 12.325 5.556 0.000 35.000
mgtshare 25,461 0.062 0.152 0.000 0.891
hhi10 25,466 0.181 0.127 0.000 0.810
independent 28,725 0.333 0.107 0.000 0.800
board 28,730 9.155 2.076 0.000 22.000
duality 23,365 0.215 0.410 0.000 1.000
intershare 30,314 0.136 0.343 0.000 1.000
completion 7,164 0.453 0.498 0.000 1.000
attitude 7,164 0.860 0.347 0.000 1.000
divestiture 7,164 0.386 0.487 0.000 1.000
cashmerger 7,164 0.255 0.436 0.000 1.000
tglist 7,164 0.025 0.156 0.000 1.000
horizontal 7,164 0.239 0.427 0.000 1.000
Notes: See Table 4.1 for variable definitions.
4�4�2 Political embeddedness and propensity for conducting cross-border 
M&As
Table 5 reports the results of different model specifications of Equation (1) and (2) for 
the hypothesized relationship between political embeddedness and the propensity 
for conducting cross-border M&As in China. The model specifications A and B 
are the results of logit regression with the dummy crossborder as the dependent 
variable. Specifications C and D use transaction volume of cross-border deals 
(volcrossborder) as the dependent variable estimated with a random effects model. 
Models A and C focus on the influence of different types of political embeddedness 
on the likelihood to conduct cross-border M&As showing a negative and significant 
impact of government ownership after controlling for firm-specific variables and 
corporate governance measures. Political connections, however, have a negative 
yet insignificant impact on both the crossborder dummy and deal volume. Together, 
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these findings confirm H1, indicating that PEEs, especially SOEs are more likely 
to conduct cross-border M&As than NPEEs in China. Furthermore, we consider 
different levels of political embeddedness and use two dummies locgov and locpc 
to compare the influence of the local level with the central level. As shown in 
specifications B and D, local SOEs are less likely to conduct cross-border M&As than 
central ones, given both the number of transactions and volumes. In summary, the 
findings in Models B and D provide support for H3 indicating that compared with 
local PEEs, central PEEs are more likely to conduct cross-border M&As.
4�4�3 Political embeddedness and M&A success
Table 4.6 and 4.7 present the results of different model specifications of Equation 
(3) for the hypothesized relationship between political embeddedness and M&A 
success. Table 4.6 reports the results of both random effects (Models E and F) and 
quantile regressions (Models G and H) for CARs (car). Models E and G show negative 
yet not significant partial impacts of political embeddedness on CARs indicating that 
in China, there is not much difference between PEEs and NPEEs regarding M&A 
short-term success. This finding is consistent with that of Kling and Weitzel (2011, 
p.369). However, the findings of Models F and H show that the level of government 
ownership does make a difference in influencing firms’ CARs. The negative and 
significant relation between locgov dummy and car means that in China, local SOEs 
are more likely to have lower CARs than central SOEs in M&A activities.
Table 4.7 reports the results of random effects for mtb and risk. As is shown by Model 
I and K, SOEs benefit less from M&A activities as they tend to have lower MTBs and 
higher operational risks than non-SOEs one year after M&A announcements. Model 
J and L show evidence for the hypothesis that the level of political embeddedness 
does influence M&A success. Clearly, local SOEs are more likely to have lower MTBs 
and higher operational risks than their central peers. Local political connection also 
reduces firms’ MTB after M&A, but does not affect operational risks. In summary, 
our findings in Table 4.6 and 4.7 provide partial support for H2 by indicating that 
only government ownership reduces acquirers’ M&A success. Moreover, H4 is also 
confirmed, for both measures of political embeddedness show negative effects for 
local levels.
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Table 4�5: Effects of political embeddedness on cross-border mergers 
(dependent: A/B: crossborder; C/D: volcrossborder)
[A] [B] [C] [D]
L.gov -0.431** -0.054**
(-2.32) (-1.98)
L.pc -0.134 -0.022
(-0.69) (-0.76)
L.locgov -0.748*** -0.104***
(-3.71) (-3.85)
L.locpc -0.176 -0.025
(-1.08) (-1.06)
L.size 0.473*** 0.479*** 0.062*** 0.063***
(4.99) (5.09) (4.60) (4.77)
L.lev -1.252** -1.327*** -0.125* -0.128*
(-2.47) (-2.62) (-1.82) (-1.89)
L.roa 2.501 2.279 0.182 0.155
(1.19) (1.09) (0.67) (0.57)
L.fcfrate 0.202 0.264 -0.007 0.001
(0.24) (0.31) (-0.07) (0.01)
L.growth 0.180 0.199 -0.017 -0.016
(0.54) (0.61) (-0.38) (-0.35)
L.age -0.011 -0.005 0.001 0.002
(-0.61) (-0.29) (0.44) (0.68)
L.mgtshare -0.471 -0.461 -0.067 -0.070
(-0.82) (-0.81) (-0.78) (-0.81)
L.hhi10 0.050 0.009 0.113 0.119
(0.08) (0.01) (1.15) (1.22)
L.independent -2.565* -2.619* -0.447** -0.450**
(-1.65) (-1.69) (-2.13) (-2.15)
L.board -0.009 -0.005 0.001 0.002
(-0.19) (-0.10) (0.14) (0.22)
L.duality 0.177 0.187 0.015 0.015
(1.00) (1.05) (0.56) (0.55)
L.intershare 0.373 0.331 0.145** 0.140**
(1.21) (1.07) (2.46) (2.39)
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
Random province 
effects
Y Y Y Y
Random firm 
effects
Y Y Y Y
Intercept -10.466*** -10.776*** -0.483 -0.522
(-4.71) (-4.85) (-1.37) (-1.49)
N 5482 5482 5576 5576
Wald chi2 81.667 92.410 106.762 118.910
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively (two-tailed), z-values are 
below the regression coefficients in parentheses. Individual coefficients of the industry dummies, year dummies, and 
random province and firm effects are not reported for parsimony. See Table 4.1 for variable definitions.
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Table 4�6: Effects of political embeddedness on M&A success 
(Dependent: car)
[E] [F] [G] [H]
L_gov -0.004 -0.007
(-1.45) (-1.45)
L_pc -0.001 -0.002
(-0.23) (-0.46)
L_locgov -0.007** -0.011**
(-2.36) (-2.41)
L_locpc 0.001 0.001
(0.30) (0.28)
L_size -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.021*** -0.021***
(-8.91) (-9.00) (-8.49) (-8.50)
L_lev 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.036*** 0.033**
(3.24) (3.20) (2.74) (2.55)
L_roa -0.167*** -0.168*** -0.215*** -0.210***
(-5.38) (-5.42) (-4.01) (-3.93)
L_fcfrate -0.003 -0.002 -0.008 -0.012
(-0.23) (-0.18) (-0.36) (-0.56)
L_growth 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004
(1.01) (1.05) (0.54) (0.45)
L_age 0.001** 0.001** 0.000 0.000
(2.28) (2.43) (0.89) (0.86)
L_mgtshare 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006
(0.33) (0.35) (0.40) (0.38)
L_hhi10 0.024** 0.024** 0.037** 0.040**
(2.25) (2.26) (2.17) (2.36)
L_independent 0.017 0.016 0.020 0.011
(0.75) (0.70) (0.53) (0.29)
L_board 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.29) (0.28) (-0.25) (-0.32)
L_duality -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(-0.46) (-0.42) (-0.69) (-0.15)
L_intershare -0.004 -0.004 0.002 -0.002
(-0.65) (-0.71) (0.21) (-0.21)
completion 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.035*** 0.033***
(8.77) (8.76) (8.86) (8.33)
attitude 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.68) (0.65) (0.28) (0.47)
divestiture 0.004* 0.004* 0.008* 0.008**
(1.82) (1.84) (1.86) (2.04)
cashmerger -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.013***
(-4.67) (-4.65) (-3.39) (-3.05)
tglist 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.042*** 0.038***
(3.41) (3.41) (3.21) (2.92)
horizontal -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(-1.10) (-1.11) (-0.44) (-0.48)
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[E] [F] [G] [H]
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
Random province 
effects
Y Y Y Y
Random firm 
effects
Y Y Y Y
Intercept 0.208*** 0.206*** 0.362*** 0.358***
(5.34) (5.31) (5.60) (5.57)
N 4883 4883 4883 4883
Wald chi2 613.371 617.678
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels respectively (two tailed); z-values (for 
random effect models and logistic models) and t-values (for quantile regressions) are below the regression coefficients 
in parentheses. Individual coefficients of the industry dummies, year dummies, and random province and firm 
effects are not reported for parsimony. See Table 4.1 for variable definitions.
Table 4�7: Effects of political embeddedness on valuation and risk 
(Dependent: I/J: mtb; K/L: risk)
[I] [J] [K] [L]
L.gov -0.166*** 0.015*
(-3.65) (1.90)
L.pc -0.036 0.009
(-0.84) (1.09)
L.locgov -0.284*** 0.014*
(-6.28) (1.76)
L.locpc -0.061* -0.002
(-1.72) (-0.31)
L.size -0.805*** -0.802*** -0.000 0.001
(-35.67) (-35.95) (-0.04) (0.18)
L.lev -0.671*** -0.682*** -0.003 -0.003
(-6.22) (-6.34) (-0.13) (-0.12)
L.roa 3.562*** 3.542*** -0.084 -0.088
(8.99) (8.96) (-0.97) (-1.02)
L.fcfrate 0.013 0.030 0.013 0.012
(0.09) (0.20) (0.37) (0.32)
L.growth 0.180*** 0.186*** 0.038** 0.037**
(2.87) (2.98) (2.52) (2.44)
L.age 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.001
(0.52) (0.89) (0.94) (0.80)
L.mgtshare -0.247* -0.242* 0.032 0.029
(-1.72) (-1.70) (1.22) (1.12)
L.hhi10 0.561*** 0.570*** 0.001 0.004
(3.46) (3.55) (0.03) (0.13)
Table 4�6: Continuation
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[I] [J] [K] [L]
L.independent 0.934*** 0.944*** -0.054 -0.047
(2.96) (3.00) (-0.83) (-0.72)
L.board 0.016 0.017 0.001 0.001
(1.47) (1.60) (0.24) (0.48)
L.duality 0.075* 0.077* -0.005 -0.006
(1.84) (1.91) (-0.59) (-0.74)
L.intershare 0.261** 0.249** -0.009 -0.008
(2.38) (2.29) (-0.56) (-0.49)
completion 0.020 0.020 0.002 0.002
(0.75) (0.75) (0.30) (0.30)
attitude -0.000 -0.004 0.002 0.002
(-0.01) (-0.10) (0.18) (0.21)
divestiture -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.18) (-0.15) (-0.21) (-0.19)
cashmerger -0.074** -0.072** 0.005 0.004
(-2.43) (-2.37) (0.63) (0.59)
tglist 0.095 0.090 0.024 0.024
(1.12) (1.07) (1.15) (1.12)
horizontal -0.061* -0.062* -0.000 0.000
(-1.86) (-1.88) (-0.00) (0.02)
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
Random province 
effects
Y Y Y Y
Random firm 
effects
Y Y Y Y
Intercept 17.893*** 17.792*** 0.944*** 0.939***
(30.73) (30.74) (3.76) (3.74)
N 5347 5347 5277 5277
Wald chi2 5419.721 5487.051 18018.692 18010.723
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels respectively (two tailed); z-values are 
below the regression coefficients in parentheses. Individual coefficients of the industry dummies, year dummies, and 
random province and firm effects are not reported for parsimony. See Table 4.1 for variable definitions.
4�5 Discussion and conclusion
This study investigates how political embeddedness affects Chinese listed firms’ 
propensity for conducting cross-border M&As and M&A success. Theoretically, 
we argue that compared with NPEEs, PEEs are less likely to conduct cross-border 
M&As due to institutional resistance from both home and host country. In addition, 
PEEs tend to benefit less from M&A activities because of multiple and conflicting 
goals. By using both government ownership and political connections as proxies for 
Table 4�7: Continuation
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political embeddedness, our results show that government ownership is the major 
channel through which the government influences cross-border activities and M&A 
success. We find that compared to non-SOEs, SOEs conduct significantly less cross-
border M&As. This finding is consistent with Cui and Jiang (2009) and Kling and 
Weitzel (2011). In addition, our findings confirm the theoretical expectation that 
SOEs benefit less from M&A activities by indicating that SOEs exhibit lower MTBs 
and higher operational risks after M&A activity than non-SOEs, although we do 
not find significant evidence for the relation between government ownership and 
CARs.
Given the assertion that the level of political embeddedness matters in firms’ 
inclination of going global, we find evidence for the hypothesis that central SOEs 
are more likely to conduct cross-border M&As than local SOEs. Our findings also 
indicate that central SOEs benefit more than local SOEs, in terms of CARs, MTBs 
and operational risks. This finding indicates that local SOEs exhibit poor M&A 
performance, which is in line with Xia and Fang (2005, p.50) who contend that “the 
value-destroying effect of SOEs is mainly caused by local SOEs”.
By contrast, as another measure of political embeddedness, executives’ political 
connections do not have a strong influence on firms’ propensity for conducting 
cross-border M&As and M&A success. Given the insignificant effect of political 
connections on the propensity for conducting cross-border M&As, politically 
connected firms could have encountered less resistance than theoretically expected, 
concerning both environments of home and host country. On the home country’s 
side, unlike SOEs, politically connected firms could be confronted with less 
scrutiny for OFDI in key industries, because political connections depend less 
on industries. On the host country’s side, firms with political connections might 
also have less resistance because unlike state ownership, ties between executives 
and home country’s political entities might cause far less concerns, or might even 
remain unnoticed. The insignificant effect of political connections on M&A success 
could possibly be explained by the fact that the goal divergence between firms 
and politically connected executives is much smaller than that in SOEs. First, as 
mentioned above, politically-driven M&As are mostly done due to political pressure 
from the government ownership. Second, different from that in SOEs, the personal 
goals of politically connected managers are more self-serving. Since their political 
and personal career are closely related with corporate performance, connected 
managers would consider value creation when selecting M&A projects. 
These findings have several important implications for managerial practice and 
research related to cross-border M&As. First, the findings are likely to be helpful for 
investors and other stakeholders in assessing the likelihood of conducting cross-
border M&As and M&A success of Chinese listed firms. Second, the finding that 
different forms and levels of political embeddedness, i.e. government ownership 
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and political connections on central and local levels, have different effects on firms’ 
internationalization behavior and M&A success has important implications for 
decision makers. Third, our finding that the negative effect of local government on 
firms’ propensity for conducting cross-border M&As and M&A success is much 
stronger than that of central government has practical implications. This finding 
optimizes the orientation of reformation for policy makers of developing countries 
like China by rectifying the general practice that all kinds of government ownership 
are treated uniformly and suggesting that the national governance in emerging 
economies should focus on the reformation of local government.
Our limitation lies in the proxies of political embeddedness. The underlying 
assumption is that all politically embedded firms have similar extents of connections. 
However, the degree of political influence might differ among firms, most of which 
is challenging to quantify. Moreover, the influence from political connections should 
be expected to differ for a member of parliament or a minister in the government. 
Consequently, different types of political connections, besides the differentiation 
of local or central connections, may have different effects. Regarding the proxies 
of M&A success, we only considered short-term measures, thus neglecting the 
long-term effects. Based on these findings and limitations, future research could 
provide a more detailed measurement of the degree of political influence. Overall, 
more research is needed to improve our understanding of the influence of political 
embeddedness on firms’ strategic decision making.
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5�1 Summary
The central theme of this dissertation is the influence of political embeddedness 
on corporate reporting and internationalization strategies in China. I choose 
the Chinese market because it provides a typical institutional setting where the 
government has considerable control over the micro-economy and could thus 
draw a profound influence on corporate affairs. Instead of focusing exclusively 
on either government ownership or political connections, this dissertation takes a 
broader approach to government intervention on corporate affairs by addressing 
both dimensions separately as well as together.23 In addition, given that different 
objectives of different levels of government might lead to different impacts on 
corporate affairs, this dissertation provides a more advanced measurement of 
political embeddedness by differentiating between local and central levels of 
government. In terms of corporate strategies, this dissertation focuses on corporate 
financial and non-financial reporting and internationalization, more specifically, on 
the effect of political embeddedness on earnings management, CSR practices, and 
cross-border M&As. These three areas are particularly interesting to study because 
they have all been recently subject to considerable policy changes in China. 
Chapter 2 investigates how political embeddedness influences the listed Chinese 
firms’ choices for earnings management strategies. By using government ownership 
and political connections as measures of political embeddedness and multiple 
proxies for real and accrual-based earnings management, the results indicate that 
government-owned firms, especially central government-owned firms, are more 
likely than non-government-owned firms to substitute real earnings management 
for accrual-based earnings management. Regarding political connections, the 
results also indicate that firms with political connections are more likely to resort 
to real earnings management strategies and to use more accrual-based earnings 
management than their non-connected peers. However, since the relative increase in 
the use of real earnings management is greater than that of accrual-based earnings 
management, there is a relative substitution effect for politically connected firms. 
The results additionally indicate that there is no significantly different substitution 
effect between the firms with central political connections and the ones with local 
political connections. This chapter finds that government ownership and political 
connections play considerable, albeit different, roles in explaining the variance in 
firms’ choices for earnings management strategies in China.
23 To address the fact that the influence of government ownership on firms’ reporting and internationalization 
strategies may differ depending on the presence of political connections and vice versa, I also estimated 
models including both the direct effects of government ownership and political connections and their 
interaction. However, the interaction effects were not statistically significant, suggesting that the effects of the 
two dimensions of political embeddedness on corporate reporting and internationalization strategies do not 
reinforce each other.
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Chapter 3 examines whether and how political embeddedness influences the 
diffusion of CSR practices in China. It investigates how government ownership 
and political connections affect the listed Chinese firms’ likelihood of issuing CSR 
reports, their underlying CSRP, and its relationship with the firms’ CFP. The results 
indicate that politically embedded firms, including both government-owned and 
politically connected firms and central politically embedded firms in particular, are 
more likely to issue CSR reports than non-politically embedded firms. The results 
also indicate that politically embedded firms have a higher average CSRP than non-
politically-embedded firms. In addition, the CSRP of central politically connected 
firms is higher than that of local politically connected firms. This chapter shows 
that, in China, the government can shape firms’ CSR practices significantly; they 
can do this directly through (majority) ownership and indirectly through politically 
connected executives. 
Chapter 4 investigates how political embeddedness affects both the propensity 
of the listed Chinese firms for conducting cross-border M&As and the success of the 
M&As. The results show that government-owned firms conduct significantly less 
cross-border M&As than non-government-owned firms. Moreover, government-
owned firms benefit less from M&A activities in comparison to non-government-
owned firms. By contrast, as another measure of political embeddedness, the 
executives’ political connections do not have a strong influence on a firm’s propensity 
for conducting cross-border M&As or their M&A success. This chapter suggests 
that government ownership is the major channel through which the government 
influences firms’ cross-border activities and M&A success in China.
5�2 Limitations
Since all three studies in this dissertation deal with political embeddedness, the 
limitations of the proxy for political embeddedness apply to them all. One of 
the contributions of this dissertation is that it provides a better approach when 
measuring political embeddedness by considering both the direct channel (i.e., 
government ownership) and the indirect channel (i.e., political connections) through 
which the government exerts influences on corporate financial strategies. However, 
a limitation of the proxy for political embeddedness still lies in the fact that, in this 
dissertation, I only apply dummies as proxies for government ownership, political 
connections, and their levels. Since only using dummies cannot distinguish the 
magnitude of political embeddedness in a continuous manner, it is not conducive to 
capturing the influence of political embeddedness accurately. 
In addition, some limitations of the proxy of political embeddedness lie in 
the definitions of government ownership and political connections. In the dataset 
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adopted in this dissertation, a firm is defined as government-owned if its largest 
de facto shareholder is the government. This neglects the potential influences from 
the government in the non-government-owned firms classified by this definition. 
For example, the cases where the government is the second largest shareholder 
are defined as non-government-owned. However, the government might still have 
interventional influences on firm affairs, which are neglected in this dissertation. For 
the definition of political connections, there is a distinction among the connections 
with the government, with the National People’s Congress (NPC), and with the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The connections with 
different authorities might possess different objectives, bring different resources, 
or draw different influential power. However, due to limited data accessibility, the 
three types of connections are treated unitarily in this dissertation.
I differentiated between central and local levels of political embeddedness based 
on the contention that different levels of political embeddedness possess different 
objectives and thus may have different influences on corporate affairs. However, the 
data did not allow for deeper scrutiny at the local levels. Just as at the central and 
local levels, the relationships among different levels of local political embeddedness 
(i.e., provincial, municipal, county, and rural) are also principal-agents in the 
Chinese political system. Specifically, the upper level of the government functions 
as a principal in regional affairs. Meanwhile, because the administrative rights of 
the lower level of government are authorized by its upper level peer, the lower level 
of the government is more an agent of its upper level peer (Xia and Fang, 2005). 
Therefore, taking the entirety of the local levels of political embeddedness together 
limits our understanding of the full depth and breadth of the relationship between 
political embeddedness and corporate strategies.
Further limitations lie in the proxies of corporate strategies. For example, in 
Chapter 2, although I included the concepts of both accrual-based and real earnings 
management, I only considered the levels of these earnings management strategies 
and thus neglected other aspects of earnings management, such as timeliness, value 
relevance, and earnings conservatism. While Chapter 3 considers the likelihood of 
firms issuing CSR reports, the CSRP, and the CSRP-CFP relationship, it does not 
examine the relationship between political embeddedness and other aspects of 
CSR, such as the credibility of the CSRP information displayed in the CSR reports. 
In addition, one of the contributions in Chapter 3 is that this research provides 
the first evidence of both the effectiveness of government-induced CSR policies in 
China and of the potential opportunity costs that the policies imply: the tradeoff 
with financial performance. However, the opportunity cost imposed on firms due 
to an improved CSP cannot necessarily be limited to only the financial impacts on 
the firms.
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5�3 Suggestions for future research
Based on the above-mentioned limitations, several directions for future research 
can be identified. First, to provide a clearer picture of the mechanisms behind the 
effects of political embeddedness, further research is needed for a more detailed 
measurement of the degree of political influence on corporate strategies. To capture 
the degree of political embeddedness better, it would be useful to adopt continuous 
variables for proxies of government ownership and political connections. For 
example, instead of using a dummy, government ownership could be measured 
by the percentage of total shareholding by the government. In addition, from the 
perspective of corporate governance, ownership concentration, which might draw 
influence on the control power of the largest shareholder, could be considered 
in building a composite indicator of government control power, together with 
government shareholding. Future research could also differentiate government 
ownership and government involvement by considering the government’s influence 
in cases where government shareholding exists yet not the largest. 
Two improvements regarding the measure of political connections could be 
considered. As mentioned in the limitations, the types of political connections (i.e., 
connections with the government, the NPC, or the CPPCC) should be differentiated. 
In addition, the degree of political connections could be measured by the length of 
period that a politically connected manager has served in the political system, or 
by the managerial ranks in the company, as these factors might influence the power 
of the manager. The possible relationships or the affinity between the corporate 
managers and their networks in the political system might also be considered.
Drawing on the special institutional background and the political system of 
China, studies about political embeddedness in the Chinese setting should make a 
more detailed classification of the levels of political embeddedness. For instance, it 
might be interesting to investigate how the influences from the provincial, municipal, 
county, and rural levels of political embeddedness differ from each other and/or 
from the involvement by the central level. Overall, a more fine-tuned measurement 
of political embeddedness is required for a deeper understanding of the influence 
of political embeddedness on corporate strategies in China.
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Table A�1: Effects of political embeddedness on earnings management substitution (with 
interaction between GOV and PC)
RM_CD/AM RM_PD/AM RM_CPD/AM
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
GOV 0.532* 0.949** 0.742**
(1.80) (2.11) (2.24)
PC 0.593* 1.114** 0.758**
(1.94) (2.40) (2.21)
GOV*PC -0.100 -0.146 -0.116
(-0.27) (-0.26) (-0.28)
SIZE -0.265*** -0.453*** -0.318***
(-3.86) (-4.34) (-4.12)
LEV 2.464*** 3.792*** 3.165***
(5.51) (5.58) (6.31)
LIQ 0.044 -0.005 0.054
(0.53) (-0.04) (0.59)
GO 0.020 0.042 0.074
(0.22) (0.30) (0.72)
ROE -2.373*** -3.297*** -3.369***
(-5.06) (-4.62) (-6.39)
AGE -0.017 -0.040 -0.020
(-0.79) (-1.22) (-0.81)
PUNISH -0.075 -0.069 -0.068
(-0.26) (-0.16) (-0.21)
MTB -0.074*** -0.118*** -0.096***
(-4.03) (-4.25) (-4.66)
FCF -1.124 -1.897 -1.475*
(-1.47) (-1.63) (-1.72)
INDDR 2.117 2.771 2.180
(1.33) (1.15) (1.22)
CON 1.449** 2.702** 1.425*
(2.09) (2.56) (1.83)
Industry dummies Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y
Random province effects Y Y Y
Random firm effects Y Y Y
Intercept -0.231 0.053 -0.378
(-0.24) (0.04) (-0.36)
N 5251 5251 5251
Wald chi2 139.740 149.460 186.266
Notes: This table adds to Table 2.5 by including the interaction between government ownership and political 
connections. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively (two-tailed), z-values 
are below the regression coefficients in parentheses. Individual coefficients of the industry dummies, year dummies, 
and random province and firm effects are not reported for parsimony. See Table 2.2 for variable definitions.
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Table A�2: Effects of political embeddedness on earnings management substitution dummies 
(with interaction between GOV and PC)
AMLOWRMHIGH AMHIGHRMLOW AMHIGHRMHIGH AMLOWRMLOW
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
GOV 0.283** -0.399*** 0.069 0.151
(2.31) (-3.39) (0.56) (1.26)
PC 0.126 -0.265** 0.322*** -0.129
(0.99) (-2.23) (2.60) (-1.05)
GOV*PC -0.129 0.291** 0.043 -0.253*
(-0.87) (2.01) (0.29) (-1.72)
SIZE -0.053** 0.128*** -0.285*** 0.282***
(-1.97) (4.48) (-10.27) (9.30)
LEV 0.560*** -0.706*** 0.638*** -1.793***
(3.27) (-3.46) (3.68) (-7.87)
LIQ 0.013 -0.064* -0.000 -0.031
(0.40) (-1.88) (-0.01) (-0.92)
GO -0.011 0.028 0.047 -0.164***
(-0.29) (0.83) (1.31) (-3.67)
ROE -0.950*** 2.065*** -1.900*** 2.606***
(-5.08) (8.83) (-9.90) (9.17)
AGE -0.010 0.017* 0.006 -0.006
(-1.14) (1.93) (0.64) (-0.69)
PUNISH 0.051 0.199* -0.093 -0.165
(0.43) (1.75) (-0.81) (-1.31)
MTB -0.061*** 0.062*** -0.021*** 0.015
(-6.88) (8.00) (-2.92) (1.44)
FCF -0.604** -0.524* 0.765** 0.306
(-2.03) (-1.70) (2.52) (0.92)
INDDR 2.205*** -0.514 -0.028 -2.153***
(3.62) (-0.80) (-0.04) (-3.26)
CON 0.993*** -0.467* -0.120 -0.652**
(3.64) (-1.66) (-0.42) (-2.31)
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
Random province effects Y Y Y Y
Random firm effects Y Y Y Y
Intercept -1.663*** -1.786*** 0.376 -1.489***
(-4.24) (-4.46) (0.94) (-3.64)
N 5271 5271 5271 5271
Wald chi2 292.179 336.557 408.597 430.162
Notes: This table adds to Table 2.6 by including the interaction between government ownership and political 
connections. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively (two-tailed), z-values 
are below the regression coefficients in parentheses. Individual coefficients of the industry dummies, year dummies, 
and random province and firm effects are not reported for parsimony. See Table 2.2 for variable definitions.
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Table A�3: Effects of political embeddedness on earnings management substitution dummies 
(built with RM_CD)
AMLOWRMHIGH AMHIGHRMLOW AMHIGHRMHIGH AMLOWRMLOW
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
GOV 0.159** -0.181** 0.053 0.028
(2.03) (-2.36) (0.69) (0.35)
PC 0.055 -0.076 0.344*** -0.314***
(0.74) (-1.01) (4.45) (-4.17)
SIZE -0.046* 0.122*** -0.288*** 0.273***
(-1.71) (4.35) (-10.44) (9.10)
LEV 0.456*** -0.449** 0.516*** -1.598***
(2.68) (-2.29) (3.02) (-7.13)
LIQ 0.008 -0.027 -0.028 -0.018
(0.24) (-0.80) (-0.84) (-0.55)
GO -0.014 0.075** -0.002 -0.153***
(-0.36) (2.29) (-0.06) (-3.43)
ROE -0.793*** 1.538*** -1.580*** 2.251***
(-4.28) (7.01) (-8.59) (8.21)
AGE -0.015* 0.017* 0.005 -0.002
(-1.68) (1.95) (0.58) (-0.27)
PUNISH -0.001 0.256** -0.153 -0.110
(-0.01) (2.29) (-1.32) (-0.88)
MTB -0.059*** 0.053*** -0.014** 0.014
(-6.70) (7.08) (-2.08) (1.44)
FCF -0.552* -0.215 0.498* 0.242
(-1.86) (-0.70) (1.66) (0.74)
INDDR 2.223*** -0.316 -0.226 -2.182***
(3.67) (-0.50) (-0.35) (-3.31)
CON 1.013*** -0.385 -0.173 -0.701**
(3.76) (-1.38) (-0.60) (-2.47)
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
Random province effects Y Y Y Y
Random firm effects Y Y Y Y
Intercept -1.531*** -1.996*** 0.506 -1.459***
(-3.96) (-5.08) (1.27) (-3.61)
N 5271 5271 5271 5271
Wald chi2 269.208 262.989 365.157 367.142
Notes: This table adds to Table 2.6 by constructing the value of dependent variables with RM_CD. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively (two-tailed), z-values are below the regression 
coefficients in parentheses. Individual coefficients of the industry dummies, year dummies, and random province 
and firm effects are not reported for parsimony. See Table 2.2 for variable definitions.
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Table A�4: Effects of political embeddedness on earnings management substitution dummies 
(built with RM_PD)
AMLOWRMHIGH AMHIGHRMLOW AMHIGHRMHIGH AMLOWRMLOW
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
GOV 0.168** -0.147* 0.025 0.019
(2.16) (-1.92) (0.32) (0.24)
PC 0.056 -0.079 0.354*** -0.318***
(0.75) (-1.05) (4.54) (-4.20)
SIZE -0.066** 0.121*** -0.283*** 0.304***
(-2.45) (4.26) (-10.23) (9.96)
LEV 0.536*** -0.791*** 0.769*** -1.739***
(3.17) (-3.89) (4.46) (-7.56)
LIQ 0.014 -0.069** 0.007 -0.029
(0.44) (-2.04) (0.21) (-0.85)
GO -0.024 0.029 0.051 -0.138***
(-0.62) (0.87) (1.45) (-3.08)
ROE -0.573*** 1.680*** -1.647*** 1.873***
(-3.13) (7.45) (-8.86) (6.90)
AGE -0.017* 0.026*** -0.004 0.001
(-1.95) (2.91) (-0.45) (0.08)
PUNISH -0.025 0.259** -0.160 -0.083
(-0.21) (2.33) (-1.37) (-0.67)
MTB -0.055*** 0.053*** -0.013* 0.014
(-6.34) (6.96) (-1.87) (1.39)
FCF -0.562* -0.442 0.690** 0.288
(-1.90) (-1.44) (2.29) (0.87)
INDDR 1.678*** -0.684 0.143 -1.637**
(2.76) (-1.07) (0.22) (-2.50)
CON 1.107*** -0.600** 0.073 -0.801***
(4.12) (-2.14) (0.25) (-2.80)
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
Random province effects Y Y Y Y
Random firm effects Y Y Y Y
Intercept -1.283*** -1.687*** 0.189 -1.768***
(-3.33) (-4.29) (0.47) (-4.36)
N 5271 5271 5271 5271
Wald chi2 260.395 285.609 380.758 380.204
Notes: This table adds to Table 2.6 by constructing the value of dependent variables with RM_PD. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively (two-tailed), z-values are below the regression 
coefficients in parentheses. Individual coefficients of the industry dummies, year dummies, and random province 
and firm effects are not reported for parsimony. See Table 2.2 for variable definitions.
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Table B�1: Effects of political embeddedness on CSR reporting and CSRP (with interaction 
between GOV and PC)
CSR RKS ESG
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
GOV 0.843*** 1.494* 0.489
(6.50) (1.91) (1.62)
PC 0.696*** 2.109*** 0.592**
(6.11) (3.00) (2.17)
GOV*PC -0.263* 0.432 0.126
(-1.71) (0.45) (0.34)
SIZE 0.177*** 0.355 -0.092
(4.29) (1.27) (-0.87)
AGE 0.034*** -0.305*** -0.033*
(3.96) (-6.67) (-1.83)
ROA 5.746*** 16.709*** 7.078***
(9.28) (2.97) (3.34)
LEV 0.867*** 11.511*** 4.180***
(4.26) (7.83) (7.37)
GROWTH -0.120*** -0.642 0.280
(-3.00) (-0.95) (1.08)
FCF 0.698*** -2.301 -0.237
(3.51) (-0.89) (-0.24)
INDEPENDENCE 0.879 5.932 0.181
(1.33) (1.46) (0.12)
VISIBILITY -0.199*** -0.688 -0.128
(-3.69) (-1.35) (-0.57)
CROSSLISTING 0.830*** 7.655*** 3.628***
(5.34) (10.77) (9.51)
Industry dummies Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y
Random province effects Y Y Y
Random firm effects Y Y Y
Intercept -4.520*** 21.427*** 15.090***
(-5.75) (4.27) (7.80)
N 15307 1862 2804
Wald chi2 735.120 721.985 550.384
Notes: Model 1 of this table adds to Table 3.5 by including the interaction between government ownership and political 
connections. Models 2-3 of this table add to Table 3.6 by including the interaction between government ownership and 
political connections. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively (two-tailed), 
z-values are below the regression coefficients in parentheses. Individual coefficients of the industry dummies, year 
dummies, and random province and firm effects are not reported for parsimony. See Table 3.2 for variable definitions.
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Table B�2: Effects of political embeddedness on the CSRP-CFP trade-off (with interaction 
between GOV and PC)
Dependent: CSRPHigh & CFPLow CSRPLow & CFPHigh
RKShigh
TQlow
RKShigh
PBlow
ESGhigh
TQlow
ESGhigh
PBlow
RKSlow
TQhigh
RKSlow
PBhigh
ESGlow
TQhigh
ESGlow
PBhigh
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
GOV 0.137 0.307 0.194 0.244 -0.438** -0.480** -0.078 -0.220
(0.47) (1.05) (0.77) (1.03) (-2.01) (-2.28) (-0.40) (-1.13)
PC 0.307 0.358 0.332 0.070 -0.130 -0.014 -0.198 -0.159
(1.10) (1.34) (1.33) (0.32) (-0.69) (-0.08) (-1.12) (-0.90)
GOV*PC 0.548 0.249 0.075 0.207 -0.425 -0.332 -0.451* -0.231
(1.61) (0.75) (0.26) (0.77) (-1.56) (-1.23) (-1.73) (-0.91)
SIZE 0.255*** 0.323*** 0.282*** 0.319*** -0.232*** -0.264*** -0.165** -0.232***
(2.73) (3.36) (3.21) (3.92) (-2.69) (-3.10) (-2.23) (-3.12)
AGE 0.030* 0.018 0.016 0.012 0.051*** 0.051*** -0.007 0.005
(1.93) (1.21) (1.01) (0.80) (3.75) (3.75) (-0.54) (0.37)
ROA -4.173** -5.367*** -6.070*** -6.331*** -0.200 1.402 4.245*** 5.255***
(-2.30) (-3.31) (-3.44) (-4.07) (-0.11) (0.80) (2.79) (3.44)
LEV 3.994*** 1.137** 4.284*** 1.205*** -4.946*** -1.856*** -4.626*** -1.394***
(7.12) (2.33) (7.78) (2.80) (-10.84) (-4.05) (-10.68) (-3.22)
GROWTH 0.032 -0.328* -0.138 -0.422*** 0.321* 0.394** 0.067 0.064
(0.17) (-1.66) (-1.00) (-2.98) (1.80) (2.37) (0.47) (0.47)
FCF 1.259* 0.990 -0.039 0.288 1.275* 1.023 -0.907* -0.674
(1.77) (1.61) (-0.07) (0.57) (1.83) (1.52) (-1.68) (-1.39)
INDEPENDENCE 0.204 0.364 1.037 0.556 1.546 0.764 1.548 0.969
(0.15) (0.28) (0.72) (0.39) (1.22) (0.62) (1.47) (0.95)
VISIBILITY -0.072 -0.089 -0.209* -0.268* 0.165 0.167 -0.116 -0.060
(-0.53) (-0.56) (-1.67) (-1.96) (1.34) (1.44) (-0.77) (-0.47)
CROSSLISTING 0.748*** 0.801*** -0.529* -0.588** -0.445 -0.590* -1.366*** -2.029***
(3.16) (3.53) (-1.86) (-2.15) (-1.39) (-1.88) (-4.13) (-5.28)
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Random province 
effects
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Random firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Constant -9.549*** -8.290*** -9.803*** -7.667*** 5.865*** 4.159*** 5.295*** 3.914***
(-5.01) (-4.40) (-5.80) (-4.98) (3.67) (2.60) (3.88) (2.87)
N 3236 3246 3390 3386 3260 3250 3382 3433
Wald chi2 334.093 340.971 229.432 167.676 404.281 254.175 335.294 184.233
Notes: This table adds to Panel A of Table 3.7 by including the interaction between government ownership and 
political connections. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively (two-tailed), 
z-values are below the regression coefficients in parentheses. Individual coefficients of the industry dummies, year 
dummies, and random province and firm effects are not reported for parsimony. See Table 3.2 for variable definitions.
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Table C�1: Effects of political embeddedness on internationalization and M&A success (with 
interaction between GOV and PC) 
(Dependent: 1: crossborder; 2: volcrossborder; 3/4: car; 5: mtb; 6: risk)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
L_gov -0.233 -0.045 -0.014** -0.015 -0.180** -0.001
(-0.56) (-0.78) (-2.29) (-1.44) (-2.08) (-0.03)
L_pc -0.076 -0.018 -0.005 -0.006 -0.042 0.004
(-0.34) (-0.54) (-1.22) (-0.90) (-0.80) (0.39)
L_igovpc -0.231 -0.010 0.012* 0.010 0.017 0.018
(-0.54) (-0.17) (1.82) (0.87) (0.20) (0.98)
L_size 0.475*** 0.062*** -0.014*** -0.021*** -0.806*** -0.000
(5.01) (4.60) (-8.99) (-8.52) (-35.66) (-0.09)
L_lev -1.254** -0.124* 0.025*** 0.036*** -0.671*** -0.003
(-2.47) (-1.82) (3.24) (2.78) (-6.22) (-0.14)
L_roa 2.513 0.183 -0.168*** -0.204*** 3.561*** -0.085
(1.19) (0.67) (-5.40) (-3.82) (8.98) (-0.99)
L_fcfrate 0.199 -0.007 -0.003 -0.011 0.013 0.014
(0.24) (-0.07) (-0.23) (-0.52) (0.09) (0.38)
L_growth 0.182 -0.017 0.005 0.004 0.180*** 0.038**
(0.55) (-0.38) (1.01) (0.44) (2.87) (2.53)
L_age -0.011 0.001 0.001** 0.001 0.003 0.001
(-0.62) (0.44) (2.26) (1.06) (0.51) (0.92)
L_mgtshare -0.473 -0.067 0.003 0.010 -0.247* 0.032
(-0.83) (-0.78) (0.34) (0.61) (-1.72) (1.23)
L_hhi10 0.052 0.113 0.024** 0.037** 0.560*** 0.001
(0.08) (1.15) (2.23) (2.18) (3.46) (0.02)
L_independent -2.546 -0.446** 0.017 0.013 0.934*** -0.056
(-1.64) (-2.13) (0.72) (0.34) (2.96) (-0.86)
L_board -0.009 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.016 0.000
(-0.18) (0.15) (0.24) (-0.45) (1.47) (0.22)
L_duality 0.181 0.015 -0.002 -0.003 0.075* -0.005
(1.02) (0.56) (-0.54) (-0.66) (1.84) (-0.62)
L_intershare 0.376 0.145** -0.004 0.002 0.261** -0.009
(1.22) (2.46) (-0.65) (0.24) (2.38) (-0.56)
completion 0.020*** 0.034*** 0.020 0.002
(8.82) (8.78) (0.76) (0.31)
attitude 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.002
(0.63) (0.45) (-0.01) (0.16)
divestiture 0.004* 0.008* -0.005 -0.001
(1.81) (1.87) (-0.18) (-0.22)
cashmerger -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.074** 0.005
(-4.72) (-3.62) (-2.43) (0.60)
tglist 0.025*** 0.042*** 0.095 0.025
(3.42) (3.23) (1.12) (1.16)
horizontal -0.003 -0.002 -0.061* 0.000
(-1.07) (-0.48) (-1.85) (0.02)
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Random province 
effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Random firm 
effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Intercept -10.578*** -0.488 0.215*** 0.369*** 17.901*** 0.955***
(-4.73) (-1.38) (5.48) (5.71) (30.67) (3.80)
N 5482 5576 4883 4883 5347 5277
Wald chi2 81.946 106.767 616.657 5418.662 18019.520
Notes: Models 1-6 add to Model A (Table 4.5), Model C (Table 4.5), Model E (Table 4.6), Model G (Table 4.6), Model I 
(Table 4.7), and Model K (Table 4.7) respectively by including the interaction between government ownership and 
political connections. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively (two-
tailed), z-values (for random effect models and logistic models) and t-values (for quantile regressions) are below the 
regression coefficients in parentheses. Individual coefficients of the industry dummies, year dummies, and random 
province and firm effects are not reported for parsimony. See Table 4.1 for variable definitions.
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Summary
This dissertation aims to investigate how political embeddedness influences firms’ 
strategies such as financial and non-financial reporting and internationalization. 
I have identified whether and how political embeddedness (i.e., government 
ownership and political connections, both at the central and the local level) affects 
corporate reporting strategies, particularly in light of the recent policy changes 
regarding the financial and non-financial reporting of firms in China. In addition, 
considering the recent government programs that were introduced to facilitate 
Chinese IFDI and OFDI, I have investigated the effect of political embeddedness 
on Chinese firms’ internationalization strategies as well. Specifically, Chapters 
2-4 examine the influence of political embeddedness on firms’ use of earnings 
management, CSR reporting, and the propensity to internationalize, respectively.
Chapter 2 examines whether and how different types and levels of political 
embeddedness influence the quality of financial reporting in China. This was 
accomplished by investigating how central and local levels of government ownership 
and political connections influence the choices of the earnings management 
strategies of the listed Chinese firms. Using a panel data set of 5,531 publicly traded 
firms in China, for the years 2009–2013, the results of Chapter 2 demonstrate that 
government-owned firms, and central government-owned firms in particular, are 
more likely to substitute accrual-based earnings management with costlier, albeit 
less detectable, real earnings management strategies than non-government-owned 
firms. The results of this chapter additionally indicate that, compared to firms 
without political connections, firms with political connections are more likely to 
resort to less detectable real earnings management strategies. Although to a lesser 
extent, these firms are also more likely to increase the use of accrual-based earnings 
management, indicating a relative substitution effect. The results indicate that, 
by affecting the trade-off between accrual-based and real earnings management 
strategies disparately, different types and levels of political embeddedness influence 
firms’ choices of earnings management strategies, and thus the earnings quality. 
By examining whether and how political embeddedness influences the diffusion 
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of corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices in China, Chapter 3 reveals the 
relationship between political embeddedness and the quality of corporate non-
financial information. Specifically, this chapter investigates how government 
ownership and political connections influence the listed Chinese firms’ likelihood of 
issuing CSR reports. It also examines the underlying CSR performance (CSRP) and 
its relationship with the firms’ financial performance (CFP). Using the panel data 
of 15,419 publicly traded firm-year observations in China for the years 2008–2014, 
the results of this chapter demonstrate that politically embedded firms, particularly 
firms that are centrally politically embedded, are more likely to issue CSR reports 
than firms without political embeddedness. The results of this chapter additionally 
indicate that politically embedded firms, on average, have a higher CSRP than non-
politically embedded firms. In addition, the results indicate that, for politically 
embedded firms, CSRP is more negatively related with financial performance than 
for firms without political embeddedness. This indicates that political embeddedness 
also affects the trade-off between CFP and CSRP. This chapter thus provides the first 
evidence not only on the effectiveness of government-induced CSR policies, but also 
on their efficiency (i.e., the potential opportunity costs that they imply). The results 
also demonstrate that different types and levels of political embeddedness play 
significant, albeit different, roles in explaining the CSR-related practices of firms. 
Cross-border M&As are a dominant form of FDI and linked closely to 
internationalization strategies. Since cross-border M&As are government-supported 
investment activities, it is important to identify the roles that political embeddedness 
play in influencing firms’ internationalization strategies with regard to the 
government’s relevant policy changes. Chapter 4 is dedicated to responding to this 
call and investigating whether and how political embeddedness influences firms’ 
propensity for conducting cross-border M&As and their success in China. I contend 
that institutional constraints, and consequential resource allocation and industry 
traits influence both politically embedded enterprises and firms without political 
embeddedness. Therefore, building on prior theories over international business, I 
developed a theoretical Chinese specific “strategy tripod” framework centered on 
an institution-based perspective and incorporating resource- and industry-based 
views. Using a panel data set with 30,314 firm-year observations of publicly traded 
firms in China from 2000 to 2015, the results demonstrate that state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) conduct fewer cross-border M&As than non-SOEs. Compared with non-
SOEs, SOEs benefit less from M&A activities. The level of government ownership 
matters, in that central SOEs conduct more cross-border M&As and benefit more 
from M&A activities than local SOEs. The results additionally indicate that political 
connections do not play a significant role in explaining a firm’s propensity for 
conducting cross-border M&As or M&A success. The findings in Chapter 4 indicate 
that different types and levels of political embeddedness in China influence firms’ 
propensity for conducting cross-border M&As and M&A success differently.
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(Dutch summary)
In deze scriptie heb ik willen onderzoeken op welke wijze politieke inbedding 
invloed heeft op bedrijfsstrategieën zoals financiële en niet-financiële rapportages 
en internationalisering. Ik heb vastgesteld of en hoe politieke inbedding (d.w.z. 
overheidsparticipatie en politieke connecties, zowel op centraal als op lokaal niveau) 
zakelijke rapportagestrategieën beïnvloeden, vooral in het licht van recent gewijzigd 
beleid ten aanzien van de financiële en niet-financiële rapportages van bedrijven 
in China. Gezien de recente overheidsprogramma’s die zijn geïntroduceerd om 
Chinese inkomende FDI (IFDI) en uitgaande FDI (OFDI) te faciliteren, heb ik 
daarnaast ook onderzoek verricht naar het effect van politieke inbedding op de 
internationalisering van Chinese bedrijven. Vooral in hoofdstuk 2 t/m 4 wordt 
gekeken naar de invloed van politieke inbedding op het gebruik van respectievelijk 
‘earnings management’ (winststuring), CSR-rapportage en de bereidheid van 
bedrijven tot internationalisering.
Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoekt of en hoe verschillende soorten en niveaus van politieke 
inbedding invloed hebben op de kwaliteit van financiële rapportage in China. 
Hiervoor heb ik onderzocht hoe centrale en lokale niveaus van overheidsparticipatie 
en politieke connecties de keuze voor de earnings management-strategieën van de 
genoteerde Chinese bedrijven beïnvloeden. De resultaten in hoofdstuk 2 komen 
voort uit een paneldataset van 5.531 beursgenoteerde bedrijven in China over de 
jaren 2009-2013. Deze resultaten laten zien dat overheidsbedrijven, en centrale 
overheidsbedrijven in het bijzonder, sneller ‘accrual-based earnings management’ 
(winststuring door middel van de manipulatie van accruals) zullen vervangen 
door het kostbaardere, zij het minder detecteerbare, ‘real earnings management’ 
(winststuring door middel van reële transacties) dan niet-overheidsbedrijven. Uit 
dit hoofdstuk blijkt bovendien dat bedrijven met politieke connecties eerder gebruik 
zullen maken van minder detecteerbare real earnings management-strategieën 
dan bedrijven zonder politieke connecties. Hoewel in mindere mate, zullen deze 
bedrijven ook vaker gebruik maken van accrual-based earnings management, 
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hetgeen wijst op een relatief substitutie-effect. Door de wisselwerking tussen 
accrual-based en real earnings management-strategieën disparaat te beïnvloeden, 
hebben verschillende soorten en niveaus van politieke inbedding invloed op de 
keuze van bedrijven voor earnings management-strategieën, en daarmee op de 
kwaliteit van de winst. 
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt of en hoe politieke inbedding invloed heeft op de 
verspreiding van praktijken van maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen (Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility/CSR) in China en toont daarmee de relatie aan tussen 
politieke inbedding en de kwaliteit van niet-financiële bedrijfsinformatie. Specifiek 
wordt onderzocht welke rol overheidsparticipatie en politieke connecties spelen in 
de bereidheid van genoteerde Chinese bedrijven om CSR-rapporten te verstrekken. 
Ook wordt in dit hoofdstuk gekeken naar de onderliggende CSR-prestaties (CSRP) 
en hun relatie met de financiële prestaties van bedrijven (CFP). De resultaten zijn 
gebaseerd op de paneldata van 15.419 bedrijfsjaarobservaties van beursgenoteerde 
Chinese bedrijven over de jaren 2008-2014. Deze resultaten laten zien dat politiek 
ingebedde bedrijven, vooral bedrijven die centraal politiek zijn ingebed, eerder 
CSR-rapportages zullen verstrekken dan bedrijven zonder politieke inbedding. Uit 
deze resultaten blijkt bovendien dat politiek ingebedde bedrijven gemiddeld hogere 
CSRP hebben dan bedrijven die niet politiek zijn ingebed. Daarnaast geven de 
resultaten aan dat de CSRP voor politiek ingebedde bedrijven negatiever verband 
houden met de financiële prestaties dan voor bedrijven zonder politieke inbedding. 
Dit wijst erop dat politieke inbedding ook effect heeft op de wisselwerking tussen 
CFP en CSRP. Dit hoofdstuk levert daarmee niet alleen het eerste bewijs voor de 
effectiviteit van CSR-beleid door de overheid, maar ook voor de efficiency ervan 
(d.w.z. de alternatieve kosten die hiervan mogelijk het gevolg zijn). De resultaten 
laten ook zien dat verschillende soorten en niveaus van politieke inbedding een 
belangrijke, hetzij verschillende, rol spelen in de CSR-gerelateerde praktijken van 
bedrijven. 
Grensoverschrijdende fusies en overnames (mergers & acquisitions/M&A’s) 
vormen een dominante vorm van directe buitenlandse investeringen (FDI) die 
nauw verband houden met internationaliseringsstrategieën. Grensoverschrijdende 
M&A-activiteiten zijn investeringsactiviteiten met overheidssteun. Daarom is 
het belangrijk vast te stellen welke invloed politieke inbedding heeft op de inter-
nationaliseringsstrategieën van bedrijven met betrekking tot relevante wijzigingen 
van overheidsbeleid. In hoofdstuk 4 wordt een reactie op dit appel gegeven. Ook 
wordt onderzocht of en hoe politieke inbedding invloed heeft op de bereidheid van 
bedrijven om tot grensoverschrijdende fusies en overnames over te gaan en het 
succes van deze M&A’s in China. Ik beweer hierbij dat institutionele beperkingen, 
en de daaruit volgende toewijzing van middelen en industriekenmerken, invloed 
hebben op zowel politiek ingebedde ondernemingen als op bedrijven zonder 
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politieke inbedding. Voortbouwend op eerdere theorieën over het internationale 
bedrijfsleven heb ik daarom een theoretisch drieledig strategiekader ontwikkeld 
dat specifiek op China van toepassing is. In dit kader staan een institutioneel 
perspectief en zienswijzen waarin wordt uitgegaan van middelen en industrie 
centraal. Resultaten op basis van een paneldataset met 30.314 bedrijfsjaarobservaties 
van beursgenoteerde bedrijven in China over de jaren 2000-2015 laten zien dat 
staatsbedrijven (State-Owned Enterprises (SOE’s) minder vaak overgaan tot 
grensoverschrijdende fusies en overnames dan niet-staatsbedrijven. Vergeleken 
met niet-SOE’s hebben SOE’s minder profijt van M&A-activiteiten. Het niveau van 
overheidsparticipatie speelt daarbij een rol. Centrale SOE’s gaan namelijk vaker over 
tot grensoverschrijdende M&A’s en profiteren meer van M&A-activiteiten dan lokale 
SOE’s. De resultaten laten bovendien zien dat politieke connecties geen belangrijke 
rol spelen bij de bereidheid van bedrijven om grensoverschrijdende M&A’s aan te 
gaan of bij het welslagen van deze fusies en overnames. De bevindingen in hoofdstuk 
4 wijzen uit dat verschillende soorten en niveaus van politieke inbedding in China 
een verschillende invloed hebben op de bereidheid van bedrijven om over te gaan 
tot grensoverschrijdende fusies en overnames en het succes van deze M&A’s.
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